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A strong relationship between member and co-operative is vital for agricultural co-operatives. 
Yet most of the research on agricultural co-operatives is centered on non-relational aspects 
such as efficiency. Although these conventional economic centric approaches are useful in 
understanding co-operatives and evaluating its performance, they are not comprehensive 
enough.  Studies on the member - co-operative relationship which require an examination of 
co-operatives from a socio-psychological perspective are lacking. This research gap is 
addressed in this thesis via first identifying three important socio-psychological phenomena 
in agricultural co-operatives – 1. Commitment, 2. Heterogeneity and 3. Social Capital, and 
presenting a conceptual framework that links the three. Thereafter, the commitment and 
heterogeneity sub-components of the framework were further unravelled and empirically 
examined by randomly surveying 2,000 members of Fonterra Co-operative Group, of which 
568 responded.  The organisational commitment dimension of commitment is decoupled into 
three components - affective (emotive), normative (ideological) and continuance (utilitarian), 
and the commitment to collective action dimension into two components – patronage and 
governance. Fonterra had moderately high levels of affective, moderate levels of normative 
and slightly low levels of continuance commitment. The level of commitment to collective 
action was moderately high as the levels of commitment to both patronage and governance 
were moderately high. Importantly, there was a positive association between commitment to 
collective action and affective and normative commitment but not continuance commitment. 
This suggests that it is the emotive followed by ideological aspects of membership that 
influence a member’s commitment to collective action, and not the utilitarian or financial 
benefit aspects. Heterogeneity was measured and analysed using 35 heterogeneity sources 
that were categorized under three dimensions – farmer-member, farm-business and member-
interest. Fonterra had high levels of heterogeneity with most of the sources in all three 
dimensions showing high heterogeneity. Of the three dimensions, member-interest, followed 
by farm-business showed the greatest heterogeneity and sources within them were most likely 
to result in difference in affective commitment, normative commitment, continuance 
commitment, commitment to collective action as well as commitment to governance and 
patronage.  In contrast, most of the sources within the farmer-member dimension were not 
associated with either organisational commitment or commitment to collective action.   




There are over 3 million co-operatives in the world currently, serving the needs of over a 
billion members and providing employment to about 280 million people. The combined 
revenues of the top 300 co-operatives alone amounted to 2.1 trillion US$ in 2019. Although 
co-operatives exist in a wide range of sectors, it is in the agricultural sector that they have the 
most comprehensive and significant presence. 97 of the top 300 co-operatives in the world 
belong to the agri-food sector. In the United States, there were approximately 1,953 
agricultural co-operatives and their average total assets and equity were US$ 47.1 million and 
US$ 20.9 million respectively in 2016. In the EU there are about 51,392 agricultural co-
operatives and their combined annual turnover was US$ 475 billion in 2016. Particularly in 
the dairy industry, farmer-owned co-operatives play a rather dominant role with market 
shares above 80% in milk collection in the USA, Western Europe, Australia and New 
Zealand. Moreover, four (Fonterra, FrieslandCampina, Dairy Farmers of America and Arla 
Foods) of the top 10 dairy companies in the world by revenue are co-operatives.  
Co-operatives play a significant role in New Zealand’s (NZ) economy contributing to about 
17% of NZ’s GDP.  Within NZ’s co-operative landscape, agricultural co-operatives play a 
dominant part. Of the top 30 co-operatives in NZ, agri-food co-operatives account for 65% of 
revenues, 68% of assets and 83% of employees. Amongst agricultural co-operatives, dairy 
co-operatives are the most important. The four major dairy co-operatives in NZ had 
combined total revenues of over NZ$ 21 billion for the 2017/18 financial year. This 
approximates to a contribution of about 7.5% of NZ’s GDP. However, the largest dairy co-
operative, Fonterra Co-operative Group (Fonterra) alone had revenues of NZ$ 20.4 billion. 
Clearly indicating the role and significance of Fonterra to both the co-operative landscape 
and the NZ economy. 
As an organisational form, co-operatives are unique member-oriented organizations that are 
purposefully organized to serve member needs and are focused on generating member 
benefits rather than return to investors.  In return, members have a responsibility to provide 
equity capital and govern the business. This ensures that members have ultimate ownership 
and control of the organisation. This strong member-orientation of co-operatives is its biggest 
differentiator from the more common investor owned firm. The member – co-operative 
relationship therefore becomes central to the existence of the co-operative and forms the 
foundation upon which the co-operative stands. Despite the member-co-operative relationship 
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being vital, most of the research work on co-operatives tends to focus on the non-relational 
aspects and traditionally the performance of co-operatives has been examined primarily from 
a economic or financial perspective.  
Although the non-relational aspects are useful in detailing the economic characteristics of the 
co-operatives and explaining the reasons for the formation, existence and behaviour, they are 
predominantly theoretical and therefore not empirically useful in evaluating the performance 
of co-operatives. Hence, they do not provide a comprehensive enough assessment and 
understanding of co-operatives. Moreover, with the evolving nature of the co-operative 
organisational form, a rethink on how co-operatives are traditionally examined, evaluated and 
interpreted is required.  
In order to present a holistic evaluation of co-operative performance that complements the 
traditional approaches an examination of the member-co-operative relational aspects, 
specifically from a socio-psychological perspective, is required. To address this gap, the 
central premise of this thesis lay in identifying, describing and analysing the key socio-
psychological phenomena that could potentially influence the member – co-operative 
relationship. This was achieved through four research papers. In each paper, a novel 
conceptual framework was developed and presented. In papers two, three and four an 
empirical test of the frameworks was also performed by surveying member-farmers of 
Fonterra. As a result, these frameworks also serve as a reference and coordination mechanism 
for efficient theory testing and are a vital step towards applying frameworks to the task of 
linking co-operative theory and structure to its performance.  
This study identified three important socio-psychological phenomena that influence the 
member-co-operative relationship. These were – 1) Commitment, 2) Heterogeneity and 3) 
Social Capital. A conceptual framework that encapsulates these three phenomena and 
explains the relationship and interactions between them was developed and described. 
Existent literature on co-operatives suggests that social capital forms the foundation upon 
which a co-operative is built while commitment is the crucial element that holds the co-
operative together. Literature indicates that there is a positive link between social capital and 
commitment, with an erosion in social capital likely to result in a weakening in commitment. 
Heterogeneity is a result of differences that arise between members and is usually the 
consequence of the co-operative growing in size and complexity. Literature suggest that there 
is a negative link between heterogeneity and both commitment and social capital. As co-
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operatives are structured around collective decision making, an increase in heterogeneity 
could lead to a weakening of member commitment and erosion of social capital.  
As all three phenomena are quite complex, their examination required un-ravelling each of 
them into probable dimensions that comprise them. In this thesis, member commitment was 
decomposed into two dimensions (organisational commitment and commitment to collective 
action), member heterogeneity into three dimensions (farmer-member, farm-business and 
member-interest) and social capital into six dimensions (groups & networks, trust & 
solidarity, collective action & co-operation, information & communication, social cohesion & 
inclusion, and empowerment & political action). Thereafter, the commitment and 
heterogeneity sub-components of the framework were further unraveled, and empirical 
studies of them were performed by randomly surveying 2000 members of Fonterra of which 
568 members responded. Each empirical study was driven by a novel conceptual framework 
that was grounded in co-operative theory and literature. Although an instrument for 
measuring social capital was developed, its empirical assessment was excluded from the 
scope of this thesis. It is strongly recommended that future studies focus on the measurement 
and analysis of social capital. 
The study on member commitment required the de-coupling of the two dimensions into its 
constituent components. Organisational commitment (which refers to the psychological state 
that characterizes the members’ relationship with the co-operative and has implications on the 
decision to continue or discontinue membership in the co-operative) was decoupled into three 
components – 1. Affective (AC), 2. Normative (NC) and 3. Continuance (CC). Affective 
commitment is emotive in nature and relates to members’ want or desire to be a part of the 
co-operative. Normative commitment is ideological in nature and relates to members’ sense 
of obligation to be a part of the co-operative. Continuance commitment is utilitarian in nature 
and relates to members’ need to be a part of the co-operative. Similarly, commitment to 
collective action, which refers to the initiatives taken by a group to realize their common 
interests and involves a willingness to make an effort towards the organization’s success, was 
broken down into two components – 1. Commitment to Patronage (CP) and 2. Commitment 
to Governance (CG). As the name suggests commitment to patronage deals with the 
patronage aspects (as suppliers or buyers of product and providers of capital) and 
commitment to governance deals with governance aspects (monitoring management and 
participating in decision making). Fonterra had moderately high levels of affective 
commitment, moderate levels of normative commitment and slightly low levels of 
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continuance commitment. Importantly, 19% of respondents had high levels of all three 
components. However, since 10.9% of respondents had low AC, CC and NC it indicates that 
some degree of organisational commitment risk exists. The co-operative had moderately high 
levels of commitment to collective action in both CG and CP; with members more committed 
towards governance of the co-operative than towards patronage of the co-operative.  More 
importantly it was found that CCA was positively influenced by members’ emotional 
attachment to the co-operative (AC) and members’ sense of obligation to the co-operative 
(NC). The economic or financial reasons, leading to an individual needing to be a member of 
the co-operative (CC), were not related to CCA. For Fonterra, recognising and strengthening 
affective and normative commitment is quite likely to result in members sacrificing short 
term economic gains in favour of long-term performance of the co-operative.  While 
improving the utilitarian aspects of member commitment (CC) will have no influence or 
effect on a member’s commitment to collective action. 
Like in the case with member commitment, the three dimensions of member heterogeneity 
were disentangled into specific heterogeneity sources that comprise them. In total 35 sources 
of heterogeneity were identified. The farmer-member dimension, which is based on 
differences between members in personal characteristics, was comprised of 9 sources. The 
farm-business dimension, which includes physical, financial and product quality related 
properties, was made up of 14 sources. The member-interest dimension, which relates to the 
differences between members that arises due to their diverging interests, was comprised of 12 
sources. A novel measure and explanation of these 35 sources was presented using the Gini-
Simpson Index. Based on this measure considerable heterogeneity was found to exist in 
Fonterra with most sources in all three dimensions showing high levels of heterogeneity. As 
Fonterra is a large and fairly complex co-operative with a foundation built on several mergers 
of co-operatives over many decades, a high level of heterogeneity was expected. The farm-
business dimensions showed the greatest homogeneity of the three dimensions and suggests 
that the membership base tends to be more uniform with respect to farm business related 
properties, which is not surprising as they are all dairy farms. The co-operative was most 
diverse when it comes to its member-interests.  
Importantly, the findings tend to indicate that higher heterogeneity does not lead to lower 
commitment. It is possible that the challenges presented by heterogeneity in this co-operative 
are mitigated by having well designed structures in place. Interestingly, of the three 
dimensions it is the differences in members’ interests followed by differences in farm-
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business that were most likely to result in differences in AC, NC, CC, CCA as well as CG 
and CP.  These findings on member heterogeneity have important implications for the 
development and delivery of co-operative communication and member engagement strategies 
that are focused on strengthening member commitment. For example, member commitment 
can be strengthened by segmenting members based on those heterogeneity sources that were 
associated with one or more components of organisational commitment and/or commitment 
to collective action; and developing segment specific engagement strategies thereafter. 
Fonterra is a fairly successful dairy co-operative and business. An important driver of this 
success is the strong member and co-operative relationship that exists. Fonterra’s 
organisational structure that comprises a unique share-holders council has been key to 
building and nurturing this relationship. The importance of a strong and healthy relationship 
between a member and the co-operative cannot be over emphasised, and member 
commitment is a core phenomenon that reflects this relationship.  A weakening of member 
commitment is indicative of a failing relationship between the member and co-operative and 
could lead to issues such as – members exiting the co-operative and therefore resulting in 
inefficient asset utilization, members behaving opportunistically and leading to increased 
monitoring costs for the co-operative etc. Co-operative leadership and management should 
therefore prioritize the inclusion of AC, CC, NC and CCA as a core performance metric. A 
regular measurement and analysis of these would indicate to what extent the strategy pursued 
by the co-operative are impacting these critical member commitment indicators over time and 
how effective the member engagement and communication protocols are. 
Lastly, a vital observation and finding of this thesis is that it is the emotive reasons for 
membership (AC) that forms the glue that holds the co-operative together. Hence, the greater 
a member’s want or desire to be a member of the co-operative, the stronger will be the co-
operative. It is imperative that the co-operative regularly monitor AC and constantly strive to 
further strengthen it. For any erosion or decrease in AC could have significant negative 
implications on co-operative performance and could also perhaps lead to its demise. Apart 
from developing specific protocols for strengthening a member’s AC, the co-operative should 
also acknowledge and appreciate members that have a high AC. Moreover, steps should also 
be taken to identify the reasons for the stronger utilitarian basis for membership of the 
smaller farm- businesses, as it is the smaller farm-businesses, both in terms of physical and 
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1.1. What are Co-operatives? 
A remark made by the renowned co-operative scholar Emilianoff (1942) nearly 75 years ago 
that…”the diversity of co-operatives is kaleidoscopic and their variability is literally 
infinite”, could be argued still holds good today. This is primarily because, over the course of 
time the co-operative model has been modified and applied to numerous and a wide range of 
businesses, causing it to evolve in a variety of ways (Zeuli and Cropp 2004). The most widely 
accepted definition of a co-operative is the one provided by the International Co-operative 
Alliance (ICA), a non-governmental organization that represents 700 million individuals 
through its 309-member organizations from over 100 countries. The ICA defines a co-
operative as “an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common 
economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through jointly owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise” (International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) 2018). This 
is a very broad definition covering off both functional and political elements of a co-operative 
(Evans and Meade 2006). More importantly it stresses on one of the most interesting and at 
the same time most challenging attributes of the co-operative: its double nature; that is a co-
operative is both an association (i.e., society) of members and an enterprise (the co-operative 
firm) in which economic activities are conducted (Bijman 2016). 
The greatest rival or possibly the closest relative of the co-operative business model would be 
the far more common model of investor-owned firms (IOFs). In fact it has been suggested 
that the co-operative form of organization is no different from the more common investor 
owned firms when it comes to a wide range of factors (Hansmann 1996, Zeuli and Cropp 
2004). For example, both types of organizations participate in the same labor market, pay 
similar wages, management compensation and interest rates; and most operational practices 
such as packaging, storing, transporting, processing, and advertising are also very similar 
across both business forms (Zeuli and Cropp 2004).  
However, there are a few significant differences between co-operatives and IOF’s. It is 
therefore prudent to identify these few critical differences between the two at the very outset 
and possibly derive a definition based on the difference that exists. The first key difference is 
centered on the profit maximization motive of firms. While profit maximization is the 
primary objective of IOF’s, whereas in the case of co-operatives, the primary objective is to 
maximize the benefits generated for their members (Hardesty and Salgia 2004). Secondly, 
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profit reimbursement (either through the dividend payout or rebate) is shared only amongst 
members of the co-operative, rather than shareholders as in an investor owned firm. This 
strong member orientation and focus of co-operatives as opposed to investor orientation of 
IOF’s is the most important differentiating feature between the two.  As a result, the core 
operating philosophies of the two organizational forms are very different. 
Since co-operatives are purposefully organized to serve member needs and are focused on 
generating member benefits rather than return to investors, members have a responsibility to 
provide equity capital and govern the business (Coltrain, Barton et al. 2000). This ensures 
that that members (and not investors) have ultimate ownership and control (Hardesty and 
Salgia 2004). Therefore a co-operative can be viewed as a business that is owned and 
controlled by the people (Patrons1) who use its services and whose benefits (services received 
and earnings allocations) are shared by the users (typically on the basis of use) (Staatz 1987). 
According to Staaz (1987), only an enterprise conforming to the spirit and intent of this 
definition should be labeled a co-operative (Staatz 1987). In other words, a co-operative can 
be defined as a user-owned, user-controlled organization whose primary purpose is to 
maximize benefits for its users. This is the definition set by the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) and it illustrates the fundamental attributes of a co-operative, i.e. those 
who use the co-op (members) - 1) help finance the co-op, and therefore own it; 2) help 
govern the business directly by voting on significant long term decisions and indirectly 
through their representatives on the board of directors, and therefore control it; and 3) derive 
benefits on the basis of use (patronage) (Zeuli and Cropp 2004). 
It is important to note that like an IOF, a co-operative too must be focused on profitability 
and growth. Co-operatives are businesses and, in the years, ahead they must focus on solving 
business problems and providing value to their members. If it cannot survive as a business, 
other considerations become irrelevant, and members will stop patronizing them and they 
will just fade away. Moreover, co-operative principles provide an additional framework 
through which options for business strategies, organizational structures, and operations must 
be analyzed (Dunn, Crooks et al. 2002). Due to this framework, when it comes to making a 
decision the co-operative must also ask, how will this decision affect the members' ownership 
interests? What influence will it exert on members' ability to control their co-operative? How 
will it affect the distribution of benefits arising from the co-operative? And, most critically, if 
 
1 Patrons can be defined as those individuals or other firms who transact with the firm as – 1) purchaser of the 
firms products or 2) seller to the firm of - supplies, labour or other factors of production. 
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the business is to remain a co-operative, how will these user interests be protected? (Dunn, 
Crooks et al. 2002). 
1.2. Co-operative principles 
To get a better understanding of co-operatives, an exploration of the principles that define its 
existence is required. Going back in history, the earliest set of guiding principles for co-
operatives were developed by the Rochdale Pioneers in 1844 and included twelve 
organizational points that manifested social, political as well as business concerns (Van 
Opstal 2010).  These principles were significantly influenced by the historical context and 
economy at that period and were primarily meant to govern a small retail store. Due to which, 
only some of the Rochdale principles are still followed today (such as democratic control), 
most others are obsolete and/or in-applicable; and over time these co-operative principles 
have evolved and new sets have emerged (Zeuli and Cropp 2004).  
Today the most widely accepted co-operative principles are those endorsed by the 
international co-operative alliance (ICA). The seven principles laid out by the ICA are – 
1. Voluntary and open membership  
2. Democratic member control 
3. Member economic participation 
4. Autonomy and independence 
5. Education, training and information 
6. Cooperation among co-operatives 
7. Concern for community 
1.3. History of Co-operatives 
The historical development of co-operatives was strongly influenced and shaped by the 
prevailing social and economic forces of that period. The earliest co-operative associations, 
which could be called pre-cursors to co-operatives, were formed in Europe and North 
America during the 17th and 18th centuries during periods of great social upheaval and 
distress caused by significant shifts in agricultural and industrial production practices (Zeuli 
and Cropp 2004).   
According to Hoyt (1989), the modern co-operative originated in Europe as a self-help 
method to counter extreme poverty and then spread to other parts of the industrializing world 
in the late 19th century.  To fill the void created by the withdrawal of public assistance, the 
16 
 
people of Europe formed various types of self-help organizations such as mutual aid societies 
in England.  
It could be argued that the history of modern co-operatives (co-operatives as we know them 
now) started with the formation of The Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers, Ltd. in 1844 
by 28 weavers working in the cotton mills of Rochdale, England.  This was a consumer co-
operative and the workers formulated a set of basic operating rules based on a two-year study 
of co-operatives including some that were not successful (Ortmann and King 2007). The 
objective of the co-operative was to address a wide range of member’s needs such as better 
housing, employment, food, education and other social requirements (Ortmann and King 
2007). While it was not the first co-operative itself, the Rochdale Society is credited with 
popularizing the modern co-operative model (Evans and Meade 2006). The Rochdale society 
continues to operate even today as The Co-operative Group, the largest consumer co-
operative in the UK with over 4.6 million members and revenues close to US$ 13.2 billion.  
The next major development in the history of co-operatives happened in 1864 with the 
establishment of the Raiffeisen Bank in Germany by F.W. Raiffeisen (Ortmann and King 
2007). Another reputed advocate of co-operatives was Horace Plunkett, an Irishman who 
invested considerable time and effort towards highlighting the benefits of agricultural co-
operatives in Ireland and other parts of the world (Shaffer 1999).  
In the specific area of agricultural co-operatives, Denmark is viewed as an good example of 
early and successful co-operative farm marketing and supply organizations (Shaffer 1999).  
An important factor in the growth of Denmark’s co-operative movement was identified to be 
the establishment of Folk High Schools in the rural areas (Zeuli and Cropp 2004). Although 
not its intended purpose or objective, the Folk High school instilled in its students a strong 
spirit of cooperation.  
Today co-operative businesses are found in nearly all countries in the world – from the 
developing and remote parts of Africa, Asia and South America to the more developed 
regions of North America, Europe and Oceania. They also exist across a broad membership 
base, with some agricultural co-operatives having less than 20 members while other can have 
over 10,000 (Boučková 2002).The rapid spread of the co-operative business model from 18th 
Century England to diverse and remote parts of the world reiterates the universal adaptability 
and diversity of the co-operative business model (Zeuli and Cropp 2004).  
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In the second half of the 20th  century, the greatest increase in co-operative activity was 
observed in India, and by 1991 India had become a world leader in terms of numbers of co-
operatives (401,139) and membership (166 million)  (Williams 2007). However, more co-
operatives does not imply that the co-operative sector as a whole is stronger or more 
competitive (Zeuli and Cropp 2004).  Also, while it may seem reasonable to conclude that 
larger the co-operative the better, this is not necessarily true.  
1.4. The Role & Significance of Co-operatives  
In a world where economic viability needs to be delicately balanced with social 
responsibility, people are increasingly looking at co-operatives as an alternative to the 
traditional investor-owned business models. Co-operatives play an important role in many 
developed and developing countries worldwide (Ortmann and King 2007). There are 
approximately 2.94 million co-operatives in the world and account for more than 1.2 billion 
in membership and clients, and provide employment either directly or indirectly to about  279 
million people (Hyung-sik 2017) . Furthermore, with revenues of about 2.98 trillion US$ 
(from an asset base of 19.6 trillion US$) co-operatives were the 5th largest economic unit 
(ahead of France and behind Germany) if they were to be viewed as a nation (Grace and 
Associates 2014). These facts suggest that co-operatives do not, as is sometimes assumed, 
contradict the goals of capitalism. Moreover, it reflects the general satisfaction and 
confidence of members towards their co-operatives and validates the efficiency and financial 
performance of co-operative businesses.  
At a national level, co-operatives play a significant role and account for more than 10% of 
GDP in  countries (Grace and Associates 2014). Based on 3 important parameters - co-
operative membership as a percentage population, co-operative employment as a percentage 
of population and co-operative revenue as a percentage of GDP, the top 6 countries with the 
most co-operative economies were  – New Zealand, France, Switzerland, Finland, Italy and 
Netherlands  (Grace and Associates 2014).  More interestingly, a fairly high level of 
correlation was found to exist between a countries co-operative economy index and its social 
progress index2 (SPI) with New Zealand occupying the number 1 spot on both indexes. Given 
the importance of co-operatives and building on the momentum created by the United 
 
2 The SPI has 54 measures and includes items like basic human needs, opportunity and access to knowledge. It 
has been developed and promoted by the Social Progress Imperative Grace, D. and Associates (2014). 
Measuring the Size and Scope of the Cooperative Economy: Results of the 2014 Global Census on Co-
operatives, United Nations Secretariat. 
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Nations by making 2012 the International Year of Co-operatives, the International 
Cooperative Alliance is focused on making the co-operative form of business (by 2020) – 1) 
the acknowledged leader in economic, social and environmental sustainability, 2) the model 
preferred by people, and 3) the fastest growing form of enterprise. However, until the scope 
and potential of co-operatives can be better understood research on smart policies to promote 
co-operatives will be hamstrung (Grace and Associates 2014). 
A commonly held belief is that co-operatives are more likely to fail than standard 
corporations. However, to the contrary, data from the US shows that 60 – 80% of standard 
corporation tend to fail after their first year whereas only 10% of co-operatives fail after their 
first year (Williams 2007). Furthermore, only 5% of standard corporations remain active after 
five years, while in the case of co-operatives nearly 90% of them remain active after five 
years (Williams 2007).  
1.5. Co-operatives in New Zealand 
New Zealand has a long standing and deep presence of co-operatives across several sectors. 
The first co-operative in NZ, Southland Building Land and Investment Society (now SBS 
Bank) was established in 1869; and there are five NZ co-operatives that are over 100 years 
old. A UN study found that NZ was the most co-operative economy in the world. New 
Zealand ranked number one in the world for – 1) share of the co-operative’s economy of 
national GDP (at 20% of NZ GDP), and 2) employment by co-operatives related to total 
population. A recent report by Garnevska, Callagher et al. (2017) found that the top 30 co-
operatives and mutuals in NZ generated revenues of over 42 billion NZ$, provided direct 
employment to 48,000 individuals and catered to a membership base of 1.4 million people  
In NZ the principle piece of legislature that governs co-operatives is the Co-operative 
Companies Act 1996, and serves as  a companion act to the New Zealand general Companies 
Act 1993, as well as the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1908 (Evans and Meade 
2006). But this is not truly all encompassing as Evans & Meade (2006) point out that co-
operative activity in NZ arises in a variety of legal organizational forms (Evans and Meade 
2006).  On the whole, the co-operative legislation in New Zealand is flexible, less tied to co-
operative principles than corresponding legislation overseas, and free of policy preferences 
favoring co-operatives over IOF’s and other organizational forms (Evans and Meade 2006).  
The purpose of the Co-operative Companies Act is to allow co-operative owners to conduct 
business on a mutual basis, where they engage in co-operative activity (Evans and Meade 
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2006). The act defines a co-operative as – A company, the principal activity of which is, and 
is stated in its constitution as being, a co-operative activity and in which not less than 60 
percent of the voting rights are held by transacting members (MBIE 2014).     
All companies in NZ, co-operative or otherwise, need to be registered under the companies 
act. However, only a company that is in addition registered under the Co-operative 
Companies Act is allowed to use the term “co-operative” in its name. Most importantly, such 
a registration allows the co-operative company to have shares of nominal value, and to issue, 
or accept surrender of shares at the nominal value – features not provided for under the 
Companies Act (Evans and Meade 2006). Typically, only transacting share-holders are 
allowed to vote on co-operative company resolutions. Since co-operative owner-members can 
redeem their co-operative capital – via the surrender of their shares, such capital is 
treated/classified as debt in co-operatives, unlike in IOF’s wherein it’s classified as equity.  
More importantly, the Co-operative Companies Act specifically modifies several items of the 
Companies Act that would constrain co-operative activity. For example, the act makes it very 
easy for a co-operative to provide its members with rebates. The Companies Act on the other 
hand makes it very difficult for an IOF to provide shareholder discounts on the companies’ 
goods or services (Evans and Meade 2006).  
1.6. Agricultural Co-operatives  
Although co-operatives exist in a wide range of sectors, it is in the agricultural sector that 
they have the most comprehensive and significance presence. Co-operatives that operate 
along the agricultural value chain, starting from the supply of farming inputs to the 
cultivation of agricultural products and livestock farming, and further on to the industrial 
processing of agricultural products and animals, can be grouped together as agricultural co-
operatives (International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) and Euricse 2014). There are 
approximately 1.2 million agricultural co-operatives in the world serving 122 million 
members and clients (Grace and Associates 2014). This is influenced by large numbers of 
agricultural co-operatives in India and China. In total, these agricultural co-operatives have 
an asset base of 133.8 billion US$ and generate revenues of about 337.7 billion US$ (Grace 
and Associates 2014). There were 328 agricultural co-operatives, distributed in 27 countries 
that reported an annual turnover in excess of 100 million US$ in 2012 (International 
Cooperative Alliance (ICA) and Euricse 2014). Looking at just the 1,465 large co-operatives 
(with turnover of greater than 100 million USD) monitored by the International Co-operative 
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Alliance (ICA), 28% are in the agriculture and food sectors. In 2019, 97 of the top 300 co-
operatives in the world were agricultural co-operatives (ICA and EURICSE 2019).  
The agricultural sector is extremely dynamic because the nature of production agriculture 
changes constantly and so does agricultural markets and public policy. Agricultural co-
operatives are an integral part of this dynamic environment. Many changes occur outside 
(external) the co-operative system, which may or may not directly influence them. Yet, co-
operatives have to recognize these changes and react to them (Dunn, Crooks et al. 2002). 
Internally, co-operatives' mission, structure, and practices not only set them apart from other 
forms of business, but also influence how they respond to external changes (Dunn, Crooks et 
al. 2002).  It was identified in the 1987 report, "Positioning Farmer Co-operatives for the 
Future,” that to be successful in fulfilling the needs of farmers, co-operatives must be able to 
provide an appropriate economic response to marketplace situations faced by members 
(USDA 1987). This response generally involves provision of competitive goods and services, 
or adoption of actions that balance or counter forces present in the business environment 
(Dunn, Crooks et al. 2002).  
Agricultural co-operatives have played an important role in strengthening market access and 
generating competitive returns for independent farm operators during the 20th century 
(Ortmann and King 2007). Generally, there are two situations under which agricultural co-
operatives are created. In most instances, the situation arises when farmers cannot obtain 
essential services from IOFs, since the provision of these services is judged to be unprofitable 
by the IOFs (Hardesty and Salgia 2004). Another situation is when the IOFs provide the 
services at prices that are too high for the farmers (Hardesty and Salgia 2004). The former 
situation is characterized in economic theory as market failure or missing services motive; on 
the other hand, the latter situation drives the creation of co-operatives as a competitive 
yardstick or as a means of allowing farmers to build countervailing market power to oppose 
the IOFs (Hardesty and Salgia 2004). In most instances, this concept of competitive yardstick 
often obliges the IOFs, through competition, to improve their service to farmers. In 
agricultural producer markets, co-operatives typically help set or stabilize market prices 
(Haller 1992). 
The creation of agricultural co-operatives is most often intricately linked to the ability of 
farmers to pool production and/or resources (USDA 2002). In many situations, it is not 
financially viable for individual farmers to manufacture products or undertake a service. Co-
operatives provide a method for farmers to join together in an 'association', through which a 
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group of farmers can acquire a better outcome (typically financial) than by going alone. This 
approach is aligned to the concept of economies of scale and can also be related as a form of 
economic synergy, where two or more agents work together to produce a result that is not 
obtainable by any of the agents independently (Zeuli and Cropp 2004).  
Above and beyond the economic benefits, an important strength of a co-operative for the 
farmer is that they retain the governance of the association, thereby ensuring they have 
ultimate ownership and control (Hardesty and Salgia 2004) . This ensures that the profit 
reimbursement (either through the dividend payout or rebate) is shared only amongst the 
farmer members, rather than shareholders as in an IOF. 
In addition, in the field of agriculture, co-operatives play a vital role in ensuring farmers 
adapt their operations to agricultural technological innovations, such as the use of fertilizers, 
plant and livestock breeding, agricultural mechanization, electricity and other new sources of 
energy, and to new information systems (Ortmann and King 2007). In a non-economic 
capacity, co-operatives have also played an important role in rural communities, where they 
are an integral part of the social fabric. They encourage democratic decision-making 
processes, leadership development and education.  
The significant trend in the agricultural economy of fewer, larger and increasingly corporate 
farms has created a significant concern among rural small holder farmers about their 
sustainability (Coltrain, Barton et al. 2000). One way for small and midsize farms to remain 
viable businesses is to increase income of their operation by participating in profitable value-
added processing and marketing activities (Dunn, Crooks et al. 2002). A popular strategy 
being used by producers to achieve this goal is to pool their limited resources through co-
operative development. This would help these small scale producers earn a larger share of the 
consumer’s food dollar (Cook 1995). Besides, the challenge posed by consumers towards the 
food industry to tailor food products for specifically defined market niches encourages the 
coordination of producer groups and alliances, thus increasing the significance of co-
operatives (Rogers and Petraglia 1994). 
Co-operatives can also accelerate the process of development and participation of rural 
population in agricultural activities. In many countries, agricultural co-operatives prove to be 
an important model of enterprise by which small farmers can organize and optimize limited 
resources to increase their income (Boučková 2002).  In Africa in particular agricultural co-
operatives are recognized as an useful means to lift small holder farmers out of poverty 
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(Bouamra-Mechemache and Zago 2015). For example, poverty reduction through the 
participation of small holder farmers in local and international markets can be enhanced by 
technical assistance and collective action provided by co-operatives (Bouamra-Mechemache 
and Zago 2015).  
Agriculture co-operatives play a very important role in the economies of developed countries 
too. In the United States, there were approximately 1,953 agricultural co-operatives and their 
average total assets and equity were US$ 47.1 million and US$ 20.9 million respectively in 
2016 (Demko 2018). In the EU there are about 51, 392 agricultural co-operatives and their 
combined annual turnover was € 347 billion in 2015 (Cocolina and Cooperatives Europe 
2016). Particularly in the dairy industry, farmer-owned co-operatives play a rather dominant 
role with market shares above 80% in milk collection in the U.S., the major dairy countries in 
Western Europe and also in Australia and New Zealand (Chaddad 2007). Moreover, four 
(Fonterra, FrieslandCampina, Dairy Farmers of America and Arla Foods) of the top 10 dairy 
companies in the world by revenue are co-operatives (Hunt and van Battum 2015).  
1.6.1 Types of Agricultural co-operatives 
Agricultural co-operative like most business organizations have complex legal, financial and 
organizational structures. However, the meaningful categorization of co-operatives has been 
difficult due to the structural evolution of co-operatives which has led to a wide range of 
formations and classifications, as well as the existence of a large number of agricultural co-
operative types  (Cook 1993) .  
Classification based on – function, geography and commodity 
Cook (1993) developed a co-operatives classification based on – function, geography and 
commodity, which resulted in 7 co-operative types.  The seven co-operative types were – 1) 
Farm credit, 2) Rural utilities, 3) Sapiro I (Bargaining Co-operatives), 4) Sapiro II (Marketing 
Co-operatives), 5) Nourse I (Local supply and/or Marketing), 6) Nourse II (Regional Supply 
and/or Marketing) and 7) New Generation Co-operatives. 
The USDA Classification  
The USDA classifies agricultural co-operatives based on function into one of three types – 1) 
marketing co-operatives, 2) supply co-operatives and 3) service co-operatives (USDA, 2012). 
• A marketing co-operative markets farm commodities produced by its member farmer 
and derives most of its total dollar volume from the sale of members’ products.  The 
marketing co-operative could simply purchase the commodity produced by its 
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members and sell it to food processing /food manufacturing firms or it could process 
the product and sell it to consumers or retailers (Royer 2014).  
The marketing co-operative solves on of the biggest challenges that farmer’s face, 
which is transportation and marketing of their products. Moreover, the relatively 
small volume supplied by an individual small farmer puts them in an unfavorable 
negotiating position with respect to intermediaries and wholesalers. In such cases it 
will be much more beneficial to form a co-operative which will act as an integrator 
that collects the output from members, sometimes undertaking manufacturing, and 
delivering it in large aggregated quantities downstream through the marketing 
channels. 
• A supply co-operative supplies members with inputs they use in farm production 
(such as seeds, fertilizers, chemicals, fuel, and farm machinery (via machinery pools)) 
and derives most of its business volume from the sale of production supplies, 
machinery and equipment, and building materials. Farm supply co-operatives may 
manufacture these inputs or purchase them from other firms (Royer 2014). Many also 
handle farm, ranch, and home items, such as heating oil, lawn and garden supplies and 
equipment, and food. 
Supply co-operatives usually aggregate purchases, storage, and distribution of farm 
inputs for their members. By taking advantage of volume discounts and utilizing other 
economies of scale principles, supply co-operatives bring down the cost of the inputs 
that the members purchase from the co-operative compared with direct purchases 
from commercial suppliers.  
• A service co-operative provides specialized services related to the business operations 
of farmers, ranchers, or co-operatives, such as banking/financial, trucking, storing, or 
drying. Amongst service co-operatives, the credit union requires special mention 
because it is an important and unique type of banking institution. Farmers, especially 
in developing countries, can be charged relatively high interest rates by commercial 
banks. In some cases, loans may not even be available for farmers to access. When 
providing loans, these banks are often mindful of high transaction costs on small 
loans, or farmers may be refused credit altogether due to lack of collateral – which is 
very common in developing countries. To provide a source of credit, farmers can pool 
together funds that can be loaned out to members and lower interest rates. 
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Alternatively, the credit union can raise loans at better rates from commercial banks 
due to the co-operative having a larger associative size than an individual farmer 
1.6.2 Agricultural Co-operatives in New Zealand 
New Zealand has a long history (144 years) of agricultural co-operatives; and co-operatives 
have been an important feature of New Zealand agricultural history (Evans and Meade 2006). 
Co-operative first emerged in the 1880’s and developed rapidly in dairying in Taranaki, the 
Waikato, and later Southland (Stephens 1936). Agricultural industry coordination in New 
Zealand has happened via the combined usage of co-operative organization and, from 1920’s 
to 1990’s statutory control/producer boards.  
During this 144-year journey, agricultural co-operatives in NZ appear to have evolved, 
especially in terms of ownership structures, management models and governance protocols, 
both within and across industries, resulting in a diversity of models. In recent times, co-
operatives have become major players in a number of New Zealand’s agricultural sectors, and 
account for a significant share of New Zealand’s economic activity (Evans and Meade 2006, 
Garnevska, Callagher et al. 2017). Within the top 30 NZ co-operatives, agri-food co-
operatives account for 65% of revenues, 68% of assets and 83% of employees (Garnevska, 
Callagher et al. 2017).  
In some New Zealand agricultural sectors, co-operatives are either as dominant (e.g. Dairy) 
or more dominant (e.g. meat and fertilizer) than in overseas jurisdictions. Whereas in some 
other agricultural sectors (apple, fishing and forestry), New Zealand co-operatives have less 
involvement when compared to  overseas jurisdictions (Evans and Meade 2006).  An 
important finding reported by Evans and Meade (2006) is that the co-operatives in New 
Zealand demonstrate considerable adaptive efficiency in response to market and other 
pressures. This is an interesting point because it alleviates several criticisms that are 
associated with the traditional co-operative model – such as constrains to raise capital and 
therefore grow.  
In the report prepared by Evans & Meade (2006), the authors presented the following 
conclusions on NZ agricultural co-operatives by specific sector –  
Dairy - co-operatives play a very significant role and account for almost all milk processing 
in New Zealand. This is similar to dairy industries overseas. 
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Meat – co-operatives dominate this sector too, but not to the extent of dairy, since IOF’s have 
a continuing presence and are commonly found in smaller, niche operations. Relative to most 
overseas meat industries, co-operative market share in New Zealand is higher. 
Wool – co-operatives do not tend to play a large role in the Wool industry, and this is similar 
to the pattern observed overseas as-well. This is attributable to wool’s heterogeneity and 
storability, both of which reduce the economic rationale for a co-operative. 
Fishing & Aquaculture – co-operatives play a small role, with processors and marketers 
preferring to integrate backwards into catching and farming. However, it is IOF’s, typically 
unlisted, that dominate this sector. Interestingly, these IOF’s, faced with challenges similar to 
those faced by a co-operative (e.g. capital constrains), adopt co-operative like strategies. 
Kiwifruit – this sector presents a unique characteristic in terms of being dominated by Zespri 
a grower-controlled organization. Zespri is in reality a functional co-operative. The high level 
of kiwifruit homogeneity and common challenges (mainly around export of product), 
facilitated the formation of a co-operative like organization in this sector.  
Apple – co-operatives play a insignificant role in this sector. This is primarily attributed to 
high levels of grower interest heterogeneity and secondarily to the constant restructuring and 
removal of the single seller desk. 
Forestry – similar to the fishing & aquaculture industry, backward integration of processors 
and marketers has ensured that co-operatives do not play much of role in this sector.  
Rural Supplies – relative to other countries, co-operatives play a much larger role in this 
sector in NZ; and it is suggested by the authors that this could possibly be due to the 
importance of security of rural supplies in a small, isolated country. 
Fertilizer – co-operatives are very dominant in this sector in NZ, even more so than in 
overseas countries. High level of product homogeneity and regional market power (due to 
lower transport costs) are suggested as being the reasons for this.  
The report by Evans & Meade (2006) also highlights that there is a substantial dearth of 
research on agricultural co-operatives of New Zealand; and it’s suggested that this is due to 
considerable data hurdles. 
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1.6.2 Evolution and Challenges faced by Agricultural Co-operatives  
1.6.2.1 Evolution 
In conventional businesses growth is accepted as an inevitable consequence of corporate 
existence, i.e. to grow or die (Hind 1997). Greiner developed a life cycle theory of business 
development and growth for investor owned firms (Greiner 1972). He described five distinct 
phases of growth each characterised by a unique feature which were – creativity, direction, 
delegation, coordination and collaboration (Greiner 1972). Like Greiner’s model, most of the 
economic and management theories of firms in this space are grounded in profit, growth, 
sales maximization/optimization as the firms obvious goals (Hind 1997). From a perspective 
of co-operatives, these traditional corporate goals are either irrelevant or act as constraints 
within which other member benefit goals may be aimed at, possibly because in the case of 
co-operatives these goals are a means rather than the end (Hind 1997).   
In the case of agricultural co-operatives the life- cycle theory developed by  Cook (1995) is 
the most widely acknowledged as it provides a better understanding of the evolution of co-
operatives  – genesis, growth, decline and demise of co-operative business organizations. 
Chadad (2007) successfully used this framework for examining the evolution of dairy co-
operatives in Brazil (Chaddad 2007). 
The framework consists of 5 stages -  
Stage 1 –  The first stage in the formation of agricultural co-operatives is primarily a result of 
a defensive response, and has two economic justifications 1) to bring economic balance, and 
2) correct market failure (Cook 1995). When the prices are depressed or if there are market 
failures, individual producers require institutional mechanisms to bring economic balance 
under their control and/or to countervail the opportunism. Since such a situation creates 
incentives for producers to react collectively and the institutional mechanism usually chosen 
is the co-operative (Cook 1995).  
Stage 2 – In the second stage, the co-operatives that were formed to bring about economic 
balance slowly cease to exist. It is quite likely that these are the co-operatives Helmberger 
and Hoos (1962) referred to in his wave-theory (Cook 1995). Whereas the co-operatives 
formed to confront market failures tend to survive past the first stage because they remain 
competitive against IOF oligopolists/oligopsonists (Cook 1995). 
Stage 3 - As the IOF’s begin to offer significant competition to co-operatives and the playing 
field is levelled, the short run transaction costs incurred by co-operatives begin to gain 
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importance. These transaction costs arise out of vaguely defined property rights and lead to 
conflicts over residual claims and decision controls. Cook (1995) classifies the conflicts over 
residual claims and decision controls into five problem sets - 1) Free Rider Problem, 2) 
Horizon Problem, 3) Portfolio Problem, 4) Control Problem and 5) Influence Cost Problem.  
Stage 4 - In stage 4, Cook (1995) argues that the Co-operative is challenged by the 
complexities arising from the trade-offs between vaguely defined property rights and unique 
opportunities; and at the end of the fourth stage the co-operative reaches a point where it is 
limited to three options. 
Stage 5 - According to Cook (1995), in stage 5 the co-operative chooses between its three 
available strategic options - 1) Exit, 2) Continue and 3) Transition. 
1.6.2.2 Challenges  
Agricultural co-operatives are shaped and influenced by factors outside (external) and inside 
(internal) the co-operative system (Dunn, Crooks et al. 2002). Both the external and internal 
issues that agricultural co-operative face today are not dissimilar to those identified by Dunn, 
Crooks et al. (2002)). For example, the main external issues shaping co-operatives are - 
changing farmer demographics, technological innovations, changing competitive 
environment, role of the consumer, structural changes in food processing and marketing, 
globalization, the policy environment and industrialization & vertical integration via greater 
supply chain control (Dunn, Crooks et al. 2002). While the internal issues affecting co-
operatives are inherent in the structure of co-operatives or result from the attitudes of the 
people in co-operatives (Dunn, Crooks et al. 2002). Given the unique framework within 
which co-operatives operative, it is the internal issues that tend to be quite significant in 
determining the fate of co-operatives. Moreover, the internal issues shaping co-operatives are 
also linked to the external ones mainly because they constrain efforts to respond to external 
forces. Some of the main internal issues that impact agricultural co-operative are – capital 
constraints and limited ability to generate sufficient equity (Richards and Manfredo 2003) 
heterogeneous member characteristics and needs (Hoehler and Kuehl 2018), board 
effectiveness and governance (Bijman, Hendrikse et al. 2013), management lack of co-
operative focus (Dunn, Crooks et al. 2002), growing emphasis on value-added activity (Royer 
1995), pressures on the traditional model (Bijman 2016), social capital (Valentinov 2004), 
and member commitment (Fulton 1999). 
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It is interesting to note that a vast majority of theories and explanations on the formation, 
existence and evolution of agricultural co-operatives are grounded in economic theory and 
the financial-benefit aspects of membership. For example, the most widely used theories to 
explain co-operatives are from the fields of economics such as – transaction cost economics, 
agency theory, property rights theory and collective action. Given that co-operatives are 
member focused organizations with a significant social construct, it is surprising that not 
much theory development or empirical research has been done from the social aspects. 
Moreover, as the demise of co-operatives could be due to the erosion of co-operative ethics 
within the membership (Hind 1997), it is prudent that future research examines the social 






2.0 Problem Statement  
Despite the member-co-operative relational dimension being an important differentiator of 
the co-operative model from the more common Investor Owned Firm (IOF) model, and also a 
significant source of competitive advantage (Jussila, Goel et al. 2012), much of the work on 
co-operatives tends to focus on the non-relational aspects (Røkholt 1999, Byrne, McCarthy et 
al. 2012). The bulk of research about co-operatives have incorporated theoretical aspects and 
approaches such as agency theory (Eilers and Hanf 1999), property rights theory (Cook and 
Iliopoulos 2000) contracting theory (Sykuta and Cook 2001) , transaction cost theory 
(Hendrikse and Bijman 2002), and game theory (Karantininis and Zago 2001). Although 
these are useful in detailing the economic characteristics of the co-operatives and explaining 
the reasons for the formation, existence and behaviour, they are not empirically based; and 
hence not entirely useful in evaluating the performance of co-operatives. Moreover, the 
literature identifies that while the study and analysis of co-operatives are often strongly 
driven by economic aspirations (e.g. profit maximization) they are not always in total 
alignment with the social features of the co-operative organisational form.  
With respect to agricultural co-operatives most of the research is rooted in economic theory, 
which is based on assumptions about human behaviour that is not always empirically 
grounded (Österberg and Nilsson 2009). Furthermore, the empirical studies that exist are 
mainly focused on applying the behaviour model of co-operatives as a profit-maximizing 
firm;  and empirical applications of the other existing models is lacking (Soboh, Lansink et 
al. 2009). The absence of empirical application could be due to difficulty in obtaining the 
relevant data, lack of interest on the part of applied economists, or lack of theoretical 
approaches that are well developed for empirical application (Soboh, Lansink et al. 2009).  
Nearly 80 years ago Bakken and Schaars (1937) stated that co-operative organizations are 
occasionally alluded to as self-liquidating corporations; and their success may cause their 
destruction. Furthermore, with the evolving nature of the co-operative organisational form, a 
rethink on how co-operatives are traditionally examined, evaluated and interpreted is 
required. Since social factors play an important role in the formation, development and 
performance of co-operatives, it is surprising that they have not been considered as a 
probable and significant challenge and/or cost, as specific strategies are pursued by co-
operatives. One reason for this is the inherent complexity that they present. Factors such as 
the long-time horizons of decisions, the delayed effects of decisions on these factors, the 
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incrementality of the negative effects, the difficulty in measuring them makes understanding, 
acknowledging and acting on the issues posed by these factors complex to address (Cook 
1995, Nilsson, Svendsen et al. 2012).  
While the conventional financial and economic rationale for measuring co-operative 
performance and explaining the reasons for being a member of a co-operative continue to be 
important, there is a parallel view that stresses the need to recognise the critical role of other 
factors (Fulton 1999, Iliopoulos and Cook 1999, Nilsson, Svendsen et al. 2012). Besides, 
given that members assess their co-operatives in social terms in addition to economic ones; 
some reorientation of research on agricultural co-operatives with a focus on the socio-
psychological perspective of members is also suggested (Österberg and Nilsson 2009).  
The non-conventional or socio-psychological approach to examining co-operatives does not 
ignore the conventional views or values, but instead presumes that the study of co-operatives 
is incomplete if it does not include other components that are a defining feature of co-
operatives. This non-conventional lens therefore provides a greater understanding of co-
operatives, enabling an analysis of multiple factors and determinants; and compliments the 
conventional economic and finance centric view on co-operatives. In addition to operating 
within the scope of the co-operative organisational form, the methodology of a non-
conventional examination of co-operatives should be informed by empirical data. 
Assumptions made based on opinion alone lack credibility, not because they are necessarily 
unreasonable or even incorrect, but because they do not satisfy the requirements of reasoned 
inquiry.  
Lastly, despite the significance of co-operatives in general and agricultural co-operatives in 
specific to the NZ economy, not much research has been done in studying them in depth. 
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to develop, describe and empirically test a conceptual 
model that provides a framework for examining NZ agricultural co-operatives from a non-
conventional perspective. Informed by the literature, this conceptual model is grounded in 
three important non-conventional factors that can impact the performance of agricultural co-
operatives. These are 1) Heterogeneity, 2) Commitment and 3) Social Capital. 
3.0 Research Objectives  
The research will have three main objectives – 
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i. The first objective is to review the literature on general co-operative theory, 
commitment, heterogeneity and social capital; and to develop a conceptual framework 
that provides a lens for a socio-psychological examination of co-operatives. 
Although this thesis developed and presented a comprehensive theoretical framework, only 
some aspects of the framework are studied in more detail. These aspects included member 
commitment and heterogeneity because several co-operative scholars have suggested that 
these require further scrutiny. Moreover, since the measurement and interpretation of social 
capital is a very critical, complex and demanding task, it requires a significant amount of 
undivided focus. Therefore, the measurement and analysis of social capital was excluded 
from this thesis and the scope of the empirical examination of agricultural co-operatives was 
centered on commitment and heterogeneity. Consequently, the second and third objectives of 
this thesis read as follows -  
ii. The second objective is to establish a measure of commitment and heterogeneity 
within the membership base of agricultural co-operatives. 
iii. The third objective is to explore and analyse the relationship between commitment 
and heterogeneity within the membership base of agricultural co-operatives. 
The pertinent questions that research objectives two and three will strive to address is – what 
is the level of member commitment and member heterogeneity that exists in a large New 
Zealand agricultural co-operative? And what is the relationship between them?  
By seeking to achieve these objectives, the research will develop an instrument for measuring 
these factors; and in the process will also explore and highlight the value and role of these 
factors on the performance of agricultural co-operatives. The outcome benefits for 
agricultural co-operatives in general and to New Zealand agricultural co-operatives in 
specific from this research are both conceptual and applied.   At one level the research will 
enable agricultural co-operatives, from an evidential base, to rationalise resources and 
investment, set strategy/priorities and measure outcomes – with regards to commitment and 
heterogeneity.    At another level the research will contribute to the overall understanding and 
uniqueness of agricultural (dairy) co-operatives of New Zealand. 
4.0 Research Approach 
Holden and Lynch (2004), suggest that research should not be methodologically led, rather, 
the methodological choice should be a consequence to the researchers’ philosophical stance 
and the social science phenomenon investigated. Based on this suggestion, this research takes 
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an objectivist approach. According to  Hunt (1993) objectivists retain objectivity by – 
“requiring that theories, laws and explanations be empirically testable ensures that they will 
be inter-subjectively certifiable since different (but reasonably competent) investigators with 
differing attitudes, opinions, and beliefs will be able to make observations and conduct 
experiments to ascertain their truth of content”. The objectivist approach to social research 
developed from natural sciences and is a consequence of social science researchers deciding 
to employ the highly successful methods of the natural sciences to investigate social science 
phenomenon. The major aim of objectivists and natural scientists is to identify causal 
explanation and fundamental laws that explain regularities in human social behaviour. Due to 
which, the generalization of results from sample sizes essentially utilizes a hypothetico-
deductive process (Lawson 2015). This process begins with the formulation of hypothesis 
developed from the researchers’ conceptualization of a particular phenomenon. Objectivists 
are grounded in causality, meaning that there are independent causes that lead to observed 
effects, and hypothesis are either verified or refuted by the observed effects. The hypothetico-
deductive approach involves the quantitative operationalization of concepts, which involves 
reductionism, that is, the problem is reduced to its smallest elements (Lawson 2015). The 
reduction enhances a problems comprehension. 
The research builds on previous work undertaken which revealed the extent to which socio-
psychological factors, specifically social capital, heterogeneity and commitment are studied 
within the context of co-operative organisational forms. The approach to the research is 
fundamentally derived from the outcomes which are sought and an interest in contributing to 
a greater understanding of co-operatives in general and agricultural co-operatives in New 
Zealand in specific. The research requires methods which are explorative, informative, co-
operative membership focused, and consistent with co-operative principles and expectations. 
Moreover, since the objective is to measure the level of commitment and heterogeneity 
within the membership base and understand the relationship between them that exists, the 
research adopted a quantitative approach whereby co-operative members were the principal 
participants in the research.  
4.1 Research Background & Context  
Dairy Industry and Dairy Co-operatives in NZ 
Globally, farmer-owned co-operatives play a rather dominant role in the dairy industry with 
market shares above 80% in milk collection in the U.S.A, the major dairy countries in 
Western Europe and also in Australia and New Zealand (Chaddad 2007). Moreover, four 
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(Fonterra, FrieslandCampina, Dairy Farmers of America and Arla Foods) of the top 10 dairy 
companies in the world by revenue are co-operatives (Hunt and van Battum 2015).  
In NZ, the first dairy co-operative was established in 1871.  Since then, dairy co-operatives 
have played a significant role in the NZ economy, and continue to do so (Garnevska, 
Callagher et al. 2017). It provides employment to about 47,310 people and accounts for 28% 
of NZ’s export revenues. Producing 21.3 million tonnes of milk, NZ is the 8th biggest milk 
producer in world (Shadbolt and Apparao 2016). Moreover as it exports 95% of its 
production, it is the largest dairy exporter in the world, accounting for over 30% of global 
dairy trade (Shadbolt and Apparao 2016). In 2016/17, dairy co-operatives accounted for over 
86% of NZ’s milk processing. The four major dairy co-operatives in NZ, Fonterra Co-
operative Group (NZ$ 19.2 billion), Tatua Dairy Company (NZ$ 0.32 billion), Westland 
Milk Products (NZ$ 0.62 billion) and the Dairy Goat Co-operative (NZ$ 0.19 billion) had 
combined total revenues of NZ$ 20.4 billion for the 2016/17 financial year. This 
approximates to a contribution of about 7.5% of NZ’s GDP (NZ$ 270 billion). In 2017/18, 
there were 11,590 dairy farms, 4.9 million dairy cows in NZ; and the average dairy farm size 
was 151 hectares. Given the role and importance of dairy co-operatives in the global dairy 
sector in general and in the NZ economy and agricultural sector in specific, they were 
identified as being the principal co-operative sector of interest in this research. Furthermore, 
amongst the dairy co-operatives in NZ, Fonterra Co-operative group is by far the largest and 
most significant. For this reason, Fonterra was selected as the co-operative organisational 
form that would be the single case-study that this research focused on.  
A potential drawback of such an approach is that the selected co-operative sector (i.e. dairy) 
might not provide sufficient information through which generic outcomes can be identified or 
extrapolated. However, by adopting a quantitative approach and ensuring a large enough 
sample size is used, it is expected that it will be possible to identify key themes and issues 
which are generically applicable to all agricultural co-operatives. Moreover, the flexibility 
within the framework ensures that it is not restrictive in nature and can be purposefully 
modified quite easily to apply to other co-operative sectors should the need arise. 
Fonterra 
The Fonterra Co-operative Group (Fonterra) was formed in 2001, from an amalgamation of 
two large NZ co-operatives, New Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi Cooperative Dairies, and 
the New Zealand Dairy Board.  With revenues of about NZ$ 20 billion in 2016/17, it is the 
largest business enterprise in New Zealand. Fonterra is owned by around 10,000 self-
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employed dairy farmers in NZ and sources about 22 billion litres of milk from NZ and 
overseas milk pools. It is the largest dairy exporter in the world, employs 22,000 people 
globally, exporting products to 140 countries (Fonterra, 2018).  
Evolution of Fonterra 
Although the final element that lead to the formation of Fonterra was the amalgamation of 
three entities mentioned earlier (i.e. New Zealand Dairy Group, Kiwi Co-operative Dairies, 
and the New Zealand Dairy Board), the origins of Fonterra can be traced back to the 1870’s. 
The formation of Fonterra is hence characterised by several mergers over the course of many 
decades. It is reported that there were about 230 dairy co-operatives in the 1960’s. These co-
operatives were characterised by a unique identity, loyal membership base and strong 
regional specificity. More importantly there was intense competition between these co-
operatives.  Over the next three decades, especially in the 1980’s and 1990’s many dairy co-
operatives gradually merged to form larger co-operatives in order to achieve economies of 
scale.  As a result, there were just 3 dairy co-operatives in 2017/18, and the formation of 
Fonterra was the main outcome and culmination of this process of mergers (Lind, 2013).   As 
explained by Nilsson and Madsen (2007) mergers between co-operatives are quite complex 
because a merger involves not only the integration of the business operations of the two co-
operatives but also the breaking down of barriers between the members of the two co-
operatives and aligning the different ways of thinking within the memberships. Moreover, the 
merger is further complicated by the concept of heterogeneity – heterogeneity in terms of 
business activities, logistics, organisational culture, leadership principles, ways of working, 
and other attributes (Nilsson and Madsen 2007). Fonterra’s large membership base and a 
foundation based on several mergers of co-operatives that once had a unique identity of their 
own, and strongly competed against each other, is thought to have introduced considerable 
member heterogeneity in the co-operative.  
Governance of Fonterra 
Farmer members can own two types of shares in Fonterra, wet shares and dry shares. The wet 
shares are based on their level of production, additionally they can also own dry shares up to 
a co-operative cap of 20% of total shares (Shadbolt and Duncan 2016). Fonterra is governed 
by an eleven-member board (seven elected farmer shareholders and four appointed) with 
voting based on wet shares held. In addition, it has a 25 member shareholders’ council which 
represents the views of all members as suppliers, owners and investors. Each councillor is 
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elected by farmers within the ward they represent, and voting is based on one vote per 
shareholder, more akin to traditional cooperative elections. According to Duncan Coull, the 
chairman of the shareholders council in 2017, there were three key areas of focus for the 
council in relation to their constitutional functions: 1. Connection – to ensure farmers' views 
are heard and that they have greater connection to the co-operative they supply and own; 2. 
Monitoring – to monitor the Fonterra board performance and hold it to account and inform 
farmers on the direction and performance of their co-operative; and 3. Guardianship – 
ensuring that the co-operative maintains its ethos, and that it acts within co-operative 
principles and is consistent to its strong values (Chandar 2017). 
Structure & Status of Fonterra 
Fonterra was formed under the Dairy Industry Restructuring Act (DIRA), 2001. At that stage 
it had a nearly 95% of New Zealand’s milk supply so the DIRA was structured to encourage 
competitors and reduce the percentage to more globally acceptable levels. Now it is closer to 
80% of NZ milk production, with almost all members having choice of who to supply, the 
new processors all being mostly overseas owned corporates. DIRA enabled the drop in 
market share through an unusual feature, for a co-operative, which was open entry and open 
exit at full market value (Shadbolt & Duncan, 2016). Shareholders could leave the co-
operative with the full cashed up value of their shares with just a few months’ notice. As a 
result, the co-operative was, and is, vulnerable to members leaving so relies heavily on 
member commitment and loyalty to maintain milk supply.  
Despite the drop-in market share the volume of milk sourced by Fonterra has increased, by 
28% over the last 10 years, reflecting increasing world demand for dairy. In 2016/17, 
Fonterra paid its farmer owners, NZ$ 6.12 / kilograms of milk solids (kg MS) and a dividend 
of NZ$ 0.40 per share. The milk price was an increase of 57% over the previous season.  The 
forecast milk price for the 2017/18 season was NZ$ 7.20 – 7.30 per kg MS, made up of a 
forecast farm gate milk price of NZ$ 6.75 per kg MS and dividend payment of per share of 
45-55 cents per share. However, given Fonterra’s significant exposure to global markets, 
there has been volatility in both milk price and dividend payments. Over the 10 year period 
(2007 to 2017), milk price ranged from NZ$ 3.90 /kg MS (2015/16) to NZ$ 8.40 /kg MS 
(2013/14); while the dividend payments ranged from NZ$ 0.07 (2007/08) to NZ$ 0.45 
(2008/09) per share (Livestock Improvement Corporation, 2018). The milk price volatility 
has been felt by all New Zealand farmers, with competitor milk prices mostly based on the 
Fonterra price. However, the volatility in dividend, and share values, is Fonterra specific and 
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could influence member attitudes and commitment to their co-operative. The shares are held 
by members at full market value, accounting for about 11% of their assets. 
 
5.0 Research Process 
The research process has been designed around six specific steps which describe the process 
through which the research outcomes will be met.  It needs to be noted that although each 
step is described separately, some activities may be undertaken concurrently during various 
stages of the research. Flexibility has been deliberately embedded into the approach to 
provide for unforeseen obstacles or opportunities and to take account of researcher and 
participant working environments. An important objective and output of this process are four 
manuscripts that were either published, accepted for publication, under peer review or 
prepared for submission in peer reviewed journals.  
5.1 Step One ‐ Problem statement 
In Step One, the problem statement, which presents the research gap that this research will 
seek to address, is explained. The problem statement was informed by the literature and an 
understanding of the research context, as well as conversations with leading academics in the 
area of co-operative research. The problem statement has been described previously (page 
17). 
5.2 Step Two – Defining the Research Objective 
Based on the problem statement and informed by the literature, in Step Two, the research 
objectives are defined. As discussed earlier, this research will have three main objectives – 
i. To review the literature on general co-operative theory, commitment, heterogeneity 
and social capital; and to develop a conceptual framework. 
ii. To establish a measure of commitment and heterogeneity within the membership base 
of co-operatives. 
iii. To explore and analyse the relationship between commitment and heterogeneity 
within the membership base of co-operatives. 
5.3 Step Three - Comprehensive Review of Literature & Development of a Conceptual 
Framework 
A review of prior, relevant literature is an essential feature of any academic project and an 
effective review creates a firm foundation for advancing knowledge (Webster and Watson 
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2002). It facilitates theory development, closes areas where a plethora of research exists, and 
uncovers areas where research is needed (Webster and Watson 2002).  This review 
systematically synthesises the literature on the co-operative organisational form within the 
contexts of commitment, heterogeneity and social capital. 
Informed by the literature review, a conceptual framework that provides for a non-
conventional examination of co-operatives from a socio-psychological perspective was 
developed (Figure 1). This framework brings together three key socio-psychological 
dimensions (i.e. commitment, heterogeneity and social capital) within the co-operative 
membership base. In Figure 1 these dimensions are represented as circles within a larger 
square box. The framework assumes that each dimension incorporates a number of 
components (constructs) that have been emphasised in research on co-operatives. In Figure 1, 
these components are shown as rectangular boxes within the larger square box. The line 
between the larger square boxes indicate the direction of relationship between the three 
dimensions. As indicated by the lines, the commitment dimension is influenced by both 
heterogeneity and social capital dimensions. The social capital dimension is influenced by the 
heterogeneity dimension but not the commitment dimension.  The heterogeneity dimension is 
not influenced by either commitment or social capital dimensions (Figure 1).  Further, it is 
hypothesised, that the relationship between heterogeneity and social capital is negative 
(inverse), i.e. when heterogeneity is high social capital is low and when heterogeneity is low 
social capital is high. This is represented by either a negative or positive sign on the lines 
(Figure 1). It is further argued that this relationship is expressed in the form of member 
commitment, with commitment having a positive relationship with social capital and a 
negative one with heterogeneity. Thus, the framework assists in identifying key components, 




Figure 1 Three-Dimensional Conceptual Framework for Examining Co-operatives 
 
5.4 Step Four – Data Collection 
The survey strategy, a deductive approach, is commonly used in business and management 
for exploratory and descriptive research (Remenyi, Williams et al. 1998, Saunders, Lewis et 
al. 2011). This allows for the collecting of cross sectional primary data that can be analysed 
using descriptive and inferential statistics (Schindler and Cooper 2005, Saunders, Lewis et al. 
2011). Hence, descriptive and inferential approaches using the survey strategy is chosen as 
the research method for this study. 
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Primary data can be collected by two approaches - observation and communication 
(Schindler and Cooper 2005). Observation involves the direct observation and recording of 
the behaviour of individuals according to well-designed rules and regulations, and is used less 
frequently in social research (Bryman 2008). In our research primary data was collected using 
the communication approach using a survey strategy. 
Step four will begin with the development of a quantitative instrument capable of measuring 
commitment and heterogeneity within the co-operative membership base. This is a complex 
and technically challenging task as many of the issues identified (in step one) have been 
measured very poorly in agricultural co-operatives in general and have never been measured 
in the New Zealand context. Considerations were given to how best these concepts can be 
quantified and how the data might be captured, from where or from whom. Literature was 
reviewed to determine what additional approaches are possible and likely to be useful. This 
led to the construction of a draft set of measures.  
Pilot Study 
Pilot studies are small-scale trial runs that researchers undertake in order to pre-test how well 
their proposed research designs such as sampling designs and survey questions work (Gray 
2009, Denscombe 2010). Results from the pilot study are very useful for improving the 
content validity of the research instrument and to plan for ensuring the main survey will run 
smoothly (Sekaran and Bougie 2016). 
A pilot study using semi-structured questionnaires administered by the interviewer and 
involving a convenience sample of 10 members of dairy co-operatives, was conducted to 
obtain comment and guidance on - the validity of the indicators, how well they match or 
reflect the research objectives, and what modifications, enhancements, or amendments are 
required. Following this process and based on the comments received modifications to the 
measures were made. 
Main Study 
In a survey, there are several methods of primary data collection available to be chosen, i.e. 
mail, internet, telephone, and face to face. The specific choice depends on many aspects of 
the survey research process and has implications for response rate, question form, the quality 
of survey estimates and survey costs (Fowler Jr 2013). For the main study, the designed 
instrument, i.e. self-administered structured questionnaires, were mailed to 2000 members of 
Fonterra Co-operative Group that were randomly selected by a Fonterra manager. The 
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researchers were blind to the member’s names and only had access to the postal contact 
information of the members. A packet that contained a cover letter, an information sheet, the 
survey questionnaire and a return envelope were mailed to this sample of 2,000 Fonterra 
members in July 2017. After six weeks a reminder was sent out in September to those 
members that did not respond. The estimated sample size for a finite population of 10,000 
farmers, a 95% confidence level and a margin of error of 5% is 370.  
In addition to primary data, secondary data was also be collected. The purpose of the 
secondary data was to inform the context of this research and therefore included information 
on co-operatives (global and NZ), agricultural co-operatives (global and NZ) and dairy co-
operatives (global and NZ). More specifically, secondary data on Fonterra was collected to 
provide important background information and further refine the context.  
5.5 Step Five – Data Analysis 
Quantitative data are analysed using statistical techniques and these can be divided into two 
broad types – descriptive and inferential (Leedy and Ormrod 2005, Wiersma and Jurs 2009, 
Saunders, Lewis et al. 2011).  Descriptive data analysis techniques as the name implies are 
used to explore, present and describe data; while inferential data analysis techniques are used 
to make inferences about a large population using small sample data  (Leedy and Ormrod 
2005, Saunders, Lewis et al. 2011). In Step five the data collected was analysed using both 
descriptive and inferential statistics.   
5.6 Step Six - Results & Discussion 
The results and discussion section describe the important findings, compares them with 
previous work, and rationalizes them using casual arguments, speculations and deductive 
arguments. In Step six the results and discussions were structured in a manner that they align 
with the core questions that chapter 2 to chapter 5 of this thesis address.  
5.7 Step Seven – Conclusions & Recommendations 
In Step seven the key findings of the thesis are summarized, the main limitations are 
mentioned, the implications of the research are highlighted and the possible avenues for 
future research are discussed.  The main outcomes from this thesis is that it presented a non-
economic centric perspective of co-operatives and helped identify key socio-psychological 
priorities for agricultural co-operatives in general and dairy co-operatives in specific; thereby 
facilitating longer term strategic planning in a manner that would enable the co-operative 
model to be better nurtured and grown. 
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Figure 2. The Research Process Outline  
 
6.0 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is comprised of 6 chapters.  
1
• Writing the Problem Statement
2
• Defining the Objectives
3








• Data Analysis - descriptive and inferential statistics
• Organisational commitment
• Commitment to collective action
• Heterogeneity
6
• Results & Discussion
• Member organisational commitment & member commitment to 
collective action
• Heterogeneity and member commitment to collective action
• Heterogeneity and member organisational commitment 
7
• Conclusions & Reccomendtations
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Chapter 1: This chapter provides an overview of the background and specific context within 
which this research is set. It then presents the problem statement, the aims and objectives of 
this research, the research approach and outlines the research process.  
Chapter 2: This chapter presents a conceptual framework that encapsulates commitment, 
heterogeneity and social capital.  The conceptual model developed is grounded in these three 
phenomena. Therefore, at a functional level, the framework forms the basis for examining 
and describing the level of and relationship between the three important phenomenon – 
commitment, heterogeneity and social capital, within the membership base of co-operatives. 
Since agricultural co-operatives play a significant role in the agribusiness sector in general 
and the New Zealand economy in specific (Garnevska, Callagher et al. 2017), the scope of 
this research is further narrowed down to focus on agricultural co-operatives. As this 
conceptual framework is derived from relevant literature, this chapter also contains an in-
depth literature review. This chapter addresses research question 1 and has been structured as 
a manuscript, which has been published in the Journal of Co-operative Organization and 
Management.  
Apparao, D., Garnevska, E., & Shadbolt, N. (2019). Examining commitment, heterogeneity 
and social capital within the membership base of agricultural co-operatives—A 
conceptual framework. Journal of Co-operative Organization Management. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcom.2019.03.003 
 
Chapter 3: In this chapter the member–co-operative relationship is decoupled into two forms 
of commitment, organisational commitment and commitment to collective action. Thereafter 
organisational commitment is unraveled into three components — 1) affective, 2) normative 
and 3) continuance; and commitment to collective action into two components – 1) patronage 
and 2) governance. Following which a framework that explores the links (and/or relationship) 
between a members’ organisational commitment and a members’ commitment to collective 
action in agricultural co-operative is presented. The framework is then applied to a large New 
Zealand dairy co-operative (Fonterra) and the relationship between the three components of 
organisational commitment and the two components of commitment to collective action are 
empirically analysed and discussed. This chapter addresses research question 2 and the 
manuscript has been submitted to the Journal of Co-operative Organization and 
Management.  
Chapter 4 In this chapter heterogeneity in agricultural co-operatives is disentangled into 
three dimensions- 1) farmer-member, 2) farming-business and 2) member-interest, and then 
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measured. A framework that explores the links (and/or relationship) between heterogeneity 
and members’ commitment to collective action in agricultural co-operative is also presented. 
Thereafter the framework is applied to a large New Zealand dairy co-operative (Fonterra) and 
the relationship between heterogeneity and member commitment to collective action is 
empirically analysed and discussed.  This chapter addresses research questions 2 and 3 and 
the manuscript has been accepted for publication in the International Journal of Co-operative 
Accounting and Management.  
Chapter 5: This chapter presents a framework that explores the links (and/or relationship) 
between heterogeneity and members’ commitment to organisational commitment in 
agricultural co-operatives. Following which the framework is applied to a large New Zealand 
dairy co-operative (Fonterra) and the relationship between heterogeneity and member 
commitment to organisational commitment is empirically tested, analysed and discussed.  
This chapter addresses research questions 2 and 3.  
Chapter 6: This chapter summarizes the key findings of this research, identifies its 
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Chapter 2: Examining commitment, heterogeneity and social capital within 
the membership base of agricultural co-operatives— A conceptual 
framework 
 
This chapter addresses research objective one and was published in the Journal of Co-
operative Organisation and Management, which is a leading international journal for the 
study of co-operatives. This journal specifically focuses on research questions that deal with 
how, why and when co-operative organizations occur and succeed, fail and disappear, and 
what can be done to influence the outcome. The manuscript presented in this chapter is 
therefore a well aligned with this journal. 
Apparao, D., Garnevska, E., & Shadbolt, N. (2019). Examining commitment, heterogeneity 
and social capital within the membership base of agricultural co-operatives—A 








Although purely economic (conventional) reasons play a significant role in the development 
and performance of (agricultural) cooperatives; so do other (non-conventional) factors. A 
comprehensive assessment of co-operatives therefore requires an examination of non-
conventional factors, in addition to the conventional factors. Three such non-conventional 
factors identified in the literature are 1) commitment, 2) heterogeneity and 3) social capital. 
Commitment is important for agricultural co-operatives because one pre-requisite for 
successful agricultural co-operatives is that farmer-members are willing to supply the co-
operative with raw products, capital and managerial inputs. In this research affective, 
continuance, normative and other aspects of member commitment are examined. 
Heterogeneity is an important source of concern for co-operatives due to its impact on 
cohesiveness and collective decision making. This study used characteristics associated with 
the farmer-member and the farm-business to examine heterogeneity. It has been suggested 
that the social capital paradigm is the common denominator for all explanations and theories 
on co-operative formation and development. A modified version of the six dimensions’ 
framework used by the World Bank to assess social capital was used in this study. Based on 
this theoretical underpinning, a Three-Dimensional Conceptual Framework, that encapsulates 
commitment, heterogeneity and social capital is developed and described. 
1.0 Introduction 
Despite the member-co-operative relational dimension being an important differentiator of 
the co-operative model from the more common Investor Owned Firm (IOF) model, and also a 
significant source of competitive advantage (Jussila, Goel, & Tuominen, 2012b), much of the 
work on co-operatives tends to focus on the non-relational aspects (Røkholt, 1999; Byrne, 
McCarthy, Ward, & McMurtry, 2012). The bulk of research about co-operatives have 
incorporated theoretical aspects and approaches such as agency theory (Eilers & Hanf, 1999), 
property rights theory (Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000) contracting theory (Sykuta & Cook, 2001) , 
transaction cost theory (Hendrikse & Bijman, 2002), and game theory (Karantininis & Zago, 
2001). Although these are useful in detailing the economic characteristics of the co-
operatives and explaining the reasons for the formation, existence and behaviour, they are not 




With respect to agricultural co-operatives most of the research is rooted in economic theory, 
which is based on assumptions about human behaviour that is not always empirically 
grounded (Österberg & Nilsson, 2009). Furthermore, the empirical studies that exist are 
mainly focused on applying the behaviour model of cooperatives as a profit-maximizing firm;  
and empirical applications of the other existing models is lacking (Soboh, Lansink, Giesen, & 
Van Dijk, 2009). The absence of empirical application could be due to difficulty in obtaining 
the relevant data, lack of interest on the part of applied economists, or lack of theoretical 
approaches that are well developed for empirical application (Soboh et al., 2009). Besides, 
the existing empirical studies on the performance of agricultural co-operatives frame co-
operatives as being profit-maximizing firms; and these studies have been identified as being 
mainly of two types – 1) studies that measure financial and other types of economic ratios 
and 2) studies that measure (economic) efficiency (Sexton & Iskow, 1993). Additionally, the 
empirical studies concerning the financial performance of agricultural co-operatives pre-
dominantly use financial ratios and are not based on any formal behavioural model. 
Nearly 80 years ago Bakken and Schaars (1937) stated that co-operative organizations are 
occasionally alluded to as self-liquidating corporations; and their success may cause their 
destruction. Furthermore, with the evolving nature of the co-operative organisational form, a 
rethink on how co-operatives are traditionally examined, evaluated and interpreted is 
required. While the conventional financial and economic rationale for measuring co-operative 
performance and explaining the reasons for being a member of a co-operative continue to be 
important, there is a parallel view that stresses the need to recognise the critical role of other 
factors (Fulton, 1999; Iliopoulos & Cook, 1999; Nilsson, Svendsen, & Svendsen, 2012). 
Besides, given that members assess their co-operatives in social terms in addition to 
economic ones; some reorientation of research on agricultural co-operatives with a focus on 
the socio-psychological perspective of members is also suggested (Österberg & Nilsson, 
2009). One such approach involves the viewing of co-operatives from a non-conventional 
perspective or lens. 
Since social factors play an important role in the formation, development and performance of 
co-operatives, it is surprising that they have not been considered as a probable and significant 
challenge and/or cost, as specific strategies are pursued by co-operatives. One reason for this 
is the inherent complexity that they present. Factors such as the long-time horizons of 
decisions, the delayed effects of decisions on these factors, the incrementality of the negative 
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effects, the difficulty in measuring them makes understanding, acknowledging and acting on 
the issues posed by these factors complex to address (Cook, 1995; Nilsson et al., 2012).  
The methodology underpinning the non-conventional focused research on co-operatives 
should not be confused with the more traditional finance and economics centric methods of 
assessing co-operatives. While both are concerned with explaining the co-operative position, 
they are essentially based on different orientations and approaches to the compilation and 
organisation of knowledge. However, the essential point is that co-operatives are influenced 
by a variety of factors operating together. The analysis of co-operatives therefore requires a 
multi‐faceted exploration and an ability to analyse numerous factors against each other. For 
example, although at first glance the lower rates of participation in co-operative governance 
by the membership might be a cause of concern in itself; but when viewed against changes 
that are occurring in the co-operative as a result of growth in size of the membership base, the 
real issue might be linked more to other underlying phenomenon. It needs to be stressed that 
a non-conventional approach to examining co-operatives does not ignore the conventional 
views or values, but instead presumes that the study of co-operatives is incomplete if it does 
not include other components that are a defining feature of co-operatives. This non-
conventional lens therefore provides a greater understanding of co-operatives, enabling an 
analysis of multiple factors and determinants; and compliments the conventional economic 
and finance centric view on co-operatives. 
The aim of this paper is to develop and describe a conceptual model that provides a 
comprehensive framework for examining co-operatives from a non-conventional perspective. 
To achieve this a robust literature search was performed and three factors – i) commitment, 
ii) heterogeneity and iii) social capital – that several scholars have highlighted as being vital 
to co-operatives were identified, described and analysed. The conceptual model developed is 
grounded in these three factors. Therefore, at a functional level, the framework forms the 
basis for examining and describing the level of and relationship between the three important 
factors – commitment, heterogeneity and social capital, within the membership base of co-
operatives. Since agricultural co-operatives play a significant role in the agribusiness sector 
in general and the New Zealand economy in specific (Garnevska, Callagher, Apparao, 
Shadbolt, & Siedlok, 2017), the scope of this research is further narrowed down to focus on 
agricultural co-operatives.  
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To comprehend this conceptual framework, an explanation of commitment, heterogeneity and 
social capital with relevance to co-operatives is required. The next section (Section 2) 
therefore explains the methodology used to perform a literature review of commitment, 
heterogeneity and social capital. This is followed by (Section 3) a summary of literature on 
commitment, heterogeneity and social capital with respect and relevance to co-operatives. 
This literature review informs the design and description of the Conceptual Framework, 
which is explained in Section 4. Finally, the conclusions of this research are presented in 
Section 5.   
2.0 Methodology 
A method grounded in the integrative literature review was chosen. This is because, the 
integrative review is the most comprehensive methodological approach of reviews and allows 
for the inclusion of both qualitative and quantitative research; as well as experimental and 
non-experimental studies. Thereby presenting an opportunity to fully understand the 
phenomenon being studied.  It also combines data from theoretical and empirical literature, 
and has a wide range of purposes, such as definition of concepts, review of theories and 
evidence, and analysis of methodological problems of a topic. It helps in creating a consistent 
and comprehensive vista of complex concepts, theories or problems that are relevant for 
researchers. It is therefore a valuable theory- building technique, while also enabling 
frameworks and perspectives on the topic to be generated (Torraco, 2005).  
Consequently, the search strategy primarily involved searching research databases for 
research material on – commitment, heterogeneity and social capital – with specific relevance 
to co-operatives. Key articles were mainly obtained from Discover, Scopus, Web of Science 
and Google Scholar research databases.   
In order to ensure that relevant research was not missed, the search terms and time frame 
remained broad. The search terms were “commitment or heterogeneity (or diversity as a 
substitute for heterogeneity) or social capital” plus “co-operatives”.  There were no language 
restrictions used. Research were eligible for consideration in this review if - 1) the focus of 
the research was commitment, or heterogeneity or social capital; and 2) there was a direct 
relevance to co-operatives or if it provided critical insight into the general theory on 
commitment or heterogeneity or social capital. Additionally, a comprehensive search was 
made of Internet resources in New Zealand and internationally. Several sites were searched, 
although the primary sites used were the University of Wisconsin-Madison Centre for Co-
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operatives, the Canadian Co-operative Research Network and the International Co-operative 
Alliance.  
As a result of the search of research databases and internet sources a pool of eligible articles 
were generated.  Thereafter, the abstracts, results, discussion and conclusion sections of the 
eligible articles were read by the researcher and a score between 0 – 10 was assigned to each 
article. The score was based on two critical parameters 1) Quality of the study; and 2) 
Linkage (agreement with) to the aim of this research. Those articles that received a score of 5 
or greater out of 10 were retained in this study while those that scored less than 5 were 
rejected.  The pool of retained (selected) articles were then classified by each of the three 
central themes (i.e. commitment, heterogeneity, and social capital) under two possible 
categories – 1) Non co-operative specific and 2) Co-operative specific. For example, with the 
case of commitment, articles that were not specific to co-operatives, such as the work by 
Meyer and Allen (1987), were classified under the Non co-operative specific category of 
Commitment. While articles that were specific to co-operatives, such as the article by Fulton 
(1999) were classified under the co-operative specific category of Commitment.  
In the next stage, a critical analysis of the selected articles was performed. Steps were taken 
to ensure the review is presented in a clear and complete manner to the reader; and to include 
relevant and detailed pieces of information. Based on the interpretation of results and 
synthesis of information, a comparison of the article to a theoretical reference was provided. 
This enabled identifying gaps in knowledge as well as provide direction for the framework 
and future studies. At the end of the review of each of the three themes, the authors own 
inferences and conclusions were also summarised and provided.   
3.0 Commitment, Heterogeneity and Social Capital 
3.1 Commitment  
Becker (1960) defines commitment as the tendency to persist in a course of action (Becker, 
1960); while, Meyer and Herscovitch (2001), define commitment as a force that binds an 
individual to a course of action of relevance to one or more targets (Meyer & Herscovitch, 
2001). In more specific terms, commitment refers to joint values, goals and actions in a 
relationship leading to the intention of relationship continuation and deployment of resources 
(Mäkelä & Maula, 2006).  
Commitment has been identified to be quite important in  business relationships (Scheer & 
Stern, 1992). For example, commitment has been associated with stronger cooperation and a 
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desire for mutual profitability (Anderson & Weitz, 1992); greater access to market 
intelligence and loyalty, and being important for successful long-term relationships 
(Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer, 1995). Commitment can also influence the preferences for 
dealing with existing partners (Gounaris, 2005) and a propensity for relation continuity 
although alternatives exist (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). 
Commitment can occur on different levels such as between individuals, between individuals 
and organizations, and between organizations (Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; Meyer, Stanley, 
Herscovitch, & Topolnytsky, 2002). Meyer & Allen (1987), argue that members of an 
association differ greatly in their degree of commitment to the organisation. Moreover, apart 
from the degree of commitment, there is also a difference in the form of commitment; and 
three distinct forms of commitment – affective, continuance and normative have been 
identified. It has been suggested that by  knowing the differences in the form  (as well as 
amount) of commitment an individual has to a group are likely to affect the degree and kind 
of influence that the group can exert upon him (Meyer & Allen, 1987).  
Commitment in Co-operatives 
As co-operatives rely on long-term and repeated exchange relationships with their members 
to generate a collective benefit that is greater than the sum of inputs of individual members 
(Jussila, Goel, et al., 2012b); commitment has been identified to be important in co-
operatives. More specifically, one pre-requisite for successful agricultural co-operatives is 
that the farmer-members are willing to supply the co-operative with raw products, capital and 
managerial inputs (Fulton, 1999; Zeuli & Cropp, 2004); and member commitment is likely to 
be important for this to happen (Staatz, 1989; Anderson & Henehan, 2005).   
According to Fulton (1999), with respect to co-operatives,  commitment can be defined (in 
simplistic terms) as the preference of co-operative members to patronize a co-operative even 
when the co-operatives price or service is not as good as that provided by an Investor Owned 
Firm (IOF). However, such a simplistic view does not fully explain commitment because the 
concept of member commitment in co-operatives is multifaceted, since members have 
different roles in relation to the co-operative. Members participate in /engage with their co-
operatives in a number of ways, ranging from, economic patronage to attending meetings, 
serving on committees, serving as elected officers, and/or in the recruitment of other 
members (Gray & Kraenzle, 1998).  For example, as patrons, by either selling or buying 
larger or smaller volumes they can affect the utilization of the production capacity. As the 
financier of the co-operative they can affect the co-operatives ability to finance its 
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investments. As the governors of the co-operative, their commitment to vote for directors and 
participate in the governance structure can affect the degree of control management has on 
the board (Bhuyan, 2007). This wider participation in, and engagement with the co-operative 
is one of the reasons that makes the co-operative form different (Gray & Kraenzle, 1998).  
Commitment improves co-operative performance in several ways. For example, it  reduces 
the transaction costs in member-co-operative transactions because the likelihood of 
opportunistic behaviour is reduced since committed members are less likely to behave as free 
riders  in their dealings with the co-operative (Bijman & Verhees, 2011). Commitment also 
incorporates in its members, a willingness to make a sacrifice to contribute to the 
organizations success (Solinger, Van Olffen, & Roe, 2008) and committed members are more 
likely to make an effort towards delivering to the co-operative’s strategy – for example 
greater customer-orientation (Cechin, Bijman, Pascucci, & Omta, 2013).  
Further, committed members are more likely to hold the management and board to high 
standards of performance (Trechter, King, & Walsh, 2002). Since participation and 
commitment have a mutual effect, if members are not committed, they may not want to invest 
the time and effort required in participating in the governance of the co-operative (Bijman & 
Verhees, 2011). Moreover, not only does participation in governance support commitment to 
the co-operative in general, it also supports commitment to the decisions of the board of 
directors, and thereby makes implementation of those decisions more easy (Reynolds, 1997; 
Bijman & Verhees, 2011) 
Studying commitment throws valuable light on the nature of the relationship of members to 
their co-operative. Although not exhaustively researched, it is not a new phenomenon 
(Cechin et al., 2013); and it has been studied by several researchers  Several factors have 
been identified and argued or empirically shown to affect members commitment to the co-
operative (Fulton & Adamowicz, 1993; Fulton, 1999; Fulton & Giannakas, 2001). These 
include, social, economic and organisational factors as well as co-operative characteristics 
such as - the age of the members, complexity, role of the co-operative in the members 
financial health, size of the co-operative, heterogeneity of member base, and type of co-
operative (Bijman & Verhees, 2011; Jussila, Goel, et al., 2012b).  
In summary, commitment is a broad phenomenon, and an integral attribute of relationships, 
especially long-term relationships. It has a unique yet significant relevance to co-operatives 
in general and agricultural co-operatives in specific. This is based not only on the fact that the 
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farmer-member and agricultural co-operative relationship is a long term one characterised by 
repeated exchanges, but also because member commitment is required for the expression of 
other properties that are unique and essential for co-operatives. A decrease in member 
commitment can have a material impact on agricultural co-operative performance with the 
most visible feature being member’s exiting the co-operatives; and if enough number of 
members exit, the co-operative will cease to exist. Additionally, a low level of member 
commitment can also influence co-operative performance by causing reduced participation in 
governance, non-alignment with the co-operative strategy, increased opportunistic and free-
rider behaviour, reduction in patronage (as suppliers of buyers) and greater reluctance to 
supply the co-operative with capital. These can hinder co-operative performance and could 
potentially lead to its demise. It is therefore important to measure and monitor commitment 
within the membership base of the co-operative. Although commitment has been studied 
within the field of co-operative research, empirical studies are very limited. Moreover, there 
are few empirical studies that measure the psychological and social aspects of member 
commitment in agricultural co-operatives. 
3.2 Heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity (or Homogeneity) has an important bearing on collective action; and several 
studies have explored the relationship between group heterogeneity and the performance of 
common property institutions (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004).  Studies have suggested that 
heterogeneity can have diverse sources.  Baland and Platteau (1996) suggest that the major 
sources of heterogeneity result from racial, ethnic, or other kinds of cultural divisions, and the 
differences in the nature of economic interests among individuals. While Vedeld (2000) 
identifies five forms of heterogeneity: (1) heterogeneity in endowments; (2) political 
heterogeneity; (3) wealth and entitlements; (4) cultural heterogeneity; and (5) economic 
interests. 
Scholars have found that heterogeneous groups have more difficulty in reaching a common 
definition of group goals, managing flow of work, sustaining members’ attention and 
cooperation, minimizing turnover, and encouraging knowledge sharing over time (Malone, 
1987; Jackson et al., 1991; Chompalov, Genuth, & Shrum, 2002; Okhuysen & Bechky, 
2009). Similarly, studies have indicated that group heterogeneity, which is derived from 
member differences in knowledge, expertise, or experience, can increase group creativity, but 
only if group members bridge their social and intellectual differences and work on behalf of 
the group as a whole (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Homan, Van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & 
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De Dreu, 2007). Further, it is argued that group heterogeneity creates barriers to identification 
with the group as a whole because members do not feel psychologically connected to those 
who are different (O'Reilly III, Caldwell, & Barnett, 1989; Tsui, Egan, & O'Reilly III, 1992).  
Similarly, Hinds and Mortensen (2005) observed that group members are more likely to 
remain more identified with their smaller and more homogeneous group than with a larger 
heterogeneous group. Olson (1971) argues that members involved in collective action often 
strive to influence corporate structure and decisions to reflect their preferences, resulting in 
organisational policies that fail to benefit the membership as a whole. Similarly, according to 
Varughese and Ostrom (2001), when the interests of appropriators differ, achieving a self-
governing solution to common pool resource problems is particularly challenging.   
Heterogeneity in Co-operatives 
A core feature of co-operatives is that it’s characterised by collective decision making and 
self-governance. As heterogeneity affects this feature, it significantly impacts co-operatives. 
Hansmann (1996) argues that a fundamental characteristic of co-operatives is that members 
(patrons) have highly homogenous interests. This ensures that the cost of collective decision 
making is relatively lower for co-operatives; and this comparative advantage is one of the 
most important reasons for firms taking up a co-operative form (Hansmann, 1996). It also 
provides an explanation as to why co-operatives tend to stick to just one commodity or 
service. 
In co-operatives, services must be provided to all members of the group if provided to any, 
which sets it apart from other forms of organization (Olson, 1971). Due to which, co-
operatives need to often handle the combined demands of meeting individual member needs 
while maintaining a balanced and consistent quality of services to all members. At the same 
time, they also need to compete with firms that do not operate within a structure of member 
governance and consensus. According to Reynolds (1997), this need for consistency in policy 
and procedure in the co-operative business model makes the handling of diverse member 
interests more challenging for co-operatives than for business entities where each transaction 
is private and distinct from all other individual deals they make.  Furthermore, according to 
Iliopoulos and Cook (1999), as membership becomes diverse in a co-operative, various and 
sometimes conflicting interests needs to be addressed by the co-operative.  
Reynolds (1997) suggests that the pressures from having to consider diverse interests build 
new values and innovative ideas for co-operatives and hence heterogeneity could be 
beneficial to the co-operatives. However, in contrast, Bijman (2005) argues that the functions 
58 
 
of a co-operative maybe negatively affected by heterogeneity of members due to issues 
involving coordination and commitment, as well as decision making, influence and agency 
costs. As the control of co-operatives is structured democratically, heterogeneity is likely to 
generate transaction costs to co-operative decision-making. As argued by Hansmann (1996), 
an increase in these transaction costs results in higher decision-making costs in co-operatives 
relative to IOF’s. Similarly, according to Pozzobon, Zylbersztajn, and Bijman (2011), as a 
consequence of heterogeneity, decision making in traditional co-operatives is likely to be 
more costly than in investor owned firms. 
On the whole, conflicting preferences can generate problems in co-operatives (Kalogeras, 
Pennings, van der Lans, Garcia, & van Dijk, 2009). For example, increasing heterogeneity 
could result in a decline in member commitment (Fulton & Giannakas, 2001) and a decrease 
in member willingness to supply equity capital (Van Bekkum, 2001), increasing costs related 
to damaging influence activities (Cook, 1995), tedious decision making process (Hansmann, 
1996) and lack of strategic focus (Hendrikse & Bijman, 2002). These in turn are likely to 
affect the performance of co-operatives. Therefore identifying members preferences and the 
heterogeneity for the attributes is fundamental for understanding co-operatives structure and 
behaviour (Kalogeras et al., 2009).  
While several scholars have highlighted the role, importance and impact of heterogeneity on 
co-operatives; empirical studies that examine heterogeneity and map out its expression are 
few in number. According to Kalogeras et al. (2009), the lack of empirical evidence, which 
can negatively affect the quality of decision-maker choice and researcher understanding of 
co-operative behaviour, is due in part to data constraints as well as difficulties in determining 
member preferences, which are not always directly observable, and in accounting for their 
heterogeneous nature.   
In summary, heterogeneity (or diversity) is an inherent property of any group or collective. It 
has a significant bearing whenever collective decision making is required. This is because a 
rise in heterogeneity leads to members in the group increasingly wanting different outcomes 
and consequently arriving at an optimal decision in an effective and efficient manner 
becomes progressively challenging. This phenomenon has a significant impact on co-
operatives in general and agriculture co-operatives in specific. As agricultural co-operatives 
become larger and more complex in their operations, membership becomes increasingly 
diverse (heterogeneous). The increase in heterogeneity is often suggested as a challenge to 
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the co-operative model. The effect of heterogeneity on the co-operative model stems from the 
fact that individual farmer-members are different (heterogeneous) in terms of their interests 
with respect to the co-operative. Apart from resulting in a rise in decision making costs, an 
increase in heterogeneity can have other significant negative effects on the co-operative such 
as – a decrease in member commitment, increase in opportunistic and free rider behaviour, 
and poor governance. It is therefore important to measure, monitor and better understand the 
phenomenon of heterogeneity. In agricultural co-operatives, heterogeneity is primarily driven 
by attributes that are personal (farmer-individual) and business (farming-business) related. A 
heterogeneity (or diversity) in the attributes therefore powers the heterogeneity in member 
interests. Although heterogeneity has been stated to be an important issue in co-operatives, 
research studies on heterogeneity are very few and empirical studies of heterogeneity in 
agricultural co-operatives are lacking.  
3.3 Social Capital 
Although no agreed definition of social capital exists, most of them contain references to 
norms, values, relationships, connections, networks as the characteristic feature of social 
capital. According to Lyda Hanifan social capital can be defined as those tangible assets that 
count for most in daily lives of people: namely goodwill, fellowship, sympathy, and social 
intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit (Hanifan, 1916). 
According to Putnam (1993), social capital refers to any features of social organisation, such 
as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefits. 
Ostrom (1994) believes that social capital is the arrangement of human resources to improve 
the flow of information to generate future income. Fukuyama (1995) defined social capital as 
the ability of people to work together for common purposes in groups and organizations. 
Woolcock (1998) suggests, social capital, as a broad term encompasses the norms and 
networks facilitating collective action for mutual benefit; and more generally it can be 
defined as the information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inherent in one's social networks. 
For the sake of simplicity social capital can be defined as the links, shared values and 
understandings in society that enable individuals and groups to trust each other and so work 
together (Brian, 2007).  
A fundamental complexity of social capital is that it has two very divergent attributes – an 
individual feature and a group feature. Which in essence makes it a property of individuals, 
but only by virtue of their membership of a group (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). Social capital 
is especially important for interpersonal behaviours, business decisions and government 
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actions (Feng, Friis, & Nilsson, 2016). Further, a unique attribute of social capital is that its 
stocks increase rather than decrease through use, for example, trust demonstrated today will 
be amplified tomorrow; whereas physical capital is worn out or consumed, (Woolcock, 
1998). On the whole, having achieved considerable importance, social capital has been 
regarded as a constructive element in the creation and maintenance of economic prosperity 
(Fukuyama, 1995), regional development (Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2001), collective 
action (Ostrom, 1994) and democratic governance (Putnam, 1993, 1995).   
Social Capital in Co-operatives 
Although none of the definitions of co-operatives explicitly state the inclusion of social 
capital, they all indicate that co-operatives are based on the existence of social capital. 
According to Nilsson et al. (2012) the social capital paradigm is the common denominator for 
all explanations and theories on co-operative formation and development. In co-operatives, 
the planning of future joint business activities and adaptation to unforeseen contingencies all 
depend on the degree of mutual understanding, trust, and personal sympathy existing between 
members; and internal coordination and resource allocation in co-operatives is primarily 
determined by the quality of interpersonal relations between its members (Valentinov, 2004). 
It is suggested that the existence of such a social foundation of cooperation which gave rise to 
the democratic and people-oriented character of co-operatives, is an critical differentiating 
feature between co-operatives and IOF’s  (Valentinov, 2004).  Further, co-operatives have an 
inherent double nature. Every co-operative represents simultaneously – 1) an association of 
persons in the sense of sociology and social psychology, (i.e. social group), and 2) a joint 
enterprise owned and operated by the same members of the group (Bonus, 1986).  
In the early part of the existence of co-operatives, they formed a tightly connected group, 
such that co-operatives tended to be quite similar to one another and very different from other 
business forms.  But co-operatives tend to become more corporate like as they develop 
through time and that in the later stages of the life cycle the aspirations of the managers rather 
than those of the farmers are realized (Hind, 1997). Nilsson et al. (2012) view this as an 
expression of less social capital.  
Attaining large size is critical for many co-operatives. It lowers average costs through 
economies of scale as well as delivers benefits through economies of scope. But a study by  
Nilsson et al. (2012) found that large complex co-operatives are slowly loosing social capital; 
and the profits generated from economies of scale and scope could quite easily be outweighed 
by the loss sustained from the reduction of social capital (Nilsson et al., 2012). This would 
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typically be expressed as – less trust amongst members and between members and leaders, 
alienation and passivity amongst members, low involvement, weak democratic governance, 
private good provision rather than collective good provision, wide spread free riding, low 
satisfaction and loss of solidarity (Valentinov, 2004; Nilsson et al., 2012).  
Similarly, as the co-operative horizontally integrates, its membership base increases; and with 
it so does the level of member heterogeneity (Nilsson & Madsen, 2007). As the size and/or 
member heterogeneity of a group expands, maintaining social capital becomes increasingly 
difficult (Coulter, Goodland, Tallontire, & Stringfellow, 1999; Markelova, Meinzen-Dick, 
Hellin, & Dohrn, 2009). In such a situation the members feel increasingly alienated (Nilsson 
et al., 2009; Ostenberg & Nilsson, 2009).  
As discussed earlier, social capital theory suggests that small cooperatives with simple 
business operations have more social capital in their membership base than large complex 
cooperatives; and therefore the geographical and social proximity among members and 
between members and leadership fosters social capital (Feng et al., 2016). A recent study by 
Feng et al. (2016) investigated this phenomenon empirically using data from member surveys 
in three Swedish farm supply and grain marketing cooperatives that vary in size from about 
150 to 36,000 to members. The findings of the study suggest that the smaller the co-
operative, the higher the social capital expressed in terms of members involvement, trust, 
satisfaction and loyalty (Feng et al., 2016). Based on their findings, the authors suggest that a 
cooperative with a focused strategy (and business orientation), most likely has a small 
homogenous membership, so the members may have the same interests, communicate with 
each other, meet the leadership, etc., that is, there may be strong involvement within the 
membership (Feng et al., 2016).  
Since co-operatives need social capital to be competitive, the drain of previously high stocks 
of social capital could be an important reason for the failure of a co-operative (Nilsson et al., 
2012). Importantly, Nilsson et al. (2012) note that if a co-operative is un-aware of the 
comparative advantage it possess in terms of social capital, and does not therefore protect it, 
it risks losing this form of capital and with it a significant source of comparative advantage. 
But, despite its importance, traditionally, social capital has been ignored as capital by both 
researchers and decision makers of co-operatives (Nilsson et al., 2012). Given that social 
capital plays an instrumental role in the formation and development of cooperatives, it is 
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surprising that the reduction in social capital has not been considered as a probable and 
significant challenge and cost, as specific strategies are pursued by cooperatives.  
In summary, social capital is a broad concept with specific relevance to social organisations 
(such as communities, groups, collectives etc.); and is comprised of several characteristic 
features such as norms, values, trust, networks and communication. It is a key element 
required for creating and maintaining - economic prosperity, development, collective action 
and governance. With respect to co-operatives, social capital is considered to be vital because 
it forms the social foundation upon which the co-operative exists. A significant loss of social 
capital could result in the erosion of this foundation and possibly lead to its demise or 
collapse. This decrease in social capital tends to occur when the co-operative grows to 
become a larger and more complex organisation. Moreover, a decrease in social capital can 
negatively affect co-operative performance by leading to – a decline in trust, reduced 
participation, weak governance, increased opportunistic and free riding behaviour, low 
satisfaction and loss of cohesion.  It is therefore important to measure and monitor social 
capital in co-operatives. However very little research has been done in the area of social 
capital and co-operatives; and given the complexity it presents empirical studies that examine 
social capital in agriculture co-operatives are significantly lacking.  
4.0 A Conceptual Framework for Examining Co-operatives  
For the purpose of this research a novel framework that allows for the examination of co-
operatives from a non-conventional perspective is conceptualized. The framework is 
constructed on the premise that a comprehensive examination of co-operatives, which 
encapsulates the social, psychological, organisational and economic aspects within the 
membership base, can be structured on three dimensions: commitment, heterogeneity and 
social capital.  
In the conceptual framework, a strong emphasis is given towards objectively examining these 
three dimensions in agricultural co-operatives via outcomes than can be anticipated and 
measured. The reason being, demonstration of clearly observable results, and the way in 
which results are measured, are seen as necessary to the study of co-operatives from a non-
conventional perspective that this research is pursuing. 
4.1 The Commitment Dimension 
As discussed previously, member commitment in co-operatives is a complex and multi-
faceted phenomenon.   In the conceptual framework, the commitment dimension is related to 
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empirically measuring these complex aspects of member commitment in agricultural co-
operatives. Consequently, grounded in the three component model developed by Allen and 
Meyer (1990), the key commitment based outcome areas that this research is examining are – 
1) affective, 2) continuance 3) normative and 4) other.   
i. Affective commitment - Allen and Meyer (1990) defined this component  of 
commitment as the affective or emotional attachment to the organisation such that the 
strongly committed individual identifies with, is involved in, and enjoys membership 
in the organisation. With respect to agricultural co-operatives, this component 
captures how strongly the farmer “wants” to be a member of the co-operative.  
ii. Continuance commitment - This component of commitment has largely been 
viewed as a tendency to engage in consistent lines of activity based on the individuals 
recognition of the costs (“lost side bets”) associated with discontinuing the activity 
(Becker, 1960; Farrell & Rusbult, 1981; Rusbult & Farrell, 1983). Hence, anything 
that increases the cost associated with leaving an organization has the potential to 
create continuance commitment (Meyer & Allen, 1991).  In agricultural co-
operatives, this component measures how strongly the farmer “needs” to be a member 
of the co-operative.  
iii. Normative commitment - This component of commitment was defined by Wiener 
(1982) as the totality of internalized pressures to act in a way which meets 
organizational goals and interests, and suggests that individuals exhibit behaviours 
solely because they believe it is the “right “and “moral” thing to do; and is based on a 
belief about ones responsibility to the organisation (Meyer & Allen, 1991). This 
component captures how strongly farmers believe that being a member of the 
agricultural co-operative is the “moral” and “right” thing to do.  
iv. Other commitment – Informed by the literature on commitment in co-operatives, 
this category (other) captures attributes that are very specific to commitment in 
agricultural co-operatives such as – participation in governance and decision making, 
propensity for opportunistic and free rider behaviour, and concern for the co-
operative’s future.  
4.2 The Heterogeneity Dimension 
The heterogeneity dimension explores the factors that influence, or have influenced, co-
operatives via the introduction of greater heterogeneity within the membership base. As 
discussed earlier, there are many factors that can impact heterogeneity. However, since this 
64 
 
research is grounded in agricultural co-operatives, it is driven by the most important sources 
of heterogeneity in agricultural co-operatives. As identified by Cook and Iliopoulos (1999), 
and in order of importance, these sources of heterogeneity include: 1) differences between 
members in terms of volume of production, 2) variance in members education levels, 3) the 
geographic dispersion of membership, 4) differences between members in terms of farm 
objectives, 5) increased non-farm income for some members, 6) variance in members age, 7) 
the number of different commodities produced by members, and 8) the number of different 
inputs procured by members.  
This framework further expands on these sources and groups them under one of two possible 
constructs – 1) Farmer-member (individual) derived, or 2) Farm business (enterprise) 
derived.  
i. Farmer-member (individual) derived sources are primarily related to attributes 
directly associated with the farmer such as the farmers’ age, gender, level of 
education etc.  
ii. Farm business (enterprise) derived sources are primarily related to attributes 
associated with the farming business such as the farm size, quality of milk produced, 
gross farm revenue, total farm assets etc.  
4.3 The Social Capital Dimension 
The social capital dimension aims to capture the characteristics of the co-operative 
organisational form from a social construct. However, as discussed previously, capturing and 
measuring social capital in co-operatives is complicated. Further, no study that we are aware 
of has comprehensively measured social capital in agricultural co-operatives. Given the 
limited amount of research and the need for a holistic instrument for measuring social capital, 
this research  is driven by the framework developed by the World Bank for measuring social 
capital (Grootaert, 2004). This framework captures social capital within the membership base 
along six themes – 
i. Groups and networks – this examines the nature and extent to which a member 
participates in various types of social organisations and informal networks. 
ii. Trust and solidarity – this reviews the degree of trust that exists towards other 
members of the co-operative, key service providers, and strangers and how these have 
changed over time. 
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iii. Collective action and co-operation - this examines whether and how members have 
worked with others in their co-operative on joint projects and/or in response to a 
crisis. 
iv. Information and communication - this reviews the routes through which members 
receive information and the extent to which they have access to communication 
infrastructure. 
v. Social cohesion and inclusion - this identifies the nature and extent of the divisions 
and differences that exist, and the mechanisms by which they are managed. 
vi. Empowerment and political action – this aims to examine the extent to which 
individuals have control over institutions and processes that directly affect them. 
4.4 Framework Constructs  
As described earlier, the conceptual framework brings together three important dimensions 
associated with a non-conventional examination of co-operatives. However, an important 
consideration is that although the three dimensions are presented at the macro-level, it needs 
to be noted and understood that there are several factors comprising each dimension, and it is 
by separating them into their component parts (constructs) that the relationships between the 
three can be examined, analysed and presented in–depth. For example, separation of 
commitment measures into affective, normative, and continuance outcomes could provide for 
greater insight into the distinct components within member commitment that exists. Based on 
this rationale, the three framework dimensions were further separated along 12 constructs. 
Appendix 1 lists these constructs and presents the sources that were critical to understanding, 
developing and framing of the constructs. 
4.5 A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Framework for Examining Co-operatives 
As indicated in Figure 1, the conceptual framework is centred on three dimensions – 
represented as circles within a larger square box. The framework assumes that each 
dimension incorporates several components (constructs) that have been emphasised in 
research on co-operatives. In Figure 1, these components are shown as rectangular boxes 
within the larger square box; and line diagrams with arrows at the end represent the 
connection between the components and the specific dimensions that they comprise.  
The line between the boxes indicate the direction of relationship between the three 
dimensions. As indicated by the lines, the commitment dimension is influenced by both 
heterogeneity and social capital dimensions. The Social capital dimension is influenced by 
the heterogeneity dimension but not the commitment dimension.  The heterogeneity 
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dimension is not influenced by either commitment or social capital dimensions (Figure 1).  
Further, it is hypothesised, that the relationship between heterogeneity and social capital is 
negative (inverse), i.e. when heterogeneity is high social capital is low and when 
heterogeneity is low social capital is high. This is represented by either a negative or positive 
sign on the lines (Figure 1). It is further argued that this relationship is expressed in the form 
of member commitment, with commitment having a positive relationship with social capital 
and a negative one with heterogeneity. Although a positive and negative connotation to the 
relationship between the three dimensions is provided, it needs to be noted that the 
relationship is not assumed to be linear. The three hypothesises that are framed based on this 
assumed relationship between – commitment, heterogeneity and social capital are - 
Hypothesis 1 – There is a negative relationship between Heterogeneity and Commitment 
Hypothesis 2 – There is a positive relationship between Social Capital and Commitment 
Hypothesis 3 – There is a negative relationship between Heterogeneity and Social Capital. 





It has been suggested that much of the work on co-operatives tends to focus on the non-
relational aspects such as efficiency; and a large part of the research on agricultural co-
operatives is centred in economic theory. However, members to a large extant assess their co-
operatives in social terms rather than only on economic ones. While the economic benefit 
reasons for being a member of a co-operative continue to be important, there is a parallel 
view that stresses the need to recognise the critical role of other factors that are not explicitly 
related to the financial or economic aspects of the co-operatives. Neglecting these other 
factors, which we term non-conventional factors, in the analysis and evaluation of co-
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is argued that a slight reorientation of research on agricultural co-operatives with an added 
focus on aspects that are not purely financial or economic is required.  
This research takes an important step towards addressing this gap in research; and contributes 
to the literature on agricultural co-operatives with a clear focus on expanding the scope of 
examining and analysing agricultural co-operatives. The research identifies and argues that 
commitment, heterogeneity and social capital within the membership base are critical non-
conventional factors influencing the co-operative organisational form.  Consequently, the 
Three-Dimensional Framework developed and described in this study provides a context 
within which these co-operative centric non-conventional factors (commitment, heterogeneity 
and social capital) can be comprehensively explored, measured, analysed and objectively be 
interpreted. As a result, this framework takes an important step towards providing a broader 
yet pertinent lens for examining and evaluating co-operative performance. Moreover, the 
framework creates a useful structure comprising of a range of variables that need to be 
considered by researchers when examining and analysing agricultural co-operatives.   
By encapsulating the three factors, the conceptual framework, adds value to the 
methodological literature on agricultural co-operatives by developing a novel and unique 
approach for examining agricultural co-operative performance. Further refinement of this 
framework will enable the next stage, its application to dairy co-operatives in New Zealand to 
be more effective. The insights generated from the application of this framework could be 
valuable for co-operative management as it has the potential to help lead to better informed 
decisions, especially around strategy, governance, policy, planning and implementation. 
Importantly, should future research suggest that member commitment is influenced by 
heterogeneity and social capital, it could have significant implications on how co-operatives 
are managed. 
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Appendix 1. The Frameworks Constructs 
Construct Source 
1. Commitment- affective Meyer and Allen (2004), Byrne and McCarthy 
(2005), Bijman and Verhees (2011),  Mazzarol, 
Soutar, and Limnios (2012), Jussila, Byrne, and 
Tuominen (2012)  
2. Commitment- continuance Meyer and Allen (2004), Bijman and Verhees 
(2011), Jussila, Goel, and Tuominen (2012a) , 
Mazzarol et al. (2012) 
3. Commitment- normative Meyer and Allen (2004), Byrne and McCarthy 
(2005), Bijman and Verhees (2011), Jussila, Roessl, 
and Tuominen (2014) 
4. Commitment – other Fulton (1999), Gaurwitsch and Nilsson (2010), 
Bijman and Verhees (2011), Cechin et al. (2013) 
5. Heterogeneity - farmer Iliopoulos and Cook (1999), Reynolds (1997), 
Kalogeras et al. (2009), Pozzobon et al. (2011) 
6. Heterogeneity- farm business Reynolds (1997), Iliopoulos and Cook (1999), 
Hendrikse and Bijman (2002); Kalogeras et al. 
(2009), Pozzobon et al. (2011) 
7. Social Capital- groups and 
networks 
Grootaert (2004), Bhuyan (2007), Megyesi, 
Kelemen, Schermer, Renting, and Oostindie (2010) 
8. Social Capital - trust and 
solidarity 
Grootaert (2004), Bhuyan (2007), Megyesi et al. 
(2010), Nilsson et al. (2012), Liang, Huang, Lu, 
and Wang (2015) 
9. Social Capital- collective action 
and co-operation 
Grootaert (2004), Valentinov (2004), Megyesi et al. 
(2010), Liang et al. (2015), Feng et al. (2016) 
10. Social Capital- information and 
communication 
Grootaert (2004), Megyesi et al. (2010) 
11. Social Capital- social cohesion 
and inclusion 
Grootaert (2004), Megyesi et al. (2010), Nilsson et 
al. (2012), Liang et al. (2015)  
12. Social Capital- empowerment and 
political action 









Chapter 3:  Member commitment in a large New Zealand dairy co-
operative: An empirical study 
 
This chapter addresses research objective two. It is submitted to the Journal of Co-operative 
Organisation and Management (JCOM) and is under peer review. This is a leading 
international journal for the study of co-operatives and it specifically focuses on research 
questions that deal with how, why and when co-operative organizations occur and succeed, 
fail and disappear, and what can be done to influence the outcome. As member commitment 
is a vital element that can influence the success, failure and disappearance of co-operatives, 






This paper explores the inter-relationship between three conceptualizations of attitudinal 
commitment, namely affective (affective attachment), continuance (perceived costs) and 
normative (obligation) and their relationship to commitment to collective action in dairy co-
operatives. Based on survey responses from 568 members of a NZ dairy co-operative (Fonterra 
Co-operative Group), the study measured the levels of affective (67.5%), normative (56.6%) 
and continuance commitment (53.9%); as well as commitment to collective action. (63.1%), 
and its two components commitment to patronage (59.4%) and commitment to governance 
(67.1%). Commitment to collective action showed a significant and positive relationship with 
affective and normative commitment, but not continuance commitment. For this cooperative, 
responding to and strengthening member affective and normative commitment, not 
continuance commitment, would improve member commitment to collective action. A 
significant and positive relationship was also found between affective and normative 
commitment; while the relationship between affective and continuance commitment was 
significant and negative. Both the control variables age and production volumes had a 
significant and positive relationship with commitment to collective action, indicating that the 
older farmers and those with larger farms are the mainstay of the cooperative members’ 
commitment to collective action.  Managerially, our study provides a roadmap for optimizing 
member commitment. Measuring these commitment metrics over time would enable Fonterra to 
better understand what activities resulted in changes to member commitment, a key to the 
future of the co-operative. Moreover, we recommend that the co-operative include member 
commitment as a key performance indicator and incentivise management to strengthen member 
commitment levels, especially affective commitment. 
 
Key Words: Commitment, affective, normative, continuance, collective action, co-operatives, 







1. Introduction  
The member-co-operative relational dimension is an important differentiator of the co-
operative model from the more common Investor Owned Firm (IOF) model, and also a 
significant source of competitive advantage (I. Jussila, S. Goel, & H. Tuominen, 2012a).   Yet 
much of the work on co-operatives tends to focus on the non-relational aspects such as 
efficiency (Røkholt, 1999; Byrne, McCarthy, Ward, & McMurtry, 2012). The bulk of 
agricultural co-operatives research is rooted in economic theory, which are based on 
assumptions about human behaviour that are not always empirically grounded (Österberg & 
Nilsson, 2009). Although it is important for co-operatives to be an efficient and productive 
business (e.g. being able to offer competitive prices and quality service) (Spear, 2000); there is 
a parallel view that they also need to have social efficiency (Birchall & Simmons, 2004; I. 
Jussila, S. Goel, & P. Tuominen, 2012b; Nelson et al., 2016). This is because members to a 
large extent assess their co-operatives in social terms in addition to purely economic ones. A 
study by Byrne and McCarthy (2014) of credit unions found that majority of members value 
the relational over, or to the same extent as, the technical dimensions of the credit union. Hence 
a reorientation of research on co-operatives  is required, with a greater focus on the socio-
psychological perspective of members (Österberg & Nilsson, 2009). One approach to achieving 
this in agricultural co-operatives is by studying member commitment (Apparao, Garnevska, & 
Shadbolt, 2019). 
Scholars have argued that member commitment is a critical and demanding task for co-
operatives and a basis of a strong and well-functioning co-operative (Fulton & Adamowicz, 
1993; Jussila, Goel, et al., 2012a; Puusa, Tuominen, & Havukainen, 2018; Apparao et al., 
2019). Member commitment is strategically important for co-operatives because member’s 
have multiple roles as owners, patrons, investors and members of a community of common 
purpose for which the enterprise was founded (Limnios, Mazzarol, Soutar, & Siddique, 2018). 
Furthermore, a pre-requisite for successful agricultural co-operatives is that farmer-members 
are willing to supply the co-operative with raw products, capital and managerial inputs (Fulton, 
1999; Zeuli & Cropp, 2004), and member commitment is important for this to happen (Staatz, 
1989; Anderson & Henehan, 2005; Cechin, Bijman, Pascucci, & Omta, 2013).  According to 
Palmer (2002), for established co-operatives, member commitment is the most significant 
influence on organisational effectiveness after formal governance. 
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It has been suggested that commitment improves co-operative performance in several ways. 
For example, Bijman and Verhees (2011) maintain that it  decreases the transaction costs in 
member-co-operative transactions because the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour is reduced 
since committed members are less likely to behave as free riders  in their dealings with the co-
operative. Solinger, Van Olffen, and Roe (2008) report that commitment incorporates in its 
members, a willingness to make a sacrifice to contribute to the organizations success, and 
Cechin et al. (2013) suggest committed members are more likely to make an effort towards 
delivering to the co-operative’s strategy. 
Fulton (1999) maintains that previously an assumption of high and stable member commitment 
in co-operatives was realistic because co-operatives faced relatively stable markets, 
membership bases were well defined, members were quite close to co-operatives and only few 
new co-operatives were being formed.  However, over time, the markets in which co-operatives 
operate have become highly dynamic, the rate of formation of new-co-operatives has increased,  
changes in co-operative’s characteristics are constantly happening, and farmer co-operatives 
have become larger, more complex and diverse, both in membership and activities. As a result 
the commitment of their members cannot be as logically assumed (Fulton, 1995; Fulton & 
Giannakas, 2001; Lang & Fulton, 2004; Byrne & McCarthy, 2005; Bhuyan, 2007; Österberg 
& Nilsson, 2009). 
For co-operative leaders, it is important that they support and increase their members desire to 
remain as members and active users of the organisation they own (Jussila, Byrne, & Tuominen, 
2012). Therefore managers of co-operative organizations need to evaluate member 
commitment, and how their strategies and operations affect it (Cechin et al., 2013). Given that 
member commitment is critical for agricultural co-operatives, the key question that arises is – 
“How can the co-operative leadership develop and implement strategies (i.e. member-facing 
as opposed to market-facing) that will strengthen or maintain member commitment”? To 
answer this question, one must first unravel commitment, which in-turn requires a framework 
that links organizational commitment to the interests and actions of members, that is, 
commitment to collective action. Drawing from the organisational behaviour literature, and 
specifically from Meyer and Allen (1991), we define organizational commitment as a 
psychological state that characterizes the members relationship with the co-operative, and 
has implications for the decision to continue or discontinue membership in the co-operative. 
Commitment to collective action, as explained by Cechin et al. (2013), involves a willingness 
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to make an effort towards the organization’s success; and not demonstrating behaviours that 
increase exit risk, side-selling and free-riding.  
This study decouples the member and co-operative relationship into two forms of commitment, 
1) organisational commitment and 2) commitment to collective action. It then unravels 
organisational commitment into three forms, i) affective, ii) normative and iii) continuance; 
and commitment to collective action into two forms, i) patronage and ii) governance. 
Thereafter, it examines the relationship between the three forms of organisational commitment 
and the two forms of commitment to collective action in co-operatives.  
Many co-operative studies have identified affective (emotive), continuance (utilitarian), and 
normative (ideological) dimensions of member commitment reflecting a member’s desire to, 
need to, and obligation to maintain membership in the co-operative (Jussila & Tuominen, 2010; 
Jussila, Byrne, et al., 2012; Jussila, Goel, et al., 2012a; Mazzarol, Soutar, & Limnios, 2012; 
Jussila, Roessl, & Tuominen, 2014). Some studies have examined the phenomenon of 
commitment to collective action in co-operatives (Cechin et al., 2013). While there has been 
significant theoretical development on this subject, less progress has been made empirically; 
and with few efforts to operationalize and test them. Moreover, empirical studies of members’ 
commitment, participation, satisfaction, loyalty and other behavioural elements are primarily 
qualitative (Limnios et al., 2018). Therefore, in this paper an effort is made provide a 
quantitative empirical test of the conceptualizations of member commitment.  
The primary objective of this paper is to explore and test the relationship between 
organisational commitment and members’ commitment to collective-action in a dairy co-
operative in New Zealand. A secondary objective is to explore the interrelationships between 
the three forms of organisational commitment, and also the two forms of commitment to 
collective action. In doing so, this paper integrates these different concepts and tests their links 
in the larger context of dairy co-operatives. Organizational commitment is a multidimensional 
attitudinal concept used to describe the relationship between an individual and an organization. 
To the authors’ knowledge, no study has explored the link between the three components of 
organisational commitment and commitment to collective action in agricultural co-operatives. 
A more general scientific contribution of this study is in applying the three component model 
(Meyer & Allen, 1991), originally developed for examining intra-organization commitment, to 
the  relationship between farmer-member and agricultural co-operative.  
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our theoretical framework on member 
commitment and formulates hypotheses on the expected relationships. Section 3 outlines the 
background, describes the data collection methods, explains the measurement of concepts and 
details the procedures for data analysis. Results are presented in Section 4 and discussed in 
Section 5.  The conclusions, implications and limitations are covered in the Section 6. 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis 
According to Achrol, Reve, and Stern (1983), a framework can be viewed as a first step in the 
direction of identifying and dimensionalising the major variables influencing and ordering the 
structure and processes of social entities. It is primarily an attempt to layout the variables and 
to chart a field of interaction.  We follow this recommendation.  The unit of analysis is the 
relationship between member and co-operative. This dyad forms the main construct around 
which the framework on member commitment revolves. Such a relational framework is 
required to meet both technical and relational needs (Byrne & McCarthy, 2014). A description 
of the major variables influencing member commitment and their interaction is provided. An 
illustration is included to present some clues about how this framework might be used for 
possible predictions. Since the objective was to develop a comprehensive framework, some 
topics have only been hinted at and not explained in detail.  
2.1 Commitment  
Becker (1960) defines commitment as the tendency to persist in a course of action; while,  
O'Reilly and Chatman (1986) defined commitment as a psychological attachment felt by the 
person for the organization. In more specific terms, commitment refers to joint values, goals 
and actions in a relationship leading to the intention of relationship continuation and 
deployment of resources (Mäkelä & Maula, 2006). Commitment has been identified to be 
important in  business relationships (Scheer & Stern, 1992), and has been associated with 
stronger cooperation and a desire for mutual profitability (Anderson & Weitz, 1992), greater 
access to market intelligence and loyalty, and being important for successful long-term 
relationships (Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer, 1995). Commitment can also influence the 
preferences for dealing with existing partners (Gounaris, 2005); and a propensity for relation 
continuity although alternatives exist (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Morgan & Hunt, 1994).  
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2.2 Organisational Commitment 
The examination of commitment in the area of organizational behaviour is primarily focused 
on the role it plays in systems that are characterized by employer (i.e., the organization) and 
employees. Porter, Steers, Mowday, and Boulian (1974) defined organisational commitment 
as the relative strength of an individual’s identification with and involvement in a particular 
organisation. Meyer and Herscovitch (2001) suggest organisational commitment can be viewed 
as a binding force that is experienced as a mind-set or as a psychological state that leads an 
individual towards a particular course of action. Although many definitions have been proposed 
for organisational commitment, an underlying and recurring theme appears to be the idea of a 
psychological bond between the member and the organisation, which can be conceived as an 
intrinsic attachment or identification of a person with something outside of oneself (Firestone 
& Pennell, 1993).  In co-operatives, organizational commitment has often been referred to as 
“member-commitment” (Jiménez, Martí, & Ortiz, 2010), and it has been suggested that it plays 
an important role in the formation and development of co-operatives (Puusa et al., 2018). 
2.2.1 Components of Organisational Commitment  
Gouldner (1960) found that commitment to one organisational value is sometimes independent 
of commitment to another, leading him to conclude that commitment is not a homogenous and 
unidirectional variable, but a multidimensional phenomenon.  These arguments were supported 
by Meyer and Allen (1987) who identified that members of an association can differ greatly in 
their degree of commitment to the organisation, and apart from the degree of commitment there 
is also a difference in the form of commitment. 
According to Meyer and Allen (1987), three distinct yet general themes, affective attachment, 
perceived costs and obligation, reflect several conceptualizations of attitudinal commitment in 
literature. Thus, commitment is viewed as having an affective orientation toward the 
organisation, recognition of the costs associated with leaving the organisation, and a moral 
obligation to remain with the organisation. These distinct themes were labelled as “affective”, 
“continuance” and “normative” commitment. These themes are important because they involve 
the psychological state reflected in commitment, the antecedent conditions leading to its 
development, and the behaviours that are expected to result from commitment (Allen & Meyer, 
1990).  Moreover, common to the three components and an underlying basis of the model is 
the view that commitment is a psychological state that (a) characterizes the employee’s 
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relationship with the organization, and (b) has implications for the decision to continue or 
discontinue membership in the organization (Meyer & Allen, 1991). As a result, each member 
of the organisation has a commitment profile reflecting his or her degree of desire (affective), 
need (continuance), and obligation (normative) to remain. These factors are also widely 
accepted within the field of marketing as key drivers of customer commitment (Keiningham et 
al., 2017). The interconnections between trust, satisfaction and loyalty to organizational 
commitment have been studied in research of consumer behaviour  (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; 
Mukherjee & Nath, 2007; Keiningham, Frennea, Aksoy, Buoye, & Mittal, 2015).  For example, 
Keiningham et al. (2017) in their study of customer commitment and customer experience, 
decoupled customer experience (CE) into five domains—cognitive, emotional, physical, 
sensorial, and social—and examined examining how each of these domains impacts the CE. 
2.2.1.1 Affective commitment 
Buchanan (1974) conceptualised commitment as a partisan affective attachment to the goals 
and values, and to the organisation for its own sake, apart from its purely instrumental worth. 
Thereafter, this dimension of commitment was defined by Allen and Meyer (1990) as the 
affective or emotional attachment to the organisation such that the strongly committed 
individual identifies with, is involved in, and enjoys membership in the organisation. 
Importantly, in simplistic terms, organisational members who are committed to an organisation 
on an affective basis continue working for the organisation because they want to (Meyer & 
Allen, 1991). In co-operatives, the affective dimension of commitment is based on emotional 
attachments to and bond with the co-operative (Foreman & Whetten, 2002; Byrne & McCarthy, 
2005; Jiménez et al., 2010; Jussila, Byrne, et al., 2012). It reflects the members desire to remain 
attached to the particular co-operative, as the relationship feels good, brings a sense of 
belonging, and is satisfying (Byrne & McCarthy, 2005). 
2.2.1.2 Continuance commitment  
According to Stebbins (1970), continuance commitment is the awareness of the impossibility 
of choosing a different social identity, because of the high penalties associated with making 
the switch. This form of commitment has largely been viewed as a tendency to engage in 
consistent lines of activity based on the individuals recognition of the costs (“lost side bets”) 
associated with discontinuing the activity (Becker, 1960; Farrell & Rusbult, 1981; Rusbult & 
Farrell, 1983). It has been proposed that the continuance component of organisational 
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commitment will develop on the basis of two factors – the magnitude and the number of 
investments (or side bets) individuals make and a perceived lack of alternatives, and may have 
two aspects to it, calculative commitment (an assessment of the sacrifices the leaving will 
entail) and imperative commitment (there are no alternatives) (Allen & Meyer, 1990; Meyer, 
Allen, & Gellatly, 1990). Anything that increases the cost associated with leaving an 
organization has the potential to create continuance commitment (Meyer & Allen, 1991). In 
co-operatives, it is suggested that continuance commitment is calculative and rational in nature 
and refers to a members need to stay in order to gain the benefits of membership (Jussila, Goel, 
et al., 2012a).  
2.2.1.3 Normative commitment  
Normative commitment was defined by Wiener (1982), as the totality of internalized pressures 
to act in a way which meets organizational goals and interests, and suggests that individuals 
exhibit behaviours solely because they believe it is the “right” and “moral” thing to do. 
Similarly, Best (1994) states that committed individuals enact specific behaviours due to the 
belief that it is morally correct rather than personally beneficial. According to Wiener (1982), 
the normative component of organisational commitment is influenced by the individuals 
experiences both prior to (familial or cultural socialization) and following (organisational 
socialization) entry into the organisation. In co-operatives,  normative commitment reflects the 
members sense of duty to remain a patron because they feel as though they ought to maintain 
that relationship (Byrne & McCarthy, 2005). This moral obligation manifests itself when a 
member considers that opportunistic behaviour is wrong; and the member thereby is willing to 
maintain their contribution (Fulton & Adamowicz, 1993; Jussila et al., 2014). 
2.3 Commitment to Collective Action in Co-operatives 
Through collective action, groups of agricultural producers both small and large, come together 
to make joint investments in processing and marketing facilities, share a collective reputation, 
bargain with supplying, processing and retailing firms, gain access to markets, and to spread 
costs of extension services (Bouamra-Mechemache & Zago, 2015). Collective action is thus 
an inherent feature in agriculture and represents an efficient way to increase market access and 
the competitiveness of food chains (Bouamra-Mechemache & Zago, 2015).  
Co-operatives are one such important collective action group in agriculture. Members 
participate in and engage with their co-operatives in a number of ways, ranging from, economic 
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patronage to attending meetings, acting as managers, serving on committees, serving as elected 
officers, and recruiting  other members (Gray & Kraenzle, 1998).  As patrons, by either selling 
or buying larger or smaller volumes they can affect the utilization of the production capacity. 
As the financier of the co-operative they can affect the co-operative’s ability to finance its 
investments. As the governors of the co-operative, their commitment to vote for directors and 
participate in the governance structure can affect the degree of control management has on the 
board (Bhuyan, 2007). This wider participation in, and engagement with, the co-operative is 
one of the reasons that makes the co-operative form different (Gray & Kraenzle, 1998). If 
member participation is restricted to purely economic reasons, a co-operative would be little 
different from other forms of business. We define this attribute, i.e. the member’s wider 
participation and engagement with the co-operative as the member’s commitment to collective 
action.  
As explained by Cechin et al. (2013), in co-operatives, commitment to collective action can be 
viewed as the members’ willingness to sacrifice short-term economic gains and contribute 
towards the co-operative’s long-term success. However, individually, members might not be 
willing to assume these collective-action responsibilities and short-term costs resulting in the 
free rider problem (Cook, 1995). Moreover, according to the rational choice literature, which 
is based on the assumption that human behaviour is self-interested, achieving cooperation 
toward collective objectives is inherently problematic (Olson, 1971) . Yet collectives and co-
operatives exist and operate successfully. A key element to overcoming this problem is by 
improving a member’s commitment to collective action, as it motivates individuals to act 
cooperatively in pursuit of shared collective goals. It has been suggested that commitment to 
collective action reduces side selling thus preventing economic costs for the co-operative 
resulting from idle capacity, decreases free-riding behaviour, and increases willingness to make 
an effort towards the organization’s success (Cechin et al., 2013). 
2.3.1 Components of Commitment to Collective Action in Co-operatives 
In this study, we decouple member commitment to collective action into two components 1) 
commitment to patronage and 2) commitment to governance. The commitment to patronage 
component is based on the premise that co-operatives rely on long-term and repeated exchange 
relationships with their members to generate a collective benefit that is greater than the sum of 
the inputs of individual members (Jussila, Goel, et al., 2012a); and if enough patrons are 
disloyal then the co-operative will cease to exist (Fulton & Adamowicz, 1993).  The 
86 
 
commitment to governance component is based on the premise that members’ participation in 
the governance of a co-operative is the distinctive characteristic of this form of organization 
(Gray & Kraenzle, 1998), and  is conceptually similar to an organizational citizenship 
behaviour of civic virtue (Barraud-Didier, Henninger, & El Akremi, 2012). It is defined as an 
individual’s mobilization and active participation in the life of his or her organization, and the 
fact of feeling concerned by what goes on within that organization (Organ, 1988; Organ, 
Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2005). This behaviour results in better performance of the 
organisation (Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & Blume, 2009; Whitman, Van Rooy, & 
Viswesvaran, 2010); and can therefore drive the success of farming co-operatives (Gray & 
Kraenzle, 1998; Bhuyan, 2007). 
2.4 Hypotheses  
We propose that co-operative members who feel an emotional attachment to the co-operative 
and have a want or desire to be a member (affective commitment) are likely to have a positive 
attitude towards the co-operative and therefore have high levels of commitment to collective 
action. Similarly, members who believe that they have a responsibility or obligation towards 
the co-operative (normative commitment), are also likely to have a positive attitude towards 
the co-operative and therefore have high levels of commitment to collective action. In contrast, 
members who remain within the co-operative because they perceive that the costs of leaving it 
are too high or because they have no alternative but to continue as members (continuance 
commitment), may feel frustrated and have a negative attitude towards the co-operative, 
resulting in low levels of commitment to collective action. 
Thus, the following hypotheses are proposed–  
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between Affective Commitment and 
Commitment to Collective Action 
Hypothesis 2: There is positive relationship between Normative Commitment and 
Commitment to Collective Action. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between Continuance Commitment and 
Commitment to Collective Action. 
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In the co-operative context and to the authors’ knowledge, organizational commitment has not 
been used to explain a members’ commitment towards collective action. 
Additionally, it is proposed that members with an emotional attachment to the co-operative 
(affective commitment) believe that they have a responsibility or obligation towards the co-
operative (normative commitment). In contrast, members who remain within the co-operative 
because they perceive that the costs of leaving it are too high or because they have no 
alternative but to remain (continuance commitment), have low levels of emotional attachment 
(affective commitment) to the co-operative and also low levels of belief that they have a 
responsibility or obligation towards the co-operative (normative commitment). Lastly, it is also 
proposed that members with a strong propensity for continued patronage of the co-operative 
will also be active participants in the governance of the co-operative. 
This leads to further hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4: There is positive relationship between Affective Commitment and Normative 
Commitment  
Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relationship between Affective Commitment and 
Continuance Commitment 
Hypothesis 6: There is negative relationship between Normative Commitment and 
Continuance Commitment. 
Hypothesis 7: There is a positive relationship between Commitment to Patronage and 
Commitment to Governance. 






3.1.1 Dairy Industry and Dairy Co-operatives in NZ 
The dairy industry plays a significant role in New Zealand’s economy. It provides employment 
to about 47,310 people and accounts for 28% of NZ’s export revenues. Producing 21.3 million 
tonnes of milk, NZ is the 8th biggest milk producer in world (Shadbolt & Apparao, 2016). 
Moreover as it exports 95% of its production, it is the largest dairy exporter in the world, 
accounting for over 30% of global dairy trade (Shadbolt & Apparao, 2016).  
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Globally, farmer-owned co-operatives play a rather dominant role in the dairy industry with 
market shares above 80% in milk collection in the U.S.A, the major dairy countries in Western 
Europe and also in Australia and New Zealand (Chaddad, 2007). In NZ, the first dairy co-
operative was established in 1871.  Since then, dairy co-operatives have played a significant 
role in the NZ economy, and continue to do so (Garnevska, Callagher, Apparao, Shadbolt, & 
Siedlok, 2017). In 2016/17, dairy co-operatives accounted for over 86% of NZ’s milk 
processing. The four major dairy co-operatives in NZ, Fonterra Co-operative Group (NZ$ 19.2 
billion), Tatua Dairy Company (NZ$ 0.32 billion), Westland Milk Products (NZ$ 0.62 billion) 
and the Dairy Goat Co-operative (NZ$ 0.19 billion) had combined total revenues of NZ$ 20.4 
billion for the 2016/17 financial year. This approximates to a contribution of about 7.5% of 
NZ’s GDP (NZ$ 270 billion).  
3.1.2 Fonterra 
The Fonterra Co-operative Group (Fonterra) was formed in 2001, from a merger of two large 
NZ co-operatives, New Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi Cooperative Dairies, and the New 
Zealand Dairy Board.  With revenues of about NZ$ 20 billion in 2016/17, it is the largest 
business enterprise in New Zealand. Fonterra is owned by around 10,000 self-employed dairy 
farmers in NZ and sources about 22 billion litres of milk from NZ and overseas milk pools. It 
is the largest dairy exporter in the world, employs 22,000 people globally, exporting products 
to 140 countries.  
Farmer members can own two types of shares in Fonterra, wet shares and dry shares. The wet 
shares are based on their level of production, additionally they can also own dry shares up to a 
co-operative cap of 20% of total shares (Shadbolt & Duncan, 2016). Fonterra is governed by 
an eleven-member board (seven elected farmer shareholders and four appointed) with voting 
based on wet shares held. In addition, it has a 25 member shareholders’ council which 
represents the views of all members as suppliers, owners and investors. Each councillor is 
elected by farmers within the ward they represent, and voting is based on one vote per 
shareholder, more akin to traditional cooperative elections.  
Fonterra was formed under the Dairy Industry Restructuring Act (DIRA), 2001. At that stage 
it had a nearly 95% of New Zealand’s milk supply so the DIRA was structured to encourage 
competitors and reduce the percentage to more globally acceptable levels. Now it is closer to 
80% of NZ milk production, with almost all members having choice of who to supply, the new 
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processors all being mostly overseas owned corporates. DIRA enabled the drop in market share 
through an unusual feature, for a co-operative, which was open entry and open exit at full 
market value (Shadbolt & Duncan, 2016). Shareholders could leave the co-operative with the 
full cashed up value of their shares with just a few months’ notice. As a result, the co-operative 
was, and is, vulnerable to members leaving so relies heavily on member commitment and 
loyalty to maintain milk supply.  
Despite the drop in market share the volume of milk sourced by Fonterra has increased, by 
28% over the last 10 years, reflecting increasing world demand for dairy. In 2016/17, Fonterra 
paid its farmer owners, NZ$ 6.12 / kilograms of milk solids (kg MS) and a dividend of NZ$ 
0.40 per share. However, given Fonterra’s significant exposure to global markets, there has 
been volatility in both milk price and dividend payments. Over the 10 year period (2007 to 
2017), milk price ranged from NZ$ 3.90 /kg MS (2015/16) to NZ$ 8.40 /kg MS (2013/14); 
while the dividend payments ranged from NZ$ 0.07 (2007/08) to NZ$ 0.45 (2008/09) per share. 
The milk price volatility has been felt by all New Zealand farmers, with competitor milk prices 
mostly based on the Fonterra price. However, the volatility in dividend, and share values, is 
Fonterra specific and could influence member attitudes and commitment to their co-operative. 
The shares are held by members at full market value, accounting for about 11% of their assets. 
3.2 Data Collection  
3.2.1 Sample 
A survey method was used to collect data on member commitment. Prior to the survey, a pilot 
study using a semi-structured interview method was conducted using ten dairy farmers chosen 
by convenience. Results of the pilot study informed the development and refinement of the 
questionnaire. The structured questionnaire that was finalised following the pilot study, was 
then sent to a random sample of 2,000 members of Fonterra between July 2017 and November 
2017. This sample of 2,000 member farmers of Fonterra was randomly generated by a Fonterra 
manager and their postal contact details was provided to the researchers. Hence, the researchers 
were blind to the member’s names. A cover letter, an information sheet, the survey 
questionnaire and a return envelope were mailed to the sample of 2,000 Fonterra members in 
July 2017. After six weeks, a reminder was sent out to those members who had not responded.  
Of the 2,000 surveys, 294 (15%) were returned by the postal service as being undeliverable.  
Of the remaining surveys (1,706), 576 were returned by the respondents, giving a response rate 
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of 34%.  After the initial survey round 384 (67%) responses were obtained and a further 192 
(33%) were received after sending the reminder. Of the 576 responses that were returned, eight 
were classified as being incomplete and were discarded from the analysis, leaving the study 
with a sample of 568 responses that were used in the analysis.  
3.2.2 Measures  
For the set of items related to organisational commitment and commitment to collective action 
respondents had to mention their degree of agreement according to a Likert type 7-point scale 
(from 1: Strongly disagree to 7: Strongly agree). 
Organisational Commitment:  Organisational commitment was measured by the three 
component model and scale developed by Allen and Meyer (1990). The statements were 
purposefully modified to suit the measurement of the farmer and co-operative relationship in a 
dairy co-operative.  All three components, affective, continuance and normative commitment, 
were measured using eight statements (items) for each. “I enjoy discussing my co-operative 
with people outside it” is an example of an item from the affective commitment scale.  
Similarly, “It would be too costly for me to leave my co-operative right now” is an example of 
an item used to measure continuance commitment; and “I do not believe that a member must 
always be loyal to his or her co-operative” is an example of an item from the normative 
commitment scale. 
Commitment to Collective Action: Commitment to collective action measures were based on 
the items developed by Cechin et al. (2013) and  Barraud-Didier et al. (2012). These were 
further adapted to measure commitment to collective action within the context of dairy co-
operatives. First, the farmers propensity for continued supply, importance placed on the 
relationship with the co-operative, and willingness to invest in the co-operative were 
considered as an indicator of commitment to patronage of the co-operative.  Second, farmer’s 
readership of annual reports, attendance of the cooperative’s meetings and voting on co-
operative matters were considered as an indicator of commitment to governance of the co-
operative.  
Control variables: Member’s age and farm production volume were used as control variables 
because they are often associated with commitment variables (Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, & 
Topolnytsky, 2002; Trechter, King, & Walsh, 2002; Lind & Åkesson, 2005; Barraud-Didier et 
al., 2012). Farmers may display different attitudes or behaviours towards the co-operative 
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depending on their age or the size of the farm under their responsibility (Klein, Richards, & 
Walburger, 1997; Hansen, Morrow, & Batista, 2002; Österberg & Nilsson, 2009). Age was 
captured in years under 6 levels (1. 18-30, 2. 31-40, 3. 41-50, 4. 51-60, 5.61-70 and 6. 70+). 
Production volumes were measured as kilogram milk-solids produced for the 2015/16 season 
and was recorded under 6 categories (1. < 50,000, 2. 50,000 – 100,000, 3. 100,000 – 150,000, 
4. 150,000 – 200,000, 5. 200,000 – 300,000, 6. > 300,000).  
3.3 Statistical Analysis  
Data was analysed using SPSS (IBM® SPSS Statistics).  First, a scale reversal was performed 
for the inverted scale statements. Second, a descriptive analysis of the data set was conducted 
by determining the median, mode, mean, standard deviation and frequencies of the variables.  
Third, the construct reliability of the statements used to measure affective, normative and 
continuance commitment as well as commitment to collective action was determined using the 
Cronbach Alpha. Fourth, a principal component analysis (PCA) was performed to examine and 
confirm the constituent components of commitment to collective action.  Fifth, the affective 
commitment, normative commitment, continuance commitment, commitment to collective 
action, commitment to patronage and commitment to governance scores were determined.  The 
affective, normative and continuance commitment score for each respondent was calculated by 
summing the responses to each of the eight statements used to measure them. Since the scale 
length for each statement was 7, the lowest score possible is 8 (8 x 1) and the highest possible 
score 56 (8 x 7).  The commitment to patronage and commitment to governance scores for each 
respondent was calculated by summing the responses for the three statements used to measure 
each of these. As the scale length for each statement was 7, the lowest score possible is 3 (3 x 
1) and the highest score 21 (3 x 7).  Thereafter, the commitment to collective action score for 
each respondent was calculated as the sum of the six statements (i.e.  3 patronage and 3 
governance statements) with the lowest score possible being 6 (6 x 1) and the highest possible 
score 42 (6 x 7).  Sixth, a Pearson correlation was performed to identify whether a linear 
relationship existed between organisational commitment, commitment to collective action and 
the control variables. Seventh, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to examine 
the relationship between the three forms of organisational commitment.  
Lastly, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used to test for the relationship between 
organisational commitment and commitment to collective action using the following model: 
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𝑌𝑗 = 𝐵1 + 𝐵2𝐴𝑗 + 𝐵3𝑁𝑗 + 𝐵4𝐶𝑗 + 𝐵5𝐾𝑗 + 𝐸𝑗 
Where Yj represents commitment to collective action, Aj represents affective commitment, Nj 
represents normative commitment, Cj represents continuance commitment and Kj represents 
the control variables (members age and farm production). A similar analysis was performed by 
substituting the dependent variable CCA (Yj) with the commitment to patronage and 
commitment to governance variables in the model.  
4. Results 
4.1 Organisational Commitment 
4.1.1 Reliability  
The Cronbach alpha of the statements used to measure the three different constructs of 
organisational commitment were all greater than 0.70, indicating that the statements were a 
reliable measure of the underlying construct being studied (Table 1). The Cronbach alpha of 
affective commitment was highest (0.87). While that for continuance commitment was the 
lowest (0.75). The Cronbach alpha for the eight statements used to measure normative 
commitment was 0.76 (Table 1). 
4.1.2 Descriptive Statistics for Organisational Commitment 
The mean affective commitment score was 37.8 (SD = 9.7) which is 67.5% of the potential 
maximum score (Table 1). Scores ranged from 9 (n = 1) to 56 (n = 3). The median was 39 with 
25% and 75% of respondents having AC scores less than 31 and 45 respectively. 74.3% (n = 
422) of respondents had an affective commitment score greater (High AC) than the mid-point 
of 32. 
The mean continuance commitment score was 30.2 (SD = 9.0), which is 53.9% of the potential 
maximum score (Table 1). The scores ranged from 8 (n = 1) to 56 (n = 1). The median was 29, 
with 25% and 75% of respondents having CC scores less than 23 and 37 respectively.  42.6% 
(n = 242) of respondents had a continuance commitment score greater (High CC) than the mid-
point of 32.  
The mean normative commitment score was 31.7 (SD = 8.1), which is 56.6% of the potential 
maximum score (Table 1). The scores ranged from 8 (n = 1) to 56 (n = 1). The median was 32, 
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with 25% and 75% of respondents having NC scores less than 26 and 37. 51.7% (n = 294) of 
respondents had a normative commitment score greater (High NC) than the mid-point of 32. 
4.2 Commitment to Collective Action 
4.2.1 Reliability  
The Cronbach alpha of the six statements used to measure commitment to collective action was 
0.72. Since this is greater than the accepted threshold of 0.70, they can all be considered reliable 
measures of the underlying construct, i.e. commitment to collective action. Excluding five of 
the statements resulted in a decrease in Cronbach alpha (Table 2), whereas deleting the 
statement A good relationship with the cooperative is more important than a higher milk price, 
resulted in a slight increase (0.73) (Table 2).  However, since there was a positive correlation 
(0.29) with the total, and the increase in Cronbach alpha was only 0.01, all 6 statements were 
included in the analysis. 
4.2.2 Principle Component Analysis of Commitment to Collective Action 
Based on the principal component analysis (PCA), two components had eigen values greater 
than the cut-off value of one, and both components together explained 61.4% of the variance 
(Table 3).   Consequently, we identified two constructs or latent variables or factors.  
Based on the grouping of the statements, we identify that the three items (manifest variables) 
on governance (Reading the Co-operatives Annual report (G1), Attending Co-operatives 
meetings (G2) and Voting on Co-operative matters (G3)) load heavily on Component 1 (Figure 
2). Similarly, we also identify that the three items (manifest variables) on patronage (Continue 
to sell to the Co-operative (P1), Milk price vs relationship with the Co-operative (P2), Investing 
in the Co-operative (P3), load heavily on Component 2 (Figure 2). Consequently, we name the 
latent variables captured by components 1 and 2 as governance and patronage respectively.  
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Figure 2. Principal Components of commitment to collective action 
 
 
4.2.3 Descriptive Statistics for Commitment to Collective Action 
The mean and median patronage score was 12.4 (SD = 3.6) and 13.0 respectively and ranged 
from 3 (n = 6) to 21 (n = 3). The mean (14.1, SD = 4.1) and median (15.0) governance score 
was slightly higher and also ranged from 3 (n = 8) to 21 (n = 16) (Table 4). Consequently, the 
mean and median CCA score was 26.5 (SD = 6.3) and 27.0 respectively and ranged from 6 (n 
= 1) to 42 (n = 1). The mean commitment to patronage, governance and collective action were 
59.4%, 67.1% and 63.1% of the maximum possible score, respectively.  
4.3 Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables 
The mean age category of respondents was 4.2 (SD = 1.2) and the median was 4.0 (Table 1); 
these correspond to the 51- 60 years category. The mean production level category of 
respondents was 3.9 (SD = 1.6) and the median was 4.0 which equated to a production of 
150,000 to 200,000 kg MS. This is similar to the New Zealand average (156,223 kg MS) for 





4.4.1.1 Commitment Variables  
There was a significant (P < 0.01) and positive correlation (0.32) between commitment to 
patronage and commitment to governance. Affective commitment was significantly (P < 0.05) 
and positively correlated with both commitment to patronage (0.60) and commitment to 
governance (0.41) and therefore to commitment to collective action (0.62). Similarly, NC was 
significantly (P < 0.05) and positively correlated with both commitment to patronage (0.60) 
and commitment to governance (0.29) and therefore to commitment to collective action (0.57). 
However, the correlation between CC and commitment to patronage (-0.03), governance (-
0.06) and collective action (-0.06) was not significant and weakly negative (Table 5).   
There was a strong positive (0.57) and significant (P < 0.05) correlation between AC and NC 
(Table 5). The correlation between AC and CC was also significant (P < 0.05), but negative (-
0.11). However, the correlation between CC and NC (P = 0.08) was not significant at 5% LOS 
and was weakly positive (0.07) (Table 5).  
A categorisation of organisation commitment scores into high and low levels based on the mid-
point score of 32.0, and a Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel test thereafter, reiterated that there was a 
significant association (P <0.05) between AC and CC, and also AC and NC, while the 
relationship between CC and NC was not significant. Interestingly, 19.2% (n = 109) of 
respondents had high levels of AC, CC and NC; while 10.9% (n = 62) had low levels of all 
three components of organisational commitment (Table 6A and Table 6B).  Similarly, 
categorisation of patronage and governance scores into high and low levels based on the mid-
point score of 12.0, showed that there was a significant association (P <0.05) between the two. 
59.1% (n = 336) had high levels of patronage and governance, while 9.1% (n = 52) had low 
levels of both.   
4.4.1.2 Control Variables & Commitment 
Age was found to be significantly (positive) correlated (P < 0.05), to AC, NC, CCA and 
commitment to governance (Table 5). However, it was not correlated with CC and commitment 
to patronage. Production level was significantly (P < 0.05) correlated with (positive) AC, 
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(negative) CC, (positive) CCA and (positive) commitment to governance.  It was not 
significantly correlated with NC and commitment to patronage.  
4.4.2 Analysis of Variance  
4.4.2.1 Organisational Commitment 
Amongst the organisational commitment variables, there was a significant relationship (P < 
0.05) between AC with both NC (F= 7.01) and CC (F = 1.57) (Table 5). However, there was 
no relationship between NC and CC (F= 1.06). With regards to the control variables, there was 
a significant relationship between (P < 0.05) AC and production volumes (F = 3.16). However, 
there was no significant relationship between (P > 0.05) AC and age (F = 1.46). Similarly, there 
was no significant relationship (P > 0.05) between CC and age (F = 2.09), but there was a 
significant relationship (P < 0.05) between CC and production volumes (F = 4.31). NC had no 
significant relationship (P > 0.05) with either age (F = 1.62), or production volumes (F = 0.99) 
(Table 5).  
4.4.3 Regression Analysis 
Three regression models with commitment to patronage (R2 = 0.46), commitment to 
governance (R2 = 0.22) and commitment to collective action (R2 = 0.44) as dependent variables, 
was run (Table 7). AC showed a significant relationship (P < 0.05) with all three dependent 
variables, i.e. patronage (β = 0.15), governance (β = 0.14) and collective action (β = 0.28).  NC 
showed a significant relationship (P < 0.05) with commitment to patronage (β = 0.17) and 
collective action (β = 0.21), but not with commitment to governance (P = 0.08). CC showed a 
negative but non-significant coefficient for all three dependent variables. Both the control 
variables, age and production volume, showed a significant relationship (P < 0.05) with 
commitment to governance and collective action, but not with patronage (Table 7).  
5. Discussion 
In this study we provided a description of the three forms of organisational commitment in co-
operatives and explored the inter-relationship between them. We then unravelled commitment 
to collective action in agricultural co-operatives into commitment to patronage and 
commitment to governance; and provided a measure and explanation of these. Thereafter, we 
examined the relationship between organisational commitment and commitment to collective 
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action. In taking this approach, our study has generated some valuable insights that are useful 
in comprehending member commitment in co-operatives; and thereby aids in the understanding 
of the relationship between a member and his or her co-operative. 
The finding that affective commitment was greater than both continuance commitment and 
normative commitment indicates that a members’ desire or want to be a member of the 
cooperative is higher than either their need to be a member or sense of obligation to be a 
member. This finding brings into question the arguments of several scholars, that it is the 
economic or utilitarian aspects (continuance commitment) that is of most importance to 
members. Similar to our findings, Puusa et al. (2018) in their study of a retail co-operative in 
Finland, found that affective commitment levels were greater than both normative and 
continuance. The authors suggest that due to strong competition and the exchange costs being 
relatively low, continuance commitment has to some extent lost its meaning and is not enough; 
and therefore it is important for co-operatives to strive towards increasing their members´ 
affective commitment toward their co-operative (Puusa et al., 2018). 
Although we found affective commitment levels to be higher than the other two, 26% of 
members had affective commitment levels that were lower than the scale mid-point. This 
proportion was greater for continuance (57%) and normative (48%) commitment. Further, the 
fact that 10.9% of respondents had low levels of all three forms, affective, continuance and 
normative, indicates that some degree of commitment risk exists for this co-operative. These 
finding, along with the findings on commitment to collective action levels should be of value 
to cooperative management as it could have implications on the co-operative’s performance 
via free riding and exit by its members. 
The results of the principal component analysis with the clear grouping of statements under 
one of two distinct components, reiterates our argument that commitment to collective action 
in agricultural co-operatives can be decoupled into two dimensions, commitment to patronage 
of the co-operative and commitment to governance of the co-operative. The significantly higher 
mean governance scores suggest that members are more committed towards governance of the 
co-operative than towards patronage of the co-operative.  
As proposed in hypothesis 1 and 2, the significant and positive relationship between 
commitment to collective action and affective and normative commitment suggests that these 
two organisational commitment components are important drivers of commitment to collective 
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action. In contrast, economic or financial reasons, leading to an individual needing to be a 
member of the co-operative (continuance commitment), are not related to commitment to 
collective action. These findings are similar to that observed in a meta-analysis of  
organisational commitment studies performed by Meyer et al. (2002). The authors found that 
there was significant and positive correlation of both affective and normative commitment with 
organisational citizenship behaviour; whereas there was weak negative and non-significant 
correlation between continuance commitment and organisational citizenship behaviour (Meyer 
et al., 2002).  Our findings are also in line with other studies that have found a significant 
relationship between affective commitment and favourable behaviour towards the organisation 
(Peng & Chiu, 2010; Rezaiean, Givi, Givi, & Nasrabadi, 2010; Barraud-Didier et al., 2012). 
Moreover, with relevance to co-operatives, these results are similar to the findings reported by 
Mazzarol, Soutar, and Mamouni Limnios (2019) that it is the “soft” (emotional) rather than 
“hard” (price) factors that are likely to be the key drivers of member loyalty in co-operatives. 
Similarly, Byrne and McCarthy (2014) found that those who express relational value 
dominance are more likely to be active patrons of a credit union. It is therefore the emotional 
attachment to the co-operative, leading to a want or desire to be a member; and the sense of 
obligation that results in members perceiving that being a member of the co-operative is the 
moral and right thing to do, which influence commitment to collective action. Importantly, this 
suggests that strengthening affective and normative commitment, will lead to members 
sacrificing short term economic gains in favour of long-term performance of the co-operative; 
and also overcoming the free rider problem in co-operatives.  Furthermore, findings suggest 
that improving the utilitarian aspects of member commitment will have no influence or effect 
on a member’s commitment to collective action. Although this finding is not in line with our 
proposed hypothesis 3 (significant but negative relationship between continuance commitment 
and commitment to collective action), it is similar to the study by Barraud-Didier et al. (2012) 
who showed that there was no relationship between continuance commitment and participation 
in governance in co-operatives. The exact nature of the relationship between continuance 
commitment and favourable behaviour towards the organisation is still unclear. Some studies 
have shown a significant negative relationship, while others, like our own study, have found 
no relationship (Meyer et al., 2002).  
More importantly there was a significant positive relationship between affective commitment 
and both the components of commitment to collective action, while normative commitment 
had a significant positive relationship with one component, commitment to patronage. These 
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findings are in line with arguments and findings reported by several scholars (Jussila, Byrne, 
et al., 2012; Jussila et al., 2014; Talonen, Jussila, Saarijärvi, & Rintamäki, 2016; Limnios et 
al., 2018). It suggests that strengthening affective commitment in the co-operative will result 
in improved patronage and increased participation in governance, while strengthening 
normative commitment could lead to improved patronage but not governance.  For the co-
operative, this implies that strengthening affective and normative commitment within its 
membership base would reduce the risks and challenges associated with: losing or decreasing 
supply, deterioration of the relationship between members and the co-operative, raising capital 
from its membership. Additionally, reinforcing affective commitment would also reduce the 
risks and challenges associated with:       members staying poorly informed about the co-
operative, not attending co-operative meetings and not voting on co-operative matters. These 
findings reinforce the point made by Jussila, Byrne, et al. (2012)  that affective commitment is 
a key factor in alleviating the generic problems challenging co-operatives.  
Utilitarian reasons (continuance commitment) were not related to either commitment to 
patronage or commitment to governance, indicating that commitment to collective action 
within the membership base of the co-operative cannot be improved by providing purely 
utilitarian benefits. While competitive costs and pricing, or plus attractive dividends, or quality 
and efficiency in service delivery, are important for members and can form the foundation of  
a strong member value proposition (MVP), it is the intangible emotional and affective attributes 
that are likely to provide the critical elements needed to maintain loyalty and commitment 
(Jussila, Byrne, et al., 2012; Limnios et al., 2018). This is because a critical element  of the co-
operative business model is its ability to develop and deliver a clear member value proposition 
that is in line with the co-operatives purpose, resonates with members and is sustainable 
(Limnios et al., 2018). As the perception of value is associated with both utilitarian (i.e. 
function and financial dimensions), and hedonic factors (i.e. emotional and social dimensions) 
(Talonen et al., 2016), the MVP offered to co-operative members should not necessarily be 
founded exclusively on financial and functional dimensions.  
The significant relationship and positive correlation between control variables age and 
production volumes with commitment to governance as well as commitment to collective 
action aligns with arguments presented by other scholars. Fulton (1999) suggested that younger 
farmers are less committed because ideological reasons are of less importance to them than 
older members. Furthermore, as younger members are more likely to have a slant towards 
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individualistic values, they are more likely to free ride and take advantage of the public goods 
provided by the co-operative (Fulton & Adamowicz, 1993). It is also possible that older farmers 
are more likely to have developed a strong bond with the co-operative, obtained a better 
understanding of the co-operative model and possess an implicit appreciation of the importance 
of commitment to collective action. Similarly, Jussila, Goel, et al. (2012a)) suggested that the 
proportion of the members income derived from the co-operative has a significant bearing on 
commitment. Members with greater production volumes are more likely to obtain a greater 
proportion (and magnitude) of their income from the co-operative and could therefore have 
higher levels of commitment. However, the significant relationship and negative correlation 
between production volumes and continuance commitment suggests the smaller farms are more 
aligned with the perceived costs commitments than the emotional or obligation commitments. 
This finding contradicts other co-operative scholars who argue that larger farmers are likely to 
be less committed to collective action or loyal (Ollila, Nilsson, & von Brömssen, 2012; Cechin 
et al., 2013). 
The strong positive relationship between the affective and normative components, as proposed 
in hypothesis 4  was expected, and in line with other studies on organisational commitment 
(Meyer et al., 2002; Chen & Francesco, 2003; Mindy, 2006; Keiningham et al., 2015). This 
finding indicates that an increase in one will result in an increase in the other. Suggesting that 
higher the affective or emotive attachment a member has to the co-operative, the greater is the 
sense of obligation or normative basis for being a member. Similarly, it also indicates that the 
erosion of one form could possibly lead to a decrease in the other as well. The weak but 
significant and negative relationship between affective and continuance components, as 
proposed in hypothesis 5, is also expected. As explained earlier, greater the need (utilitarian 
reasons) to be a member, the lesser is the want (emotive reasons) to be a member of the co-
operative.  This finding suggests that by increasing affective commitment within the 
membership base, the co-operative can decrease continuance commitment.  It also suggests 
that any increase in continuance commitment has the potential to further erode affective 
commitment within the membership base. The lack of relationship and weak positive 
correlation between normative and continuance components is not in line with hypothesis 6. 
This suggests that the utilitarian reasons (or need to be a member) are not related to normative 
reasons (or an obligation to be a member) for membership of the co-operative. This finding re-
iterates the importance of measuring normative commitment rather than assuming the high 
correlation between normative and affective commitment would result in identical findings for 
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both. As norms influencing normative commitment are situation-specific, the specific context 
of a co-operative or sector need to be considered as well. Similar to the findings and 
recommendation of Keiningham et al. (2015), these results also show that the goal of managers 
should be to optimize each dimension of commitment rather than simply maximize overall 
commitment. 
Several scholars have explored the phenomenon of managing and improving an employee’s 
organisational commitment (Nyhan, 1999; Meyer & Smith, 2000; Whitener, 2001; Bikker, 
2016). Given the importance of member commitment in co-operatives, it would be valuable if 
the management placed emphasis on developing similar structures to manage and improve 
organisational commitment of their members. Drawing from the literature on employee 
organisational commitment, few of the ways by which the co-operative can possibly achieve 
this is by 1) providing members with increased participation in decision making (Zeidan, 2006), 
2) showing greater recognition and appreciation of its members (Zeidan, 2006), 3) providing 
training and development for its members (Liden, Wayne, & Sparrowe, 2000), 4) ensuring 
effective and constructive communication with members (Van Den Hooff & De Ridder, 2004), 
5) creating a sense of community within the membership base  (Dessler, 1999), and 6) building 
an environment wherein member perceive that they and their businesses are safe and secure 
(Pfeffer & Jeffrey, 1998).  With specific relevance to co-operatives, Bijman and Verhees 
(2011) argue that strengthening hierarchy mechanisms in a co-operative might eventually erode 
the commitment of the members and could lead to the collapse of the co-operative. This is 
because approaches to deal with opportunism might destroy intrinsic motivation and result in 
further increased rather than decreased opportunism (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). Especially in 
co-operatives, where the relationship between the principal (manager) and agent (farmer) is 
personal,  the agent can perceive increased monitoring as an indication of distrust and this could 
result in an reduction in effort by the farmer (Frey, 1994). Further, in co-operatives, Trechter 
et al. (2002) found that good communication with the managers of the co-operative is strongly 
and positively related to member commitment. According to Pesämaa, Pieper, Da Silva, Black, 
and Hair Jr (2013) and Gupta (2014) the communication of member-ownership and the inherent 
democracy of most co-operatives can be a key element in building affective attachment and 
helping maintain member loyalty. Similarly Jussila, Byrne, et al. (2012), suggest that member 
ownership and democratic governance, as well as the focus of co-operatives on communicating 
with members and engendering a sense of common purpose, have also been noted as factors 
likely to enhance affective commitment. 
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6. Conclusion, Implications and Limitations 
This study makes several significant empirical and theoretical contributions. As mentioned 
earlier, this study is one of few empirical assessments of organisational commitment and 
commitment to collective action in co-operatives. While the conceptual literature in co-
operatives on member commitment has recognized the role and importance of organisational 
commitment and to a lesser extent commitment to collective action, quantitative studies of the 
phenomenon have not followed. This study provides valuable empirical insight that is overdue.  
The paper also fills an important gap in the literature by recognising the importance of 
organisation commitment and commitment to collective action in agricultural co-operatives 
and makes an important contribution towards examining agricultural co-operatives from a 
socio-psychological perspective. It thereby enhances the understanding of member and co-
operative relationships in agricultural co-operatives. The research also presents a rigorous 
framework and instrument for understanding and measuring the relationship between member 
and the co-operative. Such member commitment models may be a powerful means of 
explaining many aspects of member organization relationships.  Moreover, by measuring 
organisational commitment and commitment to collective action it provides a means to monitor 
member commitment in the co-operative over time, and also for examining the effects of the 
co-operatives strategies or policies on member commitment. Our study therefore provides an 
actionable blueprint for a co-operative’s member commitment strategy. 
As such, the findings support the core proposition of this paper—that organisational 
commitment has a significant effect on commitment to collective action and forms the 
foundation for members’ relationships with their co-operatives. It was demonstrated that a 
member’s affective and normative commitment influenced their commitment to collective 
action, while a member’s continuance commitment did not. The main implication for managers 
and board members of agricultural co-operatives is that commitment to collective action can 
be strengthened by focusing the co-operative’s efforts towards recognising and reinforcing 
affective and normative commitment. That is, members are more likely to make short term 
sacrifices and put in a sincere effort towards ensuring good long term performance of the co-
operative, if they feel a strong want or desire to be a member, and if they believe that being a 
member of the co-operative is the right and moral thing to do. More importantly, since 
utilitarian reasons or the need to be a member of the co-operative (continuance commitment) 
has no relationship with commitment to collective action, focusing on improving purely 
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utilitarian (economic) aspects may not be of much value, if the aim is to improve commitment 
to collective action. Finally, by strengthening affective commitment within the membership 
base, the co-operative can not only reap the benefits that increased affective commitment 
directly present, but also benefit from a consequent potential increase in normative 
commitment.   
For management of agricultural co-operatives, these findings indicate the importance of not 
focusing only on offering competitive pricing and excellent service to members. While these 
are important and necessary foundations for member loyalty and co-operative success, the 
members’ sense of emotional value and affective commitment are also very important drivers 
of success. It is therefore vital to create conditions that nurture or strengthen affective and 
normative commitment because these are a source of favourable behaviours by members. 
Although the economic objectives of co-operative are important, it must not neglect its social 
relationship with its members. Furthermore, it is vital that managers understand that there are 
differences among the various commitment types and more importantly do not make the 
mistake of treating them as interchangeable. Instead, they can strengthen member commitment 
by differentially allocating resources to manage each type of commitment in a context-specific 
manner. However, without understanding each commitment type, its associated costs and 
benefits and its effect on member commitment in co-operatives, managers can end up over or 
underinvesting in resources. Our results provide an initial step toward developing such a 
strategic roadmap for managing member commitment. It is recommended that the co-operative 
include member commitment as a key performance indicator and measure and monitor it 
regularly by developing a member commitment dashboard. Furthermore, it is suggested that 
management should be incentivised to strengthen member commitment, specifically affective 
commitment. 
Limitations: This study was conducted at a single point in time and was a cross-sectional 
analysis of one co-operative. It is important to note that the relationship between a member and 
the co-operative is a dynamic one and a member’s psychological state and attitude towards the 
co-operative could be different at various points of the relationship. As a result, the research 
does not throw light on any changes in the relationships between organisational commitment 
and commitment to collective action; and between the three forms of organisational 
commitment that occurs over time. Therefore, a longitudinal study that takes into account the 
evolution and variability in a members psychological state would be valuable. Secondly, since 
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this research focused on only one co-operative (Fonterra), agricultural sector (dairy), and nation 
(NZ) generalizations of the findings, especially to non-dairy co-operatives need to be made 
with caution. Despite these limitations, this research provides some meaningful contributions 
towards the understanding of member commitment in agricultural cooperatives. The empirical 
research on member commitment in agricultural cooperatives is still in its infancy and many 
interesting questions remain to be addressed. Future research should also consider making 
comparisons between co-operative members and IOF suppliers or customers, to identify 
similarities or differences between these two groups in relation to affective, normative and 
continuance commitment.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics – Organisational Commitment and Control Variables  
 N 
Mean 
(% of Max Score) 
SD Median Quartile 1 Quartile 3 Cronbach Alpha 
Affective Commitment 568 37.8 (67.5) 9.7 39.0 31.0 45.0 0.87 
Continuance Commitment 568 30.2 (53.9) 9.0 29.0 23.0 37.0 0.75 
Normative Commitment 568 31.7 (56.6) 8.1 32.0 26.0 37.0 0.76 
Age 564 4.2 1.2 4.0 3.0 5.0 NA 
Production Level 565 3.9 1.6 4.0 2.0 6.0 NA 
 
Table 2:  Cronbach Alpha of Commitment to Collective Action (CCA) with items excluded 
 
Item Excluded Correlation with Total Cronbach Alpha 
1.  Continue to sell milk to Co-op even if another company offers a higher price 0.38 0.68 
2.  A good relationship with the cooperative is more important than a higher milk price 0.29 0.73 
3.  Willing to invest in the Co-op 0.46 0.65 
4.  Reading the Co-ops Annual report every year 0.44 0.66 
5.  Attending Co-op meetings 0.57 0.62 




Table 3: PCA - Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Components Total Eigenvalues % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.47 41.2 41.2 
2 1.21 20.2 61.4 
 





(% of Max Score) 
SD Median Quartile 1 Quartile 3 
Commitment to Collective Action 568 26.5 (63.1%) 6.3 27.0 22.0 31.0 
Commitment to Patronage 568 12.4 (59.4%) 3.6 13.0 10.0 15.0 
Commitment to Governance 568 14.1 (67.7%) 4.1 15.0 11.0 18.0 
 
Table 5: Correlations and ANOVA Results for Affective Commitment, Normative Commitment, Continuance Commitment, Commitment to 
Patronage, Commitment to Governance, Commitment to Collective Action and Control Variables 
  
Age Production Level AC CC NC CP CG CCA 
Age 1 
    
  
 
Production Level -0.02 1 
   
  
 














(2.09) (4.31) ** (1.57) * 








1   
 
Commitment to Patronage (CP) 0.06 0.05 0.60** -0.03 0.60** 1   
Commitment to Governance (CG) 0.19** 0.21** 0.41** -0.06 0.29** 0.32** 1  
Commitment to Collective Action 
(CCA) 
0.16** 0.17** 0.62** -0.06 0.54** 0.78** 0.84** 1 
( ) ANOVA F statistic in parenthesis  
* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01 
 
Table 6A: High Levels of Affective Commitment (n = 422) 
 
 
Table 6B: Low Levels of Affective Commitment (n = 146) 
 
  Continuance Commitment 
 
    Continuance Commitment 
 
  High Low 
 




























Table 7: Regression Analysis  
 
 Dependent Variable 
Commitment to Patronage Commitment to Governance Commitment to Collective Action 
Independent Variables B SE B SE B SE 
       
Organisational Commitment       
• Affective Commitment 0.15* 0.01 0.14* 0.02 0.28* 0.02 
• Continuance Commitment -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
• Normative Commitment 0.17* 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.21* 0.03  
      
Control Variables       
• Age -0.02 0.09 0.56* 0.14 0.52* 0.17 
• Production Volume -0.07 0.07 0.42* 0.10 0.34* 0.13  
      
R2 0.46  0.22  0.44  
  
 
    














Chapter 4: Heterogeneity and Commitment to Collective Action: An 
empirical study of a New Zealand dairy co-operative 
 
This chapter addresses research objective 3 and the manuscript has been accepted for 
publication in the International Journal of Co-operative Accounting and Management 
(IJCAM). The IJCAM is a product of the merger of the Journal of Co-operative Accounting 
and Reporting (JCAR) with the International Journal of Co-operative Management 
(IJCM).  It is a co-operatives specific journal and explores a wide range of topics related to 
the accounting and management of co-operatives. The journal is attached to the Centre of 
Excellence in Accounting and Reporting for Co-operatives (CEARC) at the Sobey School of 
Business, St Mary’s University, Canada.  The CEARC actively researches Co-operative 
Performance Indicators with a current research project being on the Non-Financial Impact 
Assessment for Co-operatives: Demonstrating the Co-operative Difference. As this 
manuscript explores and assesses the non-financial aspects that influence co-operative 






This paper presents and empirically tests a novel framework that links member heterogeneity 
with member commitment to collective action (CCA). Member heterogeneity was first 
decoupled into three dimensions – 1) farmer-member, 2) farm-business and 3) member-interest 
and was then linked to CCA and the two components that comprise it - 1) commitment to 
patronage (CP) and 2) commitment to governance (CG). Following which the framework was 
assessed by performing an empirical study of 568 members of Fonterra Co-operative Group. 
A total of 35 sources of heterogeneity, 9 farmer-member, 14 farm-business and 12 member-
interest were used to measure heterogeneity.  The study found that the membership base of this 
co-operative was heterogeneous because a high level of heterogeneity was found in all three 
dimensions - farmer-member (66%), farm-business (64%) and member-interest (83%). 
Moreover, as the CCA level was also high, it tends to suggest that high heterogeneity does not 
lead to low commitment to collective action. Several of the 35 sources showed a significant 
difference in CCA (n = 18), CG (n = 20) and CP (n = 12) between groups that comprised them. 
Further, our findings tend to indicate that there is a relationship between the farm-business and 
member-interest dimensions of heterogeneity and CCA, CG and CP but not the farmer-member 
dimension.   






1. Introduction   
As voluntary organizations, co-operatives are based on a democratic decision-making process 
that rests upon collective participation, cohesion among members, and balance of 
countervailing powers (Hendrikse & Bijman, 2002). In agricultural co-operatives, an essential 
element for success is that the farmer-members are willing to supply the co-operatives with 
raw products, capital, and managerial inputs (Fulton, 1999). For this to take place member 
commitment is important (Staatz, 1989; Anderson & Henehan, 2005). In other words, success 
of the co-operative depends on the members commitment to collective action; wherein 
collective action refers to initiatives taken by an identifiable group to realize their common 
interests (Gray & Kraenzle, 1998).  
However, farmers differ in their individual commitment to participate in the co-operative 
(Cechin, Bijman, Pascucci, Zylbersztajn, & Omta, 2013). Importantly, co-operative scholars 
have reported a decrease in members’ participation in co-operatives (Harte, 1997; Holmstrom, 
1999; Levi & Davis, 2008; Nilsson, Svendsen, & Svendsen, 2012). Whether members behave 
opportunistically (Cook, 1995; Nilsson, Kihlén, & Norell, 2009) or as free-riders (Bhuyan, 
2007), the main reason for this change in farmers’ behaviour is attributed to the phenomenon 
of concentration and restructuring of agricultural co-operatives (Lang & Fulton, 2004; Nilsson 
et al., 2012). Österberg and Nilsson (2009) suggest that farmers find themselves in large, 
diversified and international co-operatives with a heterogeneous membership base; and with 
strategy so complex that farmers find it difficult to understand. 
This phenomenon of heterogeneity of membership has been claimed to have a negative effect 
on the efficiency of co-operatives (Cechin, Bijman, Pascucci, Zylbersztajn, et al., 2013). It may 
become particularly problematic when co-operatives become larger and/or more diverse in 
their activities, and where different activities of the co-operative cater to different groups of 
members (Fulton & Giannakas, 2001).  Hansmann (1996) argues, the more heterogeneous the 
membership the more difficult to achieve goal congruence and, thereby, the higher will be the 
decision‐making costs. Heterogeneity due to large memberships may also generate passivity 
because some member categories do not get their interests well attended to (Österberg & 
Nilsson, 2009). Furthermore, as the management obtains few, unclear, and conflicting signals 
from a heterogeneous membership, there is a risk that neither the board of directors nor the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) can interpret what the members want them to do (Cook & 
Iliopoulos, 2000; Hendrikse, 2007).  
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Increase in heterogeneity among members over the life span of a co-operative can be due to 
factors that are either external or internal to the co-operative organization (Cook, 2018). The 
external factors include divergence in farm size, multiple farming strategies, cooperative 
consolidation through merger and acquisition, and changing consumer demand (Bogetoft & 
Olesen, 2003; Cook, 2018; Weersink, 2018). Similarly, the endogenous or internal 
organizational processes include divergence in equity allocation, patron drift, membership 
growth, substitution effects, diversification and special interest groups arising internally that 
seek to apply pressure on management (Staatz, 1987; Cook & Burress, 2009; Iliopoulos & 
Valentinov, 2017; Cook, 2018). However, increasing heterogeneity due to either exogenous or 
endogenous factors are likely lead to similar issues for the co-operative (Cook & Burress, 
2009).   
While several scholars have highlighted the role, importance and impact of heterogeneity on 
co-operatives; empirical studies that examine heterogeneity and map out its expression are 
lacking. Often, member heterogeneity appears as an assumption in theoretical models or 
becomes visible in significant coefficients of member, farm and product characteristics as 
independent variables (Hoehler & Kuehl, 2018). As a result, the picture of member 
heterogeneity and its impact on co-operatives is largely incomplete (Hoehler & Kuehl, 2018); 
and a comprehensive understanding of member heterogeneity and its dimensions is missing 
(Cook & Iliopoulos, 2016).   
Österberg and Nilsson (2009) argue that there is an increasing need to study member behaviour 
within large and complex agricultural co-operatives. Moreover, given the trend towards 
increase in members’ detachment and decrease in participation, it is important that co-
operatives understand such attitudes and behaviours of its members, and what could perhaps 
be causing them (Fulton & Adamowicz, 1993; Birchall & Simmons, 2004; Bhuyan, 2007; 
Nilsson et al., 2012; Cechin, Bijman, Pascucci, Zylbersztajn, et al., 2013). Such studies are 
integral to the very survival of the co-operative business model (Österberg & Nilsson, 2009).  
However, very few studies have examined the behaviours of farmers and the antecedents of 
these behaviour’s in the specific context of agricultural co-operatives (Barraud-Didier, 
Henninger, & El Akremi, 2012; Cechin, Bijman, Pascucci, & Omta, 2013; Cechin, Bijman, 
Pascucci, Zylbersztajn, et al., 2013).  
Importantly, the impact of heterogeneity on the capacity of individuals to self-organize and 
sustain collective action is highly contested. These concepts are generally used in the social 
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science domain to describe the relationship between a group and a common pool resource. 
Although empirical studies have explored the relationship between group heterogeneity and 
the performance of common property institutions (Varughese & Ostrom, 2001; Poteete & 
Ostrom, 2004); none have explored this relationship within the context of agriculture co-
operatives. Also, the relationship between heterogeneity and member commitment, which is a 
multidimensional attitudinal concept, has not yet, to our knowledge, been studied in the context 
of agricultural co-operatives. Moreover, a critical aspect to overcoming the perceived 
heterogeneity problem in agricultural co-operatives is to ensure members reconcile their 
differences and exhibit a commitment to the collective good or collective action.  Yet, empirical 
research on this phenomenon is lacking.  
We strive to address these gaps by pursuing two main objectives. First, to disentangle 
heterogeneity in agricultural co-operatives, and develop a measure for it. Second, to present 
and test a framework that explores the links between heterogeneity and members’ commitment 
to collective action in a large New Zealand agricultural co-operative.   
We contribute to the literature on member heterogeneity and commitment in at least three ways: 
1) we develop a new theoretical framework for linking member heterogeneity and commitment 
to collective action in co-operatives;  (2) based on the framework, we distinguish heterogeneity 
in agricultural co-operatives into three dimensions- i) farmer-member, ii) farming-business and 
iii) member-interest; and (3) by measuring heterogeneity and exploring its link with 
commitment to collective action, we provide a much-needed empirical assessment of important 
phenomena that have been suggested to impact co-operative performance.  
The next section of this article covers the theoretical framework. This is followed by the third 
section which deals with the methodological aspects of the study carried out on a sample of 
568 members of Fonterra Co-operative Group, a large dairy co-operative in New Zealand. The 
fourth section focuses on the results and the fifth section presents a discussion of these. The 
conclusions, limitations and possibilities for future research are presented in the sixth section. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
For the purpose of this research a novel framework that allows for the examination of two 
important phenomena in agricultural co-operatives, heterogeneity and commitment to 
collective action is conceptualized. In the framework, a strong emphasis is given towards 
120 
 
objectively examining these two phenomena in agricultural co-operatives via outcomes than 
can be anticipated and measured. The reason being, the way in which results are measured and 
demonstration of clearly observable results, are necessary to further enhance the understanding 
of agricultural co-operatives. To achieve this, as a first step, a description of heterogeneity and 
commitment to collective action, and an identification of the dimensions that comprise them is 
required.  
2.1 Heterogeneity 
A core feature of co-operatives is that it is characterised by collective decision making and self-
governance (Apparao, Garnevska, & Shadbolt, 2019). As heterogeneity is perceived to affect 
this feature, it impacts the performance of co-operatives (Apparao et al., 2019). Moreover, the 
heterogeneity (diversity) of co-operatives’ membership is increasing (Simmons & Birchall, 
2004). For example, Elliott, Elliott, and Sluis (2018)  project future changes to cooperative 
member heterogeneity such as greater member aging, more member asset value, greater value-
added dollars at the farm level, and greater diversity of farm size. This increase in heterogeneity 
is because, as co-operatives become larger and more diverse in their operations, membership 
becomes increasingly heterogeneous (Nilsson et al., 2012). Globalisation and international 
expansion of co-operatives coupled with structural changes in the farming sector have led to 
further magnification of the differences between farmer members. Consumer demand for 
higher quality and more variety have resulted in an increase in diversification at farm level 
(Bogetoft & Olesen, 2007). Moreover, in search of efficiency gains and additional bargaining 
power, co-operatives are seeking new members and merging partners outside their original 
areas (Hoehler & Kuehl, 2018).  
Increase in member heterogeneity is suggested to be a major challenge for co-operatives 
(Bijman, Hanisch, & Van der Sangen, 2014). Scholars have argued that members with different 
characteristics and conflicting interests are inclined to compete for rents (Kalogeras, Pennings, 
van der Lans, Garcia, & van Dijk, 2009). When members possess disparate preferences for 
attribute alternatives, disagreements can emerge as to which combination is most desirable 
(Zusman, 1992).  As discussed by Vitaliano (1983), Cook (1995), and Hansmann (1996) the 
divergence in incentives and preferences is particularly problematic for the assignment of 
contractual property rights among members with diverse characteristics.  
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Collective decision making costs (Staatz, 1987; Bijman, 2002), agency costs (Gorton & 
Schmid, 1999) and influence costs (Iliopoulos & Cook, 1999) are believed to be greater in co-
operatives than in investor owned firms (IOF). Increased heterogeneity of co-operatives and 
their members is suggested to be an important reason for further increase in these costs and 
resulting decrease in competitiveness of co-operatives (Fulton & Giannakas, 2001; Bijman, 
2002; Bogetoft & Olesen, 2004). More specifically, since the control of co-operatives is 
structured democratically, heterogeneity is likely to generate transaction costs to co-operative 
decision-making. As argued by Hansmann (1996) an increase in these transaction costs results 
in higher decision-making costs in co-operatives relative to IOF’s. Similarly, according to 
Pozzobon, Zylbersztajn, and Bijman (2011), as a consequence of heterogeneity, decision 
making in traditional co-operatives is likely to be more costly than in IOF’s. Hansmann (1996) 
further posits that farmers are the most efficient owners of agricultural co-operatives because 
the costs of market contracting are highest for farmers while their cost of ownership is lowest.  
The low cost of ownership for farmers is because of high homogeneity of interest amongst 
farmers (Hansmann, 1996).  
On the whole, increasing heterogeneity leading to conflicting preferences can generate 
problems in co-operatives (Kalogeras et al., 2009) such as decline in member commitment 
(Fulton & Giannakas, 2001), decrease in member willingness to supply equity capital (Van 
Bekkum, 2001), increasing costs related to damaging influence activities  (Cook, 1995),  
tedious decision making process (Hansmann, 1996) and lack of strategic focus (Hendrikse & 
Bijman, 2002). Increasing heterogeneity could therefore present  challenges to cooperative 
sustainability (Elliott et al., 2018), particularly in traditional cooperatives where structural 
adaptations in response to member heterogeneity have not been made (Cook & Iliopoulos, 
2016). Moreover, as a result of more diverse members, it is increasingly difficult for the co-
operative to demonstrate that it is acting in the best interests of all members (Fulton & 
Giannakas, 2001).   
2.1.1 Dimensions of heterogeneity 
It is important to examine the dimensions of member heterogeneity in co-operatives since it 
helps to identify the sources of conflict potential and adopt governance structures to meet the 
needs of the members e.g. by introducing advisory boards for different producers or by 
establishing new ways of organising and financing the co-operative (Kalogeras et al., 2009). 
Moreover, identifying the attributes, levels and factors of member heterogeneity enhances the 
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co-operatives’ ability to meet the needs of the members (Kalogeras et al., 2009). Despite its 
importance, very few scholars have taken a step in this direction.   
Cook and Iliopoulos (1999), in their study of influence costs, identified eight factors that can 
be used to explain the degree of heterogeneity. These factors were in order of importance - 1) 
differences between members in terms of volume of production, 2) variance in members 
education levels, 3) the geographic dispersion of membership, 4) differences between members 
in term of farm objectives, 5) increased non-farm income for some members, 6) variance in 
members age, 7) the number of different commodities produced by members, and 8) the 
number of different inputs procured by members.  
Pozzobon et al. (2011) argue that member heterogeneity can be due to - 1) individual 
characteristics and 2) farms characteristics. The differences in individual characteristics may 
be due to – 1) demographic characteristics such as age and education, 2) economic 
characteristics such as percentage of non-farm income; business objectives; risk preference, 
and 3) individual beliefs. Similarly, the differences in farm characteristics may be due to – 1) 
farm size, 2) technology, 3) geographical, 4) types of commodities produced, and 5) types of 
inputs used (Pozzobon et al., 2011).  More recently, Hoehler and Kuehl (2018), based on a 
comprehensive search of ‘member heterogeneity’ in economic journals, working papers and 
conference proceedings, suggested that member heterogeneity in agricultural co-operatives can 
be grouped under three categories 1) farm (e.g. size, location), 2) member (e.g. age, education) 
and 3) product (e.g. type and quality). 
Considering the arguments and suggestions of Cook and Iliopoulos (1999), Pozzobon et al. 
(2011) and Hoehler and Kuehl (2018), we decouple member heterogeneity into three 
dimensions, 1) farmer-member, 2) farm-business and 3) member-interest. The farmer-member 
dimension is based on differences between members in personal characteristics, especially in 
their age, experience, and educational background (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1999; James & Sykuta, 
2006; Höfer & Rommel, 2015).  The farm-business dimension includes physical, financial and 
product quality related properties. It is centred on differences that pertain to the members 
farming entities such as size, revenue, product quality, and location (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1999; 
Österberg & Nilsson, 2009; Cechin, Bijman, Pascucci, & Omta, 2013; Alho, 2015).  The 
difference between members that arises due to their diverging interests (Hansmann, 1999; 
Kalogeras et al., 2009), such as price and dividend payments, sale of co-operative shares, 
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concern for the co-operative’s future, and importance of being valuable to the co-operative is 
captured under the member-interest dimension.  
2.2 Commitment to Collective Action 
Olson (1971), in his work titled The Logic of Collective Action, questioned the rational and 
basis of the foundation of modern democratic thought, and argued that groups will not tend to 
form and take collective action whenever members jointly benefit. Instead, Olson strongly 
suggested that rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or 
group interests (e.g. production of a public good), unless there is coercion or some other device 
to make individuals act in their common interest (Olson, 1971). This argument, which came to 
be known as the “Zero Contribution Thesis”, formed the basis of the presumption, that 
individuals cannot overcome collective action problems and need to have externally enforced 
rules to achieve their long-term self-interest.  However, Ostrom (2000) argues that observations 
in everyday life strongly contradict the zero-contribution thesis. Empirical field work has 
established that individuals from all walks of life and all parts of the world voluntarily organise 
themselves so as to gain the benefits of trade, to provide mutual protection against risk and to 
create and enforce rules that protect natural resources (Ostrom, 2000).  
In agriculture, co-operatives are an important collective action group. Through agricultural co-
operatives, diverse producers use collective action to come together to make joint investments 
in processing and marketing facilities, to share a collective reputation, to bargain with 
supplying, processing and retailing firms, to gain access to markets, and to spread costs of 
extension services (Bouamra-Mechemache & Zago, 2015). In co-operatives, commitment to 
collective action can be viewed as the members willingness to sacrifice short-term economic 
gains and make an effort towards the co-operative’s long-term success (Cechin, Bijman, 
Pascucci, & Omta, 2013).  
In this study, member commitment to collective action (CCA) is separated into two dimensions 
1) commitment to patronage (CP) and 2) commitment to governance (CG). These two 
dimensions, as well as commitment to collective action in agricultural co-operatives, have 




2.3 Framework Structure and Hypothesis 
The conceptual framework brings together two important phenomena associated with 
agricultural co-operatives and is structured on the premise that heterogeneity has an important 
bearing on commitment to collective action. As indicated in Figure 1, the relationship between 
heterogeneity and commitment to collective action is examined by bringing together the three 
dimensions of heterogeneity and the two dimensions of commitment to collective action. The 
framework assumes that each dimension incorporates a number of components (sources) that 
have been emphasised in research on co-operatives. The farmer-member dimension is 
comprised of 9 sources, the farm-business dimension is comprised of 14 sources and the 
member-interest dimension is comprised of 12 sources.  
It is hypothesised, that the relationship between heterogeneity and commitment to collective 
action is negative (inverse), i.e. when heterogeneity is high, commitment to collective action is 
low and when heterogeneity is low, commitment to collective action is high. It is further argued 
that this relationship is expressed via the associated dimensions. When there is an increase in 
heterogeneity within one or more of the heterogeneity dimensions, there is a decrease in either 
or both commitment to patronage and commitment to governance, and thereby a decrease in 
commitment to collective action. 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework: Heterogeneity and Commitment to Collective Action 
 
Based on the framework, we propose the following hypotheses – 
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Hypothesis 1: In large and complex co-operatives, there is a high level of heterogeneity, which 
is indicated by a majority of the sources comprising each heterogeneity dimension showing 
high to very high heterogeneity.  
Hypothesis 2:  High heterogeneity will result in a low level of commitment to collective action; 
as well as commitment to patronage and commitment to governance. 
We further propose that if there is high heterogeneity within a source, then there will be a 
significant difference in CCA, as well as CP and CG between the groups that comprise the 
heterogeneity source. The basis for this is that heterogeneity can be linked to commitment to 
collective action by identifying if there is a significant difference in CCA (as well as CP and 
CG) between the various groups that comprise a source that has high heterogeneity. Similarly, 
if there is a low level of heterogeneity for a specific source, there will be no significant 
difference in CCA (and CP & CG) between the groups that comprise the source. Based on this 
rational we propose: 
Hypothesis 3: For the 9 sources of the farmer-member heterogeneity dimension that showed 
high or very high heterogeneity, there is a significant difference in commitment to patronage, 
commitment to governance and commitment to collective action between the groups that 
comprise the source. While there is no significant difference between groups for sources that 
showed low or very low heterogeneity. 
Hypothesis 4: For the 14 sources of the farm-business heterogeneity dimension that showed 
high or very high heterogeneity, there is a significant difference in commitment to patronage, 
commitment to governance and commitment to collective action between the groups that 
comprise the source. While there is no significant difference between groups for sources that 
showed low or very low heterogeneity. 
Hypothesis 5: For the 12 sources of the member-interest heterogeneity dimension that showed 
high or very high heterogeneity, there is a significant difference in commitment to patronage, 
commitment to governance and commitment to collective action between the groups that 
comprise the source. While there is no significant difference between groups for sources that 





3.1.1 Dairy Industry and Dairy Co-operatives in NZ 
The dairy industry plays a significant role in New Zealand’s economy. It provides employment 
to about 47,310 people and accounts for 28% of NZ’s export revenues. Producing 21.3 million 
tonnes of milk, NZ is the 8th biggest milk producer and the largest dairy exporter in the world, 
accounting for over 30% of global dairy trade (Shadbolt & Apparao, 2016). In 2017/18, there 
were 11,590 dairy farms, 4.9 million dairy cows in NZ; and the average dairy farm size was 
151 hectares.  
Across the world, co-operatives play a major role in the dairy industry, accounting for over 
80% of milk production in the U.S.A, Western Europe and Australia (Chaddad, 2007). In New 
Zealand, the first dairy co-operative was established in 1871.  Since then, dairy co-operatives 
have played a significant role in the NZ economy, and continue to do so (Garnevska, Callagher, 
Apparao, Shadbolt, & Siedlok, 2017). Dairy co-operatives account for over 86% of NZ’s milk 
processing and contribute to about 7.5% of NZ’s GDP.  
3.1.2 Fonterra 
Fonterra Co-operative Group (Fonterra) was formed in 2001, via the merger of three entities, 
New Zealand Dairy Group, Kiwi Co-operative Dairies, and the New Zealand Dairy Board. 
With revenues of about NZ$ 20.4 billion in 2017/18 it is the largest dairy co-operative and also 
the largest business enterprise in NZ. Fonterra sources about 22 billion litres of milk, which is 
about 82% of NZ milk production. It is the largest dairy exporter in the world, exporting about 
95% of its milk sourced to 140 countries. Fonterra employs 22,000 people across the world and 
accounts for 25% of NZ’s exports. It is governed by an 11-member board (7 elected farmer 
shareholders and 4 appointed). Farmer shareholders vote for board members on the basis of the 
number of wet shares they hold, that is, one share per kilogram of milksolids supplied to the 
co-operative.  Additionally, it has a 25 member shareholders council which represents the 
views of all Fonterra farmer shareholders as suppliers, owners and investors. Each councillor 




Over a 10-year period, the volume of milk sourced by Fonterra increased by 28%. However, 
over the same 10-year period Fonterra has seen its share of NZ milk supply decrease from 94% 
(2007/08) to 82% (2016/17). In 2016/17, Fonterra paid its farmer owners, NZ$ 6.12 / kilograms 
of milk solids (kg MS) and a dividend of NZ$ 0.40 per share. Due to Fonterra’s significant 
exposure to global markets, there has been volatility in both milk price and dividend payments. 
Milk price has ranged from NZ$ 3.90 /kg MS (2015/16) to NZ$ 8.40 /kg MS (2013/14); while 
the dividend payments have ranged from NZ$ 0.07 (2007/08) to NZ$ 0.45 (2008/09) per share. 
Fonterra is owned by around 10,000 self-employed dairy farmers that are spread across NZ. 
Although the final element that lead to the formation of Fonterra was the amalgamation of three 
entities mentioned earlier (i.e. New Zealand Dairy Group, Kiwi Co-operative Dairies, and the 
New Zealand Dairy Board), the origins of Fonterra can be traced back to the 1870’s. The 
formation of Fonterra is hence characterised by several mergers over the course of many 
decades. It is reported that there were about 230 dairy co-operatives in the 1960’s. These co-
operatives were characterised by a unique identity, loyal membership base and strong regional 
specificity. More importantly there was intense competition between these co-operatives.  Over 
the next three decades, especially in the 1980’s and 1990’s many dairy co-operatives gradually 
merged to form larger co-operatives in order to achieve economies of scale.  As a result, there 
were just 3 dairy co-operatives in 2017/18, and the formation of Fonterra was the main outcome 
and culmination of this process of mergers.   As explained by Nilsson and Madsen (2007) 
mergers between co-operatives are quite complex because a merger involves not only the 
integration of the business operations of the two co-operatives but also the breaking down of 
barriers between the members of the two co-operatives and aligning the different ways of 
thinking within the memberships. Moreover, the merger is further complicated by the concept 
of heterogeneity – heterogeneity in terms of business activities, logistics, organisational 
culture, leadership principles, ways of working, and other attributes (Nilsson & Madsen, 2007). 
Fonterra’s large membership base and a foundation based on several mergers of co-operatives 
that once had a unique identity of their own, and strongly competed against each other, is 
thought to have introduced considerable member heterogeneity in the co-operative.  
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3.2 Data Collection  
3.2.1 Sample 
A survey method was used to collect data on heterogeneity and commitment to collective 
action. Before the survey, a pilot study was performed using 10 dairy farmers chosen by 
convenience to inform the development and refinement of the questionnaire. The structured 
questionnaire that was developed was mailed in July 2017 to a random sample of 2,000 
members of Fonterra that was generated by a Fonterra manager. The researchers were blind to 
the member’s names and only had access to the postal contact information of the members.  
After 6 weeks a reminder was sent out in September 2017 to those members that did not 
respond. Of the 2,000 surveys that were mailed 294 (15%) were returned by the postal service 
as being un-deliverable and 576 were returned by the respondents, giving a response rate of 
34%. Of these 8 responses were classified as being incomplete and were discarded. Thus, 
leaving the study with a sample of 568 responses (33%) that were used in the analysis.  
3.2.2 Measures  
Heterogeneity: As described in the framework earlier, this study captured heterogeneity in 
agricultural co-operatives along three dimensions:   farmer-member, farm-business and 
member-interest. To achieve this, each dimension was further broken down to its constituent 
elements or sources of heterogeneity; and the degree of heterogeneity that existed for each of 
these sources was measured. These sources were included because they are often associated 
with member heterogeneity in agricultural co-operatives (Iliopoulos & Cook, 1999; Kalogeras 
et al., 2009; Pozzobon et al., 2011; Hoehler & Kuehl, 2018); and are of specific relevance to 
heterogeneity within the membership base of NZ dairy co-operatives.  
First, we considered gender, age, ethnicity, education, experience in agriculture, experience in 
share-milking, type of involvement with the farm-business, number of farming entities and 
years co-operative member as the sources (n = 9) of farmer-member heterogeneity. Second, 
farm type, dairy system, seasonality, milk production, milk types, milk quality, gross farm 
revenue, total dairy assets, total debt, non-farm income proportion, stage of business, shares in 
the co-operative, share of milk supplied to co-operative and region were considered to be 
important sources (n = 14) of farm-business heterogeneity. Third, we considered likelihood of 
selling shares, seasons a low milk price is acceptable, willingness to accept lower dividend, 
concern for the co-operative’s future, importance of  being valuable to the co-operative, 
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importance of being a respected member of the community, importance of creating 
opportunities for future farmers, importance of having time available for socializing with 
family and friends, importance of having variety in work, importance of looking after the 
environment, importance of maximizing farm profits, and importance of paying off debts, as 
the sources (n = 12) of member-interest heterogeneity. 
Commitment to Collective Action: The measures used to capture commitment to collective 
action are explained in Apparao et al. (2020) and were based on the suggestions of Cechin, 
Bijman, Pascucci, and Omta (2013) and Barraud-Didier et al. (2012). Three statements, 
farmer’s readership of annual reports, attendance of the co-operative’s meetings and voting on 
co-operative matters were considered as an indicator of commitment to governance. Similarly, 
farmer’s propensity for continued supply, importance placed on the relationship with the co-
operative, and willingness to invest in the co-operative were considered an indicator of 
commitment to patronage.  Respondents indicated their degree of agreement to each of the six 
statements on a Likert type 7-point scale (from 1: Strongly disagree to 7: Strongly agree).  
3.3 Statistical Analysis  
The analysis of data was done using SPSS (IBM® SPSS Statistics).  First, a scale reversal was 
performed for the inverted scale statements. Second, a descriptive analysis of the data set was 
conducted by determining descriptive statistics such as the median, mode, mean, standard 
deviation and frequencies of the variables.  Third, the construct reliability of the statements 
used to measure commitment to collective action was determined using the Cronbach Alpha. 
Fourth, a principal component analysis (PCA) was done to examine and confirm the constituent 
components of commitment to collective action.   
Fifth, the commitment to collective action, commitment to patronage and commitment to 
governance scores were determined. The commitment to patronage and commitment to 
governance scores for each respondent was calculated by summing the responses for each of 
the three statements used to measure them. Since the scale length for each statement was 7, the 
lowest score possible is 3 (3 x 1) and the highest possible score is 21 (3 X 7).  Thereafter, the 
commitment to collective action score for each respondent was calculated as the sum of 
commitment to patronage and commitment governance scores. The lowest commitment to 
collective action score possible is 6 (6 X 1) and the highest score is 42 (6 X 7).   
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Sixth, the Gini-Simpson Index was used to determine the degree of heterogeneity that existed 
within each source variable. This is one of the most widely used indexes to measure diversity 
(heterogeneity) and considers the number of different types that exist in the data field of interest 
and how evenly entities are distributed among those types. Although its origins lie in the field 
of ecology, it has been widely used in diverse disciplines, such as genetics, sociology, 
economics, management etc. For example, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which is 
extensively used to measure market concentration in economics and management, is based on 
Gini-Simpson Index (Rhoades, 1993). The equation used to determine Gini-Simpson Index is 
given below -  




Where R is richness and quantifies the number of different types the data field of interest 
represents. For example, in the case of heterogeneity source variable gender, R is equal to two 
since the data field of interest comprises of two types, male and female. Pi represents the 
proportion of individuals that belong to the ith type in the data field of interest. An index value 
of 0 indicates complete homogeneity, while an index value of 1 indicates complete 
heterogeneity. We classify heterogeneity in our source variables into five categories based on 
the index value as follows, 0 to 0.20 very low heterogeneity, > 0.20 to 0.40 low heterogeneity, 
> 0.40 to 0.60 moderate heterogeneity, > 0.60 to 0.80 high heterogeneity, and > 0.80 to 1.0 
very high heterogeneity.  
Seventh, for the heterogeneity sources for which correlations could be determined, the 
Spearman’s correlation technique was used to determine if a correlation exists between a 
heterogeneity source and commitment to collective action as well as commitment to patronage 
and commitment to governance.  Lastly, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to 
determine if the commitment to collective action, commitment to patronage and commitment 




4. Results  
4.1 Heterogeneity  
Of the 35 heterogeneity sources 5 (14%) showed very high levels of heterogeneity (Gini-
Simpson index > 0.80). Two sources each were from the farmer-member and farm-business 
dimension, while one was from member interest (Table 1). High heterogeneity (Gini-Simpson 
index > 0.60 to 0.80) was the most frequently observed heterogeneity level. It was observed 
for 20 (57%) sources. Of these, 4 were from farmer-member, 7 were from farm-business and 
9 were from member-interest. Since a majority (71%) of the heterogeneity sources that we 
measured demonstrated high or very high levels of heterogeneity, the membership base of this 
co-operative can be considered to be heterogeneous. This finding reinforces the point made by 
co-operative scholars that large and complex agricultural co-operatives are characterised by a 
heterogeneous membership base.  
Moderate levels of heterogeneity (Gini-Simpson index > 0.40 to 0.60) were observed for 3 
(9%) sources, 1 from farmer-member and 2 from member-interest. Low levels of heterogeneity 
(Gini-Simpson index > 0.20 to 0.40) were observed for 6 (17%) sources. Of these 6 sources, 1 
was from farmer-member and 5 were from farm-business. Finally, very low levels of 
heterogeneity (Gini-Simpson index > 0.0 to 0.20) was observed for only 1 (3%) source, 
belonging to the farmer-member source type.  These findings indicate that some degree of 
homogeneity exists in the farmer-member and farm-business dimensions but not in the 
member-interest dimension.  





















> 0.80 5 (14%) 2 (22%) 2 (14%) 1 (8%) 
High 
Heterogeneity  
> 0.60 to 0.80 20 (57%) 4 (44%) 7 (50%) 9 (75%) 
Moderate 
Heterogeneity  





> 0.20 to 0.40 6 (17%) 1 (11%) 5 (36%) - 
Very Low 
Heterogeneity 
< 0.20 1 (3%) 1 (11%) - - 
Total 
 
35 9 14 12 
4.2 Commitment to Collective Action 
A detailed presentation of the results on commitment to collective action are provided in 
Apparao et al. (2020). In brief, the 6 statements used to measure CCA were found to be reliable 
as their Cronbach Alpha was 0.71. The principal component analysis (PCA), showed that two 
components had eigenvalues greater than the cut-off value of 1 and they explained 61.4% of 
the variance. The three statements (manifest variables) on governance load heavily on 
Component 1 and the three statements (manifest variables) on patronage load heavily on 
Component 2.  
The mean and median CCA score was 26.5 (SD = 6.3) and 27.0 respectively and ranged from 
6 (n = 1) to 42 (n = 1). This meant merely 0.2% of respondents obtained the potential maximum 
score for CCA.  However, since both the mean and median scores were greater than the scale 
mid-point of 21, we believe that this co-operative has moderately high levels of commitment 
to collective action. The mean and median governance score was 14.1 (SD = 4.1) and 15.0 
respectively and ranged from 3 (n = 8) to 21 (n = 16).  Only 2.8% of respondents obtained the 
maximum possible score for governance. The mean (12.4, SD = 3.6) and median patronage 
score (13.0) was lesser and ranged from 3 (n = 6) to 21 (n = 3). Just 0.5% of respondents 
obtained the potential maximum score for patronage. Since both mean and median governance 
and patronage scores were above the scale mid-point (10.5), it suggests that this co-operative 
has moderately high levels of commitment to governance and commitment to patronage within 
its membership base.   
4.3 Heterogeneity and Commitment to Collective Action 
It was hypothesized that there is an inverse relationship between heterogeneity and CCA, CP 
and CG. Therefore, given that a high level of heterogeneity was observed within the 
membership base of this co-operative a low level of CCA as well as CP and CG is expected. 
However, as explained earlier this was not the case, and moderately high levels of CCA, CP 
and CG were observed. Although this relationship between heterogeneity and commitment 
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could not be statistically tested, this finding tends to suggest that high heterogeneity need not 
necessarily lead to low CCA, CP and CG.  
Importantly, a majority of the 25 sources that showed high or very heterogeneity also showed 
significant differences (P < 0.05) in CCA (n = 16), CG (n = 16), CP (n = 12). Similarly, most 
of the 7 sources that showed low or very low heterogeneity did not show a significant difference 
(P > 0.05) in CCA (n = 7), CG (n = 6) and CP (n = 7). Of the three sources that showed moderate 
heterogeneity, there were no differences in CP but one showed differences in CG and two 
showed significant differences in CCA and CG.  These findings our in alignment with our 
hypothesis that high heterogeneity will result in differences in CCA, CG and CP between the 
groups that comprise the heterogeneity source, while low heterogeneity will not; and tends to 
suggest that there is a relationship between heterogeneity and CCA, CG and CP.  
4.3.1 Farmer-Member  
Of the 9 farmer-member sources of heterogeneity, 2 (22%) had very high heterogeneity and 4 
(44%) had high heterogeneity. Since 66% of sources showed high or very high levels of 
heterogeneity, the membership base of this co-operative can be considered to be heterogeneous 
with respect to the farmer-member dimension. Moderate (11%), low (11%) and very low (11%) 
heterogeneity was observed for 1 source each (Table 1). This indicates that a low degree of 
homogeneity also exists within this dimension. The descriptive statistics on the 9 sources is 
presented in Table 2.   
For the source Gender, low levels of heterogeneity were observed (GSI = 0.35) and most 
respondents were male (77 %). Age had a high level of heterogeneity (GSI = 0.76) and most 
respondents (33%) belonged to the age group of 51-60 years. The source ethnicity had a very 
low level of heterogeneity (GSI = 0.11). This was also the lowest level of heterogeneity 
observed across all 35 sources. Most of the respondents were of European ethnicity (94%) and 
remaining were of Māori (6%) ethnicity. The question on level of education was the least 
answered one with only 333 (58.9%) respondents answering the question. It had a very high 
level of heterogeneity (GSI = 0.81) and diploma or trade certificate was the most frequent 
(24.3%) response. High levels of heterogeneity were observed for the source years’ experience 
in agriculture (GSI = 0.71). Most respondents (43.4%) reported that they have 20-30 years of 
experience in agriculture. Very high level of heterogeneity (GSI = 0.81) was observed for the 
source years’ share-milking experience. Most respondents (30.6%) reported that they have 0 
years’ experience in share-milking, but the median response was 3-5 years. Like in the case of 
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level of education several respondents (n = 187) did not answer the question on the type of 
involvement with and/or ownership of the farming business. The most frequent response was 
owner-operator type of involvement (45.9%), and the GSI was 0.73 indicating high levels of 
heterogeneity. Moderate levels of heterogeneity (GSI = 0.58) were observed for the source 
number of farming entities, and most respondents (55.8%) reported having only 1 farming 
entity. High levels of heterogeneity (GSI = 0.73) were observed for the source years co-
operative member and most respondents (35.2%) reported being a member of the co-operative 
for 20-30 years. 
Of the 6 sources for which correlations could be determined, a significant (P < 0.05) and 
positive correlation was observed between 4 sources (age, level of education, years’ experience 
in agriculture, and number of farming entities) and commitment to collective action, as well as 
commitment to governance (Table 2). This finding indicates that farmers that are older, more 
educated, have greater experience in farming and are involved with more farming enterprises 
are more committed to collective action and governance of the co-operative. No significant 
correlations were observed with commitment to patronage.  This suggests that CP is not linearly 
related with any of the heterogeneity sources that comprise the farmer-member dimension. 
A significant difference (P < 0.05) was observed in the commitment to collective action scores 
between groups that comprised just 1 (11%) source (age) of the farmer-member dimension 
(Table 2). There was no difference in CCA between the groups that comprise the remaining 8 
sources. Importantly, since high or very heterogeneity was observed in 5 of these 8 sources, it 
suggests that high level of heterogeneity was not related to a significant difference in CCA. 
Moreover, only four sources fit with our hypothesis of having a high level of heterogeneity and 
a difference in CCA or a low level of heterogeneity and no difference in CCA. These findings 
indicate that heterogeneity in the sources that comprise the farmer-member dimension does not 
lead to differences in commitment to collective action.    
There was a significant difference (P < 0.05) in the commitment to governance scores between 
groups that comprised 4 (44%) sources (age, level of education, years’ experience in agriculture 
and number of farming entities) of the farmer-member dimension.  Three of these sources had 
a high level of heterogeneity. Two sources that had low heterogeneity did not have a significant 
difference in CG. However, three sources had a high level of heterogeneity and no difference 
in CG; and one source (number of farming entities) had a moderate level of heterogeneity and 
a significant difference in CG. As 5 of the 9 sources aligned with the hypothesis, it tends to 
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suggest that there is a weak association between heterogeneity and CG within the farmer-
member dimension.   
There was no significant difference (P > 0.05) in commitment to patronage scores between 
groups for all the 9 sources (Table 2). Since 6 of these sources showed high heterogeneity, it 
suggests that there is no relationship between heterogeneity and CP within the farmer-member 
dimension.  
Table 2: Farmer-Member: Descriptive Statistics of Heterogeneity and Relationship to Commitment 
# Source 
Variable 
N Median Mode Mean SD GSI ANOVA F Values 
 (Correlation Coefficients) 
        CP CG CCA 





2 Age 564 51-60 years 51-60 
years 




























565 30-50 years 30-50 
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8 Number of 
Farming 
entities 






9 Years Co-op 
Member 
559 20-40 years 20-40 
years 






GSI - Gini-Simpson Index 
CP - Commitment to Patronage 
CG - Commitment to Governance 
CCA - Commitment to Collective Action 
NA - Not Applicable  





Of the 14 sources comprising the farm-business dimension, 2 (14%) had very high 
heterogeneity and 7 (50%) had high heterogeneity (Table 1).  Since 64% of sources showed 
high or very-high levels of heterogeneity, the membership base of the co-operative can be 
considered heterogeneous with respect to the farm-business dimension. None of the sources 
showed moderate and very low levels of heterogeneity (Table 1). However, 5 (36%) sources 
had low heterogeneity. This suggests that the farm-business dimension is the least 
heterogeneous (or most homogenous) of the three dimensions. The descriptive statistics on the 
14 sources is presented in Table 3. 
Farm type had a low level of heterogeneity (GSI = 0.34) and most respondents (80.5%) only 
had dairy farms. The question on the type of dairying farming system was the least answered 
amongst the farm-business questions (n = 499). The most frequent response was system 3 
(32.5%) type of dairy farming system and the level of heterogeneity was high (GSI = 0.71). 
The seasonality of dairy farming had a low level of heterogeneity (GSI = 0.21) and most 
respondents (88.7%) had only a spring calving system. The volume of milk production had a 
high level of heterogeneity (GSI = 0.81). Over 50% of respondents had a milk production 
volume of less than 200,000 kg MS, but the most frequent response (25.1%) was a milk 
production greater than 300,000 kgMS. Most respondents (86.8%) produced only the 
conventional type of milk and the level of heterogeneity was low (GSI = 0.24). A low level of 
heterogeneity was observed for the quality of milk (GSI = 0.39) and the most frequent response 
(43.7%) was a somatic cell count of 100,000 to 150,000 cells per ml. Gross farm revenue (GFR) 
had a high level of heterogeneity (GSI = 0.79). More than 50% of respondents had a gross farm 
revenue of less than 1 million, and the most frequent response was NZ$ 500,000 – 1 million 
(27.3%). High levels of heterogeneity were observed for total dairy assets (GSI = 0.64) and 
most respondents (52.8%) had dairy assets in the range of NZ$ 2 – 10 million. A high level of 
heterogeneity (GSI = 0.70) was also observed for total level of debt. More than 50% of the 
respondents had a total level of debt less than 10 million and the most frequent response 
(45.8%) was NZ$ 2 – 10 million. Non-farm income as a percentage of total income was less 
than 15% for most (84.8%) respondents, and the level of heterogeneity was low (GSI = 0.27). 
Most respondents (54.7%) reported that they were in the consolidation stage of the farming 
business, but the level of heterogeneity was high (GSI = 0.64). Similar to milk production, 
Gini-Simpson Index for the number of shares in the co-operative was 0.81, indicating a high 
137 
 
level of heterogeneity. More than 50% of respondents had less than 200,000 shares in the co-
operative, but the most frequent response (24.8%) was greater than 300,000 shares. Most 
respondents (86.8%) reported that they supply 100% of their milk to Fonterra, and the level of 
heterogeneity was low (GSI = 0.24). The Gini-Simpson Index for region was 0.79, indicating 
a high level of heterogeneity. Most farming businesses belonged to the Waikato (27.6%) 
region; and the North Island of NZ accounted for 75% of the farming businesses in our study. 
This is very similar to the national NZ dairy statistics with Waikato region accounting for 
28.8% and the North Island 73% of NZ’s dairy farms in 2016/17 (Livestock Improvement 
Corporation Limited & DairyNZ Limited, 2017).  
Of the 9 sources for which correlations could be determined, a significant (P < 0.05) and 
positive correlation was observed between 7 sources (dairy system, milk production, GFR, total 
assets, total debt, shares in the co-operative and share of milk supplied) and commitment to 
collective action, as well as commitment to governance. This finding indicates that higher the 
intensity of the dairy system and larger the milk production volumes, GFR, total assets, total 
debt, shares in the co-operative and share of milk supplied to the co-operative, greater will be 
CCA as well as CG. No significant correlations were observed with commitment to patronage. 
Suggesting that there is no linear relationship between any of the farm-business sources of 
heterogeneity and a member’s commitment to patronage of the co-operative.  
A significant difference (P < 0.05) was observed in the commitment to collective action scores 
between groups that comprised 7 (50%) sources (dairy system, milk production, milk quality, 
GFR, total assets, shares in the co-operative, and region) of the farm-business dimension (Table 
3). An important implication of this finding is that a member’s CCA can differ based on the 
type of dairy system, volume of milk produced, the quality of milk produced, the gross farm 
revenue, total assets of the dairy business, number of shares owned in the co-operative, and the 
region the dairy business is located. Two sources that had high heterogeneity did not have a 
significant difference in CCA. But more importantly, all 7 sources for which differences in 
CCA were found also had a high GSI measure of heterogeneity. While 5 of the 7 sources for 
which no differences in CCA were found had a low measure of heterogeneity. Since 12 out of 
the 14 sources fit with the hypothesis, it suggests that there is a relationship between 
heterogeneity in the farm-business dimension and CCA.  
There was a significant difference (P < 0.05) in the commitment to governance scores between 
groups that comprised 7 (50%) sources (dairy system, milk production, GFR, total assets, total 
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debt, shares in the co-operative, and share of milk supplied to the co-operative) of the farm-
business dimension (Table 3).  Six of these had high heterogeneity while one had low 
heterogeneity. There was no significant difference between groups for the remaining 7 sources. 
Of these 4 had low heterogeneity while 3 had high heterogeneity. As 10 of the 14 sources fit 
with the hypothesis it suggests that there might be a relationship between heterogeneity in the 
farm-business dimension and CG. 
There was a significant difference (P < 0.05) in commitment to patronage scores between 
groups for just 2 (14%) sources (milk quality and region). While, there was a significant 
difference between groups for the source dairy system at the 10% level (P = 0.06).  All three 
sources had high levels of heterogeneity. There was no significant difference between groups 
for the remaining 11 sources. Of these 5 had low heterogeneity while 6 had high heterogeneity. 
As 8 of the 14 sources fit with our hypothesis, it indicates that there might be a weak 
relationship between heterogeneity in the farm-business dimension and CP.  
Table 3:  Farm- Business - Descriptive Statistics of Heterogeneity and Relationship to Commitment 
# Variable N Median Mode Mean SD GSI ANOVA F Values 
 (Correlation Coefficients) 
 
      
 CP CG CCA 
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6 Milk Quality  
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8 Total Assets 
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540 2 million– 
10 million 
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10 million 
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10 million 










Of the 12 sources comprising the member-interest dimension, 9 (75%) had high heterogeneity, 
while 1 (8%) had very high heterogeneity. Since 83% of the sources showed high or very high 
heterogeneity the membership base of this co-operative can be considered to be heterogeneous 
with respect to the member interest dimension.  Two (16%) sources had moderate levels of 
heterogeneity.  None of the sources showed low and very low levels of heterogeneity (Table 
1). These findings indicate that of the three dimensions the member interest dimension is the 
most heterogeneous. The descriptive statistics on the 12 sources is presented in Table 4.  
The most frequent response (33.7%) to the statement how likely are you to sell some of your 
co-operatives shares in the next five years was very unlikely. The Gini-Simpson Index was 
0.79, indicating a high level of heterogeneity. Most respondents (51.0%) reported that one 
season or less would be the period of time a continued (< $ 5/ kg MS) low milk price payment 
will be acceptable. A high level of heterogeneity was observed for this statement (GSI = 0.64). 
A high level of heterogeneity (GSI = 0.78) was also observed for the statement how willing are 
you to accept a lower (< $ 0.20/share) dividend payment temporarily.  The most frequent 
response (25.6%) was slightly willing while the median response was slightly unwilling. A 
very high level of heterogeneity (GSI = 0.84) was observed for the statement I am concerned 
about the co-operative’s future (15 years from now). The most frequent response (19.8%) was 
10 Non-Farm 
Income  






11 Stage of 
business 






12 Shares in 
Co-op 
557 150,000 – 
200,000 






13 Share of 
milk 
supplied 












GSI - Gini-Simpson Index 
CP - Commitment to Patronage 
CG - Commitment to Governance 
CCA - Commitment to Collective Action 
NA - Not Applicable  
Significance level: * P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01 
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slightly agree, while the median response was agree. The Gini-Simpson Index for the statement 
I think it is important to be valuable to the co-operative was 0.72, indicating a high level of 
heterogeneity. The most frequent response (44.4%) was agree. A high level of heterogeneity 
(GSI = 0.69) was also observed for the statement I think it is important to be a valuable member 
of the community. The most frequent response (45.8%) was agree. The Gini-Simpson Index for 
the statement creating opportunities for future farmers is important to me was 0.71, indicating 
a high level of heterogeneity. The most frequent response (41.5%) was agree. High level of 
heterogeneity (GSI = 0.61) was observed for the statement it is important that I have time 
available for socializing with family and friends. The most frequent response (49.3%) was 
agree.  Moderate level of heterogeneity (GSI = 0.59) was observed for the statement it is 
important that I have variety in my work. Most of the respondents (57.1%) agreed with the 
statement. Moderate level of heterogeneity (GSI = 0.55) was also observed for the statement 
looking after the environment is important to me. The most frequent response (34.5%) was 
agree. The Gini-Simpson Index for the statement producing to maximise profits is important 
to me was 0.66, indicating a high level of heterogeneity. The most frequent response (47.8%) 
was agree. A high level of heterogeneity was also observed for the statement paying off debts 
is important to me (GSI = 0.67). The most frequent response (40.7%) was agree.  
A significant (P < 0.05) correlation was observed between 7 of the 12 sources of member-
interest heterogeneity and CCA. The commitment to collective action was greater for members 
who were less likely to sell co-operative shares, more willing to accept a lower dividend, and 
gave higher importance to – being valuable to the co-operative, being a respected member of 
the community, creating opportunities for future farmers, having variety in their work, and 
looking after the environment. Similarly, significant (P < 0.05) correlation was observed 
between 7 sources of member-interest heterogeneity and commitment to governance. Six of 
these sources were the same as CCA. The willingness to accept a lower dividend payment was 
not correlated with CG. Additionally, farmers who placed greater importance on having time 
available to socialize with family and friends had a higher CG.  Lastly, significant (P < 0.05) 
correlation was observed between 6 sources and commitment to patronage (Table 4). The CP 
was greater for members who were less likely to sell co-operative shares, more willing to accept 
a lower dividend, less concerned about the co-operatives future and gave higher importance to 
- being valuable to the co-operative, being a respected member of the community, and creating 
opportunities for future farmers.  
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A significant difference (P < 0.05) was observed in the commitment to collective action scores 
between groups that comprised 10 (83%) sources of the member-interest dimension (Table 4). 
This finding indicates that the CCA of the members can differ depending on their interests 
related to: selling co-operative shares, milk price, dividend payments, concern for the co-
operative, being valuable to the co-operative, being respected by the community, creating 
opportunities for future farmers, having variety in their work, looking after the environment 
and producing to maximise farm profits. High heterogeneity was found in 8 of these 10 sources 
while 2 had moderate heterogeneity.  Two sources that had high heterogeneity did not show 
significant difference in CCA. Since 8 out of the 12 sources fit with our proposed hypothesis, 
it suggests that there might be a relationship between the member-interest dimension of 
heterogeneity and CCA.  
There was a significant difference (P < 0.05) in the commitment to governance scores between 
groups that comprised 9 (75%) sources (Table 4). High heterogeneity was observed for 7 of 
these sources and moderate heterogeneity for 2. Three sources that had high heterogeneity did 
not show differences in CG. Since 7 out of the 12 sources conformed to our hypothesis, it 
suggests that there might be a relationship between the member-interest dimension of 
heterogeneity and CG.  
Similarly, there was a significant difference (P < 0.05) in commitment to patronage scores 
between groups for 9 (75%) sources of the member-interest dimension (Table 4). All 9 sources 
showed high heterogeneity. No difference in CP was found for two sources that showed 
moderate heterogeneity and one source that showed high heterogeneity. As 11 out of the 12 
sources aligned well with our hypothesis, it suggests that there might be a relationship between 
the member-interest dimension of heterogeneity and CP.  
Table 4: Member-Interest - Descriptive Statistics of Heterogeneity and Relationship to Commitment 
# Variable N Median Mode Mean SD GSI ANOVA F Values 
 (Correlation Coefficients) 
        CP CG CCA 
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GSI - Gini-Simpson Index 
CP - Commitment to Patronage 
CG - Commitment to Governance 
CCA - Commitment to Collective Action 
NA - Not Applicable  
Significance level: * P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01 
5. Discussion 
This study had two main objectives. First, we unravelled heterogeneity in agricultural co-
operatives into three dimensions, identified the sources that comprised each dimension and 
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provided a novel measure and explanation of them. Second, we examined the relationship 
between the sources of heterogeneity and a members’ commitment to collective action as well 
as commitment to patronage and governance. In pursuing these objectives, our study has 
generated some valuable insights that are useful in comprehending the phenomenon of member 
heterogeneity in agricultural co-operatives (Apparao et al., 2019). This in turn could serve as a 
starting point for evaluating its implications on co-operative performance and for providing 
suggestions for developing co-operative structures (Kyriakopoulos, Meulenberg, & Nilsson, 
2004). Further, by providing an examination of agricultural co-operatives from a socio-
psychological perspective, it also aids in the understanding of the relationship between a 
member and the co-operative, an important aspect that influences co-operative performance 
(Österberg & Nilsson, 2009). For example, the insights on member heterogeneity can help 
inform the development of co-operative communication strategies that enhance member 
commitment (Trechter, King, & Walsh, 2002).  
We identified 35 sources of heterogeneity that comprised the three dimensions of heterogeneity 
– 1) Farmer-member (n = 9), 2) Farm-business (n = 14) and 3) Member-interest (n = 12) and 
presented a novel measure and explanation of these using the Gini-Simpson Index. Based on 
this measure we found that considerable heterogeneity exists in this co-operative with all three 
dimensions measured showing high levels of heterogeneity. As this is a large and fairly 
complex co-operative a high level of heterogeneity is expected, and this finding is in line with 
arguments presented by several co-operative scholars (Nilsson, 2001; Birchall & Simmons, 
2004; Österberg & Nilsson, 2009; Nilsson et al., 2012; Hoehler & Kuehl, 2018). Moreover, 
since the foundation of Fonterra was built on several mergers of co-operatives over many 
decades, a high level of heterogeneity is expected. This is in-line with the arguments presented 
by Nilsson and Madsen (2007). In addition to the amount of heterogeneity across the 35 
sources, the kind of heterogeneity by dimension also showed interesting features and 
differences. Of the three dimensions the membership base was most heterogeneous in the 
member-interest dimension with 83% of sources showing high or very high levels of 
heterogeneity and none of the sources showing low or very low heterogeneity. This indicates 
that this co-operative is most diverse when it comes to its members-interests and relatively less 
diverse when it comes to its farmer-member and farm-business dimensions of heterogeneity. 
Although the term ‘member interests’ tends to have a range of interpretations within the context 
of co-operatives, similar to our findings,  several scholars have highlighted the significance and 
impact of heterogeneity that is  derived from differences in member-interests (Iliopoulos & 
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Hendrikse, 2009; Kalogeras et al., 2009; Alho, 2015).  Interestingly, the farm-business 
dimensions showed the greatest homogeneity of the three dimensions, with 36% of sources 
demonstrating low or very low heterogeneity. This suggests that the membership base tends to 
be more uniform with respect to farm business related properties, which is not surprising as 
they are all dairy farms. On the whole, as suggested by Hoehler and Kuehl (2018) this 
knowledge of member heterogeneity and its dimensions can help identify conflict potential and 
develop governance structures to meet the needs of the members, e.g. by introducing advisory 
boards for different producers (Kalogeras et al., 2009) or by establishing new ways of financing 
the co-operative. 
It was hypothesised that high heterogeneity will result in low commitment to collective action 
in agricultural co-operatives. Since this co-operative had high levels of heterogeneity, low 
levels of CCA were expected. However, this was not the case as CCA, as well as CP and CG, 
levels were moderately high.  This suggests that high heterogeneity does not lead to low 
commitment, which is similar to findings reported by Varughese and Ostrom (2001). Based on 
their work on 18 forest user groups in Nepal, Varughese and Ostrom (2001) found that there 
was a high degree of collective action despite there being significant heterogeneity. They 
identified that by having good institutional design and mechanisms to manage for heterogeneity 
the community was able to overcome the negative implications of heterogeneity and achieve 
high levels of collective action (Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Similarly, research has indicated 
that inequality among certain member attributes may motivate collective action and improve 
team performance (Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). Further, Ostrom (1990, 2005) based on 
her extensive work on governance of the commons presented eight design principles for the 
effective governance of common pool resources. These were 1. Well defined boundaries, 2. 
Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs, 3. Collective choice arrangements, 4. 
Monitoring, 5. Graduated sanctions, 6. Conflict resolution mechanisms, 7. Minimal recognition 
of rights to organise, and 8. Nested enterprise.  According to Ostrom (1990) organizations able 
to design collective choice arrangements that maximize positive externalities related to 
diversity and reduce relative ownership costs arising from heterogeneity may effectively 
manage heterogeneity. Although agricultural co-operatives are different from the common pool 
resources that Ostrom’s work is centred on, they too should benefit from the same principles, 
as similar to groups involved in common pool resources,  members of agricultural co-operative 
must work together to achieve a common goal which is threatened by self-serving behaviours 
stemming from heterogeneity.  It is therefore possible that the challenges presented by 
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heterogeneity in this co-operative are mitigated by having well designed structures in place that 
are aligned with the design principles identified by Ostrom (1990). Furthermore, based on the 
widely accepted co-operative lifecycle and classification framework developed by Cook (1995, 
2018) Fonterra can be considered to be in Stage 5 of the co-operative lifecycle and classified 
as a new generation co-operative or Sapiro III in structure. Fonterra has put in place 
mechanisms to bring in outside equity without restructuring as an IOF and developed structures 
such as increasing share liquidity to ameliorate the issues posed by the five property rights 
constraints that  Cook (1995) has highlighted. As heterogeneity tends to play out via the 
property rights constraints, by addressing the property rights issues, Fonterra is likely to have 
mitigated the adverse effects of heterogeneity as well. Importantly, according to Cook (2018) 
the significant challenges presented by heterogeneity to a co-operative via increased ownership 
costs can be avoided by the co-operative genius process and the resultant tinkering which 
includes continuous redesign of collective choice arrangements to achieve regeneration. 
Fonterra took this approach by changing its ownership rights along with its purpose and culture 
by adopting tradeable shares (Cook, 2018). 
 
Our study found that there tended to be a relationship between heterogeneity and CCA, CP and 
CG for the farm-business and member-interest dimensions but not for the farmer-member 
dimension. This tends to suggest that the higher the heterogeneity in the farm-business and 
member-interest dimensions, the more likely are there to be differences in CCA as well as CG 
and CP between the groups that comprise the heterogeneity sources. While heterogeneity in 
farmer-member sources is not likely to result in differences in CCA. Furthermore, although 
significant differences in CCA, CG and CP were observed between groups for several sources, 
it was most pronounced for sources in the member-interest dimension and less for farm-
business and much less for farmer-member dimensions. This indicates that of the three 
dimensions it is the differences in members’ interests that is most likely to result in differences 
in CCA as well as CG and CP. Several scholars have indicated that member-interest 
heterogeneity could have a significant influence on co-operatives (Hansmann, 1996; James & 
Sykuta, 2005; Iliopoulos & Hendrikse, 2009; Kalogeras et al., 2009; Iliopoulos & Valentinov, 
2018). While differences in farmer-member related properties, such as gender, ethnicity, years 
as co-operative member is least likely to result in differences in CCA, CG and CP.  
Moreover, significant differences in both CP and CG were observed between groups for several 
heterogeneity sources in the member-interest dimension such as the likelihood of selling co-
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operative shares, willingness to accept a lower dividend, concern for the co-operative’s future, 
being valuable to the co-operative and producing to maximise farm profits. However, fewer 
differences between groups that comprised a heterogeneity source were observed for CP as 
compared to CG for the farmer-member dimension followed by the farm-business dimension 
of heterogeneity. This indicates that with respect to famer-member and farm-business sources 
of heterogeneity CP is relatively more uniform across the groups that comprise the sources and 
is less influenced by heterogeneity when compared to CG. This is an important finding as it 
suggests that commitment to patronage tends to remain unaffected by most of the farmer-
member and farm-business sources of heterogeneity. While a member’s commitment to 
governance is influenced by relatively more heterogeneity sources in the farmer-member and 
farm-business dimensions. A members CP is more amenable to being influenced by the co-
operative via the use of both monetary (milk price and dividend payments) and non-monetary 
(member engagement) instruments or policies. Moreover, as these are uniformly applied to the 
membership base, CP is less likely to vary between member groups. However, this is not the 
case with commitment to governance. As there is no control, no sanction, and no reward or 
prize associated with a members’ participation in governance, a members’ commitment to 
governance of their co-operative is conceptually similar to an organizational citizenship 
behaviour of civic virtue (Barraud-Didier et al., 2012). CG is therefore more likely to be 
influenced by other factors such as the sources of heterogeneity (e.g. age, level of education, 
type of dairy system, volume of milk produced, total assets, total debt etc.), resulting in greater 
variability in CG between member groups. 
6. Conclusions, implications and limitations 
The framework that was developed brought together some relatively robust insights on 
heterogeneity and commitment to collective action in co-operatives into a more tightly knit and 
comprehensible whole, and in the specific context of agricultural co-operatives. In doing so we 
believe the framework serves the purpose of a reference and coordination mechanism for 
efficient theory testing. It is therefore a small but important and necessary step in the effort that 
remains to be expended in applying frameworks to the task of linking co-operative structure 
and processes to its performance. This is a critical challenge that co-operative scholars must 
address in order to progress co-operative research and enhance its managerial relevance.  
We found that this co-operative had high levels of both heterogeneity and commitment to 
collective action. This suggests that high heterogeneity does not necessarily lead to low 
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member commitment to collective action. Amongst the heterogeneity dimensions, the greatest 
heterogeneity was seen in the member-interest dimension and least in the farm-business 
dimension. This indicates that heterogeneity within the membership base is more likely to be 
a result of differences in member-interests such as likelihood of selling co-operative shares, 
willingness to accept a lower dividend, seasons a low milk price is acceptable, importance of 
being valuable to the co-operative etc.  
Additionally, our findings can contribute towards addressing the challenge of strengthening 
member commitment in agricultural co-operatives and therefore has important managerial 
implications. For example, the result of the correlation analysis suggest that  gains towards 
further enhancing commitment to collective action can be made by devising a two pronged 
engagement protocol that either reward or recognise members with higher CCA and also more 
precisely targeting members with relatively lower CCA. In the specific case of the member-
interest dimension our results point out that the co-operative can bolster member commitment 
by acknowledging and remunerating those with higher CCA and simultaneously paying 
specific attention to members with lower CCA who tend to be more likely to sell co-operative 
shares, less willing to accept a dividend, and who give less importance to - being valuable to 
the co-operative, being a respected member of the community, creating opportunities for future 
farmers, having variety in their work, and looking after the environment.  
This study had a few limitations. Firstly, due to its cross-sectional design and analysis, this 
study was focused on one large dairy co-operative in New Zealand. The study therefore could 
not test if the link between heterogeneity and commitment to collective action is statistically 
significant across diverse co-operatives. The results therefore are indicative at this stage and 
further research is required to validate them. Moreover, as most dairy co-operatives focus on 
only one commodity (milk) and farmer-type (dairy farmers) generalisations of the results to 
non-dairy co-operatives need to be made with caution. Secondly, since the data was collected 
over a single point in time it does not allow us to study or understand any changes in the 
relationship between heterogeneity and commitment that can occur. This is important because 
a member’s psychological state can vary over time with respect to their relationship with the 
co-operative. Lastly, the proposed model did not take into account the important feedback loops 
that exist between the variables included in the model, and it did not measure the indirect 
impact of the heterogeneity sources on CCA through other variables. However, by measuring 
the stated and direct relationship between the heterogeneity sources and CCA, this study is an 
important first step which can inform future research on the indirect relationship that could 
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exist via other variables. To examine the feedback loops and measure the indirect relationships, 
future research on heterogeneity and commitment should consider using structural equation 
modelling (SEM) as the analytical technique, and data collection and hypothesis testing should 
be devised accordingly. An important source of member-interest heterogeneity in co-operatives 
is the succession plan of farmers as it can introduce tension, for e.g. via the horizon and 
portfolio problems. Future research on heterogeneity should include succession planning as a 
heterogeneity source. 
Despite these limitations our findings contribute towards the growing literature on 
heterogeneity and commitment in agricultural co-operatives. By revealing the links between 
heterogeneity and commitment to collective action, this study contributes towards the larger 
body of research aimed at identifying factors that influence member commitment in co-
operatives and therefore come into play in predicting or assessing co-operative performance. 
We hope that the findings reported in this paper with regards to heterogeneity and commitment 
to collective action will encourage researchers to further expand the scope of empirical research 
of these two phenomena in the context of agricultural co-operatives. Lastly, the relationship 
between commitment to the co-operative and commitment to wider societal requirements such 
as animal welfare, sustainability and protecting the environment would also be a very 
interesting area for future research. 
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Chapter 5: Member Heterogeneity and Organisational Commitment:  An 
empirical study of a New Zealand dairy co-operative 
 
This chapter addresses research objective 3 and the manuscript has been prepared for 
submission to the International Journal of Co-operative Accounting and Management 
(IJCAM). This is a co-operatives specific journal and explores a wide range of topics related 
to the accounting and management of co-operatives. Moreover, this chapter is related to the 






This paper presents and empirically tests a framework that examines the relationship between 
member heterogeneity and member organisational commitment in agricultural co-operatives. 
Member heterogeneity was measured using 35 sources that were grouped under one of three 
heterogeneity dimensions – 1) farmer-member, 2) farm-business and 3) member-interest. 
This was linked to three conceptualizations of member organizational commitment namely 
affective (affective attachment), continuance (perceived costs) and normative (obligation). 
Based on survey responses from 568 members of a NZ dairy co-operative (Fonterra Co-
operative Group), the study found that high heterogeneity does not necessarily result in low 
affective (AC) and normative commitment (NC) while it might lead to a low continuance 
commitment (CC). Moreover, the results suggest that heterogeneity could be associated with 
AC but not NC and CC. Further, our findings tend to indicate that the farmer-member 
dimension is not related to any of the three organisational commitment components. While 
the farm-business dimension is related to AC and CC, and the member-interest dimensions is 
related to AC and NC.  






The international cooperative alliance (ICA) outlines seven core principles that shape co-
operatives and defines a co-operative as “an autonomous association of persons united 
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations 
through jointly owned and democratically-controlled enterprise” (International Co-operative 
Alliance (ICA), 2018). This is a very broad definition covering off both functional and 
political elements of a cooperative (Evans & Meade, 2006). More importantly it highlights 
the dual nature of co-operatives, that is a cooperative is both an association (i.e., society) of 
members and an enterprise (the cooperative firm) in which economic activities are conducted 
(Bijman, 2016). Although there are several similarities between co-operatives and the more 
common Investor Owned Firms (IOF), for example, both types of organizations participate in 
the same labour market, pay similar wages, management compensation and interest rates; and 
most operational practices such as packaging, storing, transporting, processing, and 
advertising are also very similar across both business forms (Zeuli & Cropp, 2004), there are 
some critical differences as well.  Most importantly cooperatives are purposefully organized 
to serve member needs and are focused on generating member benefits rather than return to 
investors; and members have a responsibility to provide equity capital and govern the 
business (Coltrain, Barton, & Boland, 2000).  Therefore a cooperative can be viewed as a 
business that is owned and controlled by the people (patrons) who use its services and whose 
benefits (services received and earnings allocations) are shared by the users (typically on the 
basis of use) (Staatz, 1987). In other words, a cooperative can be defined as a user-owned, 
user-controlled organization whose primary purpose is to maximize benefits for its users 
(Zeuli & Cropp, 2004). This strong member orientation and focus of cooperatives as opposed 
to investor orientation of IOF’s is the most important differentiating feature between the two.  
As a result, the core operating philosophies of the two organizational forms are very different. 
Moreover, cooperative principles provide an additional framework through which options for 
business strategies, organizational structures, and operations must be analysed (Dunn, 
Crooks, Frederick, Kennedy, & Wadsworth, 2002). 
Despite the member-co-operative relational dimension being an important differentiator of 
the co-operative model from the more common IOF model, and also a significant source of 
competitive advantage (Jussila, Goel, & Tuominen, 2012), much of the research work on co-
operatives tends to be centred on the non-relational aspects (Røkholt, 1999; Byrne, 
McCarthy, Ward, & McMurtry, 2012). Research about co-operatives have mainly focused on 
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theoretical aspects and approaches such as agency theory (Eilers & Hanf, 1999), property 
rights theory (Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000) contracting theory (Sykuta & Cook, 2001) , 
transaction cost theory (Hendrikse & Bijman, 2002), and game theory (Karantininis & Zago, 
2001). Although these are useful in detailing the economic characteristics of the co-
operatives and explaining the reasons for the formation, existence and behaviour, they are not 
empirically based; and hence not entirely useful in evaluating the performance of co-
operatives. While the conventional financial and economic rationale for measuring co-
operative performance and explaining the reasons for being a member of a co-operative 
continue to be important, there is a parallel view that stresses the need to recognise the 
critical role of other factors (Fulton, 1999; Iliopoulos & Cook, 1999; Nilsson, Svendsen, & 
Svendsen, 2012; Apparao, Garnevska, & Shadbolt, 2019). Moreover, the literature identifies 
that while the study and analysis of co-operatives are often strongly driven by economic 
aspirations (e.g. profit maximization) they are not always in total alignment with the social 
features of the co-operative organisational form. Furthermore, the empirical studies that exist 
are mainly focused on applying the behaviour model of cooperatives as a profit-maximizing 
firm;  and empirical applications of other existing models is lacking (Soboh, Lansink, Giesen, 
& Van Dijk, 2009). Besides, given that members assess their co-operatives in social terms in 
addition to economic ones; some reorientation of research on agricultural co-operatives with 
a focus on the socio-psychological perspective of members is also suggested (Österberg & 
Nilsson, 2009). Two such  important socio-psychological phenomena that influence and 
impact co-operatives are -1) member heterogeneity (Iliopoulos & Cook, 1999; Kalogeras, 
Pennings, van der Lans, Garcia, & van Dijk, 2009; Hoehler & Kuehl, 2018; Apparao et al., 
2019) and 2) member commitment (Fulton, 1999; Österberg & Nilsson, 2009; Bijman & 
Verhees, 2011; Apparao, Shadbolt, & Garnevska, 2020b). Member heterogeneity deals with 
the diversity that exists within the membership base while member commitment deals with 
the force that binds a member to a course of action of relevance to the co-operative.  
A very important feature of co-operatives is that it is characterised by collective decision 
making and self-governance (Apparao et al., 2019). As heterogeneity is perceived to affect this 
feature, it impacts the performance of co-operatives (Cook, 1995; Iliopoulos & Cook, 1999; 
Kalogeras et al., 2009; Pozzobon, Zylbersztajn, & Bijman, 2011; Bijman, Hanisch, & Van der 
Sangen, 2014; Apparao et al., 2019). More specifically, since the control of co-operatives is 
structured democratically, heterogeneity is likely to generate transaction costs to co-operative 
decision-making. As argued by Hansmann (1996) an increase in these transaction costs results 
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in higher decision-making costs in co-operatives relative to IOF’s. Similarly, according to 
Pozzobon et al. (2011), as a consequence of heterogeneity, decision making in traditional co-
operatives is likely to be more costly than in IOF’s. It has been suggested that the heterogeneity 
(diversity) of co-operatives’ membership is increasing (Simmons & Birchall, 2004). This is 
because, as co-operatives become larger and more diverse in their operations, membership 
becomes increasingly heterogeneous (Nilsson et al., 2012). Globalisation and international 
expansion of co-operatives coupled with structural changes in the farming sector have led to 
further magnification of the differences between farmer members. Consumer demand for 
higher quality and more variety have resulted in an increase in diversification at farm level 
(Bogetoft & Olesen, 2007). Moreover, in search of efficiency gains and additional bargaining 
power, co-operatives are seeking new members and merging partners outside their original 
areas (Hoehler & Kuehl, 2018).  
For agricultural co-operatives to be successful it is required that farmer-members are willing 
to supply the co-operative with raw products, capital and managerial inputs (Fulton, 1999; 
Zeuli & Cropp, 2004), and for this to happen member commitment is essential (Staatz, 1989; 
Anderson & Henehan, 2005; Cechin, Bijman, Pascucci, & Omta, 2013). It has been 
suggested that commitment improves co-operative performance in several ways. For 
example, Bijman and Verhees (2011) maintain that it  decreases the transaction costs in 
member-co-operative transactions because the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour is 
reduced since committed members are less likely to behave as free riders in their dealings 
with the co-operative. Solinger, Van Olffen, and Roe (2008) report that commitment 
incorporates in its members, a willingness to make a sacrifice to contribute to the 
organizations success, and Cechin et al. (2013) suggest committed members are more likely 
to make an effort towards delivering to the co-operative’s strategy. 
It has been argued than an increase in heterogeneity can lead to a decline in member 
commitment (Fulton & Giannakas, 2001; Apparao et al., 2019). Moreover, a critical aspect to 
overcoming the perceived heterogeneity problem in agricultural co-operatives is to ensure 
members reconcile their differences and exhibit a commitment to the organisation.  Yet, very 
few studies have examined the relationship between member heterogeneity and member 
commitment (Apparao, Shadbolt, & Garnevska, 2020a) and empirical research on this 
phenomenon is lacking. More specifically, the relationship between member heterogeneity 
and member organisational commitment, which is a multidimensional attitudinal concept, has 
not yet, to our knowledge, been studied in the context of agricultural co-operatives. Drawing 
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from the organisational behaviour literature, and specifically from Meyer and Allen (1991), 
we define organizational commitment as a psychological state that characterizes the 
members relationship with the co-operative, and has implications for the decision to 
continue or discontinue membership in the co-operative.  
We strive to address these gaps by pursuing two main objectives. First, to develop a 
framework that explores the links (and/or relationship) between heterogeneity and members’ 
organisational commitment in agricultural co-operatives.  Second, to empirically test these 
links via the measurement and analysis of heterogeneity and member organisational 
commitment in agricultural co-operatives. By pursuing these objectives, we present a new 
theoretical framework for linking member heterogeneity and organisational commitment and 
provide a much-needed empirical assessment of important phenomena that have been 
suggested to impact co-operative performance. 
This manuscript is structured as follows - the second section presents and explains the 
theoretical framework, the third section details the methodological aspects of the study carried 
out on a sample of 568 members of Fonterra Co-operative Group, the fourth section describes 
the results, and the fifth section presents a discussion of these. The conclusions, limitations and 
possibilities for future research are presented in the sixth section. 
2.0 Theoretical Framework 
In this study a framework that provides an examination of member heterogeneity and member 
organisational commitment in agricultural co-operatives is conceptualized. As empirical 
studies are necessary to further enhance the understanding of agricultural co-operatives, 
importance is given towards objectively examining these two phenomena in agricultural co-
operatives via outcomes than can be measured. The first step towards achieving this is to 
provide a description of heterogeneity and organisational commitment. 
2.1 Heterogeneity 
As co-operatives become larger and more complex in their operations, membership becomes 
increasingly diverse (heterogeneous), and the increase in heterogeneity has often been 
suggested as being a significant challenge to the co-operative model (Bijman et al., 2014; 
Apparao et al., 2019). This is because both democratic costs (Staatz, 1987; Bijman, 2002) and 
agency costs (Gorton & Schmid, 1999) are believed to be greater in co-operatives than in 
investor owned firms (IOF). Increased heterogeneity of co-operatives and their members is 
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suggested to be an important reason for further increase in these costs and resulting decrease 
in competitiveness of co-operatives (Fulton & Giannakas, 2001; Bijman, 2002; Bogetoft & 
Olesen, 2004).  When members possess diverse preferences for attribute alternatives, 
disagreements can occur as to which combination is most desirable (Zusman, 1992).  As 
discussed by Vitaliano (1983), Cook (1995), and Hansmann (1996) the divergence in 
incentives and preferences is particularly problematic for the assignment of contractual 
property rights among members with diverse characteristics. Moreover increasing 
heterogeneity leading to conflicting preferences can generate problems in co-operatives 
(Kalogeras et al., 2009) such as decline in member commitment (Fulton & Giannakas, 2001), 
decrease in member willingness to supply equity capital (Van Bekkum, 2001), increasing costs 
related to damaging influence activities  (Cook, 1995),  tedious decision making process 
(Hansmann, 1996) and lack of strategic focus (Hendrikse & Bijman, 2002). 
The study of heterogeneity in agricultural co-operative should start with decoupling the 
dimensions of member heterogeneity that exist. These dimensions help identify conflict 
potential and adopt governance structures to meet the needs of the members e.g. by introducing 
advisory boards for different producers or by establishing new ways of organising and 
financing the co-operative (Kalogeras et al., 2009). Moreover, by identifying the attributes, 
levels and factors of member heterogeneity, the co-operatives’ ability to meet the needs of the 
members can be further strengthened (Kalogeras et al., 2009). Despite its importance, very few 
scholars have taken a step in this direction.  Cook and Iliopoulos (1999), in their study of 
influence costs, identified eight factors that can be used to explain the degree of heterogeneity 
in agricultural co-operatives. While Pozzobon et al. (2011) postulate that member 
heterogeneity in agricultural co-operatives can be because of - 1) individual characteristics and 
2) farms characteristics. More recently, Hoehler and Kuehl (2018) posit that member 
heterogeneity in agricultural co-operatives can be grouped under three categories 1) farm (e.g. 
size, location), 2) member (e.g. age, education) and 3) product (e.g. type and quality). 
In this study, based on the arguments and suggestions of Cook and Iliopoulos (1999), Pozzobon 
et al. (2011) and Hoehler and Kuehl (2018), we separate member heterogeneity into three 
dimensions, 1) farmer-member, 2) farm-business and 3) member-interest. Further, each of the 
heterogeneity dimensions incorporates several sources that have been stressed in research on 
co-operatives. The farmer-member dimension is comprised of 9 sources, the farm-business 
dimension is comprised of 14 sources and the member-interest dimension is comprised of 12 
sources. These three dimensions, as well as the sources and overall member heterogeneity in 
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agricultural co-operatives, have already been described and analysed in an earlier research 
study (Apparao et al., 2020a). 
2.2 Organisational Commitment  
Organisational commitment, which lies in the area of organizational behaviour is primarily 
focused on the role it plays in systems that are characterized by employer (i.e., the 
organization) and employees, and has been conceptualized and measured in several ways. 
According to  Mäkelä and Maula (2006) organisational  commitment refers to joint values, 
goals and actions in a relationship leading to the intention of relationship continuation and 
deployment of resources. Although many definitions have been proposed for organisational 
commitment, an underlying and recurring theme appears to be the idea of a psychological 
bond between the member and the organisation, which can be conceived as an intrinsic 
attachment or identification of a person with something outside of oneself (Firestone & 
Pennell, 1993).   
According to Meyer and Allen (1987), three distinct yet general themes, affective attachment, 
perceived costs and obligation, reflect several conceptualizations of attitudinal commitment 
in literature. Thus, commitment is viewed as having an affective orientation toward the 
organisation, recognition of the costs associated with leaving the organisation, and a moral 
obligation to remain with the organisation. These distinct themes were labelled as “affective”, 
“continuance” and “normative” commitment; and are important because they involve the 
psychological state reflected in commitment, the antecedent conditions leading to its 
development, and the behaviours that are expected to result from commitment (Allen & 
Meyer, 1990).   
Based on the widely accepted three component model of organisational commitment 
presented by Meyer & Allen (Meyer & Allen, 1991), few co-operative studies have identified 
affective (emotive), continuance (utilitarian), and normative (ideological) dimensions of 
member commitment reflecting a member’s desire to, need to, and or/sense of obligation to 
maintain membership and patronage in the co-operative (Jussila & Tuominen, 2010; Jussila, 
Byrne, & Tuominen, 2012; Jussila, Goel, et al., 2012; Mazzarol, Soutar, & Limnios, 2012; 
Jussila, Roessl, & Tuominen, 2014).  
Affective Commitment: Co-operative literature indicates that the affective dimension of 
commitment is based on emotional attachments to and bond with co-operative society 
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(Foreman & Whetten, 2002; Byrne & McCarthy, 2005; Jiménez, Martí, & Ortiz, 2010). It 
reflects the members desire to remain attached to the particular social entity – as the 
relationship feels good, brings a sense of belonging, and is satisfying (Byrne & McCarthy, 
2005). According to Jussila et al (2012), affective commitment is an essential ingredient for 
sustainable and successful co-operation because it helps address important challenges 
intrinsic to the co-operative model such as the free-riding problem, property rights problem 
and horizon problem (Jussila, Byrne, et al., 2012).   
Continuance Commitment: Within the context of co-operatives, it is suggested that 
continuance commitment is calculative and rational in nature and refers to a members need to 
stay in order to gain the economic benefits of membership (Jussila et al., 2014). Continuance 
(utilitarian) commitment is important because the existence of a co-operative is dependent on 
continued support from members, but this form of commitment is prone to switching 
vulnerabilities (Oliver, 1997). Although continuance (utilitarian) commitment leads to short 
termism and selfish behaviour, it may also be a critical tool to keep the co-operative 
managers accountable to members (members that actively weigh costs and benefits will 
demand better performance from managers) and thereby reduce agency costs (Jussila, Goel, 
et al., 2012). 
Normative Commitment: According to Byrne and McCarthy (2005), normative commitment 
reflects the members sense of duty to remain a patron because they feel as though they ought 
to maintain that relationship. Moreover, there is a close connection between co-operative 
ideology and normative commitment, and often normative commitment is referred to as 
ideological commitment, which may be very difficult to build but which is very persistent 
and creates lasting loyalty (Byrne & McCarthy, 2005).  This moral obligation manifests itself 
when a member considers that opportunistic behaviour (e.g. free riding and taking advantage 
of the public goods provided by the co-operative) is wrong; and the member thereby is 
willing to maintain their contribution (Fulton & Adamowicz, 1993; Jussila et al., 2014).  
In this study, member organisational commitment is separated into three components 1) 
Affective 2) Continuance and 3) Normative.  These three components, as well as organisational 
commitment in agricultural co-operatives, have already been described and analysed in an 
earlier research study (Apparao et al., 2020b). 
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2.3 Framework Structure and Hypothesis 
The conceptual framework is organized based on the premise that heterogeneity has an 
important influence on member organisational commitment. This relationship between 
heterogeneity and organisational commitment is examined by bringing together the three 
dimensions of heterogeneity and the three components of organisational commitment (Figure 
1). It is hypothesised, that the relationship between heterogeneity and organisational 
commitment is inverse, i.e. when heterogeneity is high, organisational commitment is low and 
when heterogeneity is low, organisational commitment is high. It is further argued that this 
relationship is expressed via the associated heterogeneity dimensions and organisational 
commitment components. When there is an increase in heterogeneity within one or more of the 
heterogeneity dimensions, there is a decrease in one or more components of organisational 
commitment. 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework: Heterogeneity and Organisational Commitment 
 
Based on the framework, we propose the following hypotheses – 
Hypothesis 1: There is a high level of heterogeneity, and a low level of affective, continuance 
and normative commitment, as well as overall organisational commitment.  
We further propose that if there is high heterogeneity within a source, then there will be a 
significant difference in AC, CC and NC between the groups that comprise the heterogeneity 
source. The basis for this is that heterogeneity can be linked to organisational commitment by 
identifying if there is a significant difference in AC, CC and NC between the various groups 
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that comprise a source of heterogeneity. Furthermore, this could also indicate if an association 
between heterogeneity and that component of organisational commitment exists. Based on this 
rational we propose: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant difference in AC, CC and NC between the groups that 
comprise each of the 9 sources of farmer-member heterogeneity dimension that showed high 
or very high heterogeneity. While there is no significant difference between groups for sources 
that showed low or very low heterogeneity. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a significant difference in AC, CC and NC between the groups that 
comprise each of the 14 sources of farm-business heterogeneity dimension that showed high 
or very high heterogeneity. While there is no significant difference between groups for sources 
that showed low or very low heterogeneity. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a significant difference in AC, CC and NC between the groups that 
comprise each of the 12 sources of member-interest heterogeneity dimension that showed high 
or very high heterogeneity. While there is no significant difference between groups for sources 
that showed low or very low heterogeneity. 
3.0 Methods 
3.1 Background 
3.1.1 Agriculture and Dairy Co-operatives 
Although co-operatives exist in a wide range of sectors, it is in the agricultural sector that 
they have the most comprehensive and significance presence. Co-operatives that operate 
along the agricultural value chain, starting from the supply of farming inputs to the 
cultivation of agricultural products and livestock farming, and further on to the industrial 
processing of agricultural products and animals, can be grouped together as agricultural 
cooperatives (International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) & Euricse, 2014). Agricultural 
cooperatives have played an important role in strengthening market access and generating 
competitive returns for independent farm operators during the 20th century (Ortmann & 
King, 2007). In the United States, there were approximately 1,953 agricultural co-operatives 
and their average total assets and equity were $47.1 million ad $20.9 million respectively 
(Demko, 2018). In the EU there are about 51, 392 agricultural co-operatives and their 
combined annual turnover in €347 billion (Cocolina & Cooperatives Europe, 2016). 
Particularly in the dairy industry, farmer-owned cooperatives play a rather dominant role with 
165 
 
market shares above 80% in milk collection in the U.S., the major dairy countries in Western 
Europe and also in Australia and New Zealand (Chaddad, 2007). Moreover, four (Fonterra, 
FrieslandCampina, Dairy Farmers of America and Arla Foods) of the top 10 dairy companies 
in the world by revenue are co-operatives (Hunt & van Battum, 2015).  
New Zealand has a long standing and deep presence of co-operatives across several sectors. 
They also account for a significant share of New Zealand’s economic activity (Evans & 
Meade, 2006; Garnevska, Callagher, Apparao, Shadbolt, & Siedlok, 2017). A recent report 
by Garnevska et al. (2017) found that the top 30 co-operatives and mutuals in NZ generated 
revenues of over 42 billion NZ$, provided direct employment to 48,000 individuals and 
catered to a membership base of 1.4 million people. Amongst the top 30 NZ co-operatives, 
agri-food cooperatives account for 65% of revenues, 68% of assets and 83% of employees 
(Garnevska et al., 2017). Within the agricultural sector, cooperatives play a very significant 
role in the dairy industry and account for over 80% of milk processing in New Zealand. 
3.1.2 Fonterra 
Fonterra Co-operative Group (Fonterra) is owned by around 10,000 self-employed dairy 
farmers that are spread across NZ. It was formed in 2001 by the amalgamation of three entities 
- 1. New Zealand Dairy Group, 2. Kiwi Co-operative Dairies, and 3. the New Zealand Dairy 
Board. This process that lead to the formation of Fonterra was driven by several mergers over 
the course of many decades. It is reported that there were about 230 dairy co-operatives in the 
1960’s. These co-operatives were characterised by a unique identity, loyal membership base 
and strong regional specificity. More importantly there was intense competition between these 
co-operatives.  Over the next three decades, especially in the 1980’s and 1990’s many dairy 
co-operatives gradually merged to form larger co-operatives in order to achieve economies of 
scale.  As a result, there were just 3 dairy co-operatives in 2017/18, and the formation of 
Fonterra was the main outcome and culmination of this process of mergers.   As explained by 
Nilsson and Madsen (2007) mergers between co-operatives are quite complex because a 
merger involves not only the integration of the business operations of the two co-operatives 
but also the breaking down of barriers between the members of the two co-operatives and 
aligning the different ways of thinking within the memberships. Moreover, the merger is further 
complicated by the concept of heterogeneity – heterogeneity in terms of business activities, 
logistics, organisational culture, leadership principles, ways of working, and other attributes 
(Nilsson & Madsen, 2007). Fonterra’s large membership base and a foundation based on 
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several mergers of co-operatives that once had a unique identity of their own, and strongly 
competed against each other, is thought to have introduced considerable member heterogeneity 
in the co-operative.  
With revenues of about NZ$ 20.4 billion in 2017/18 Fonterra is the largest business enterprise 
in NZ. Fonterra sources about 22 billion litres of milk, which is about 82% of NZ milk 
production. It is the largest dairy exporter in the world, exporting about 95% of its milk sourced 
to 140 countries. Fonterra employs 22,000 people across the world and accounts for 25% of 
NZ’s exports. It is governed by an 11-member board (7 elected farmer shareholders and 4 
appointed). Farmer shareholders vote for board members on the basis of the number of wet 
shares they hold, that is, one share per kilogramme of milksolids supplied to the co-operative.  
Additionally, it has a 25 member shareholders council which represents the views of all 
Fonterra farmer shareholders as suppliers, owners and investors. Each councillor is elected by 
farmers within the ward they represent, on the basis of one vote per shareholder farm.  
3.2 Data Collection  
3.2.1 Sample 
A survey method was used to collect data on heterogeneity and member organisational 
commitment. Before the survey, a pilot study was performed using 10 dairy farmers chosen by 
convenience to inform the development and refinement of the questionnaire. A random sample 
of 2,000 members of Fonterra was generated by a Fonterra manager and the structured 
questionnaire that was developed was mailed to this sample in July 2017. The researchers only 
had access to the postal contact information of the members and were blind to the member’s 
names and other details. A reminder was sent out in September 2017 to those members that 
hadn’t yet responded. Of the 2,000 surveys that were mailed 294 (15%) were returned by the 
postal service as being un-deliverable and 576 were returned by the respondents, giving a 
response rate of 34%. Of these 8 responses were classified as being incomplete and were 
discarded. Thus, leaving the study with a sample of 568 responses (33%) that were used in the 
analysis.  
3.2.2 Measures  
Heterogeneity: As described in the framework earlier, this study captured heterogeneity in 
agricultural co-operatives along three dimensions, farmer-member, farm-business and 
member-interest. To achieve this, each dimension was further broken down to its constituent 
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elements or sources of heterogeneity; and the degree of heterogeneity that existed for each of 
these sources was measured. These sources were included because they are often associated 
with member heterogeneity in agricultural co-operatives (Iliopoulos & Cook, 1999; Kalogeras 
et al., 2009; Pozzobon et al., 2011; Hoehler & Kuehl, 2018); and are of specific relevance to 
heterogeneity within the membership base of NZ dairy co-operatives. The farmer-member 
dimension comprised of 9 sources, the farm-business dimension comprised of 14 sources and 
the member-interest dimension comprised of 12 sources. These three dimensions, as well as 
the sources that comprise them, have already been described in an earlier research study 
(Apparao et al., 2020a). 
Organisational Commitment  The measures used to capture organisational commitment are 
explained in Apparao et al. (2020b) and were based on the three component model and scale 
developed by Allen and Meyer (1990). The original statements developed by Allen and Meyer 
(1990) were specifically adapted to suit the measurement of the member-farmer and co-
operative relationship in a dairy co-operative.  All three components, affective, continuance 
and normative commitment, were measured using eight statements (items) for each. 
Respondents indicated their degree of agreement to each of the twenty-four statements on a 
Likert type 7-point scale (from 1: Strongly disagree to 7: Strongly agree).  
3.3 Statistical Analysis  
The data was analysed using SPSS (IBM® SPSS Statistics).  First, a scale reversal was 
performed for the inverted scale statements. Second, a descriptive analysis of the data set was 
conducted by determining descriptive statistics such as the median, mode, mean, standard 
deviation and frequencies of the variables.  Third, the construct reliability of the statements 
used to measure organisational commitment was determined using the Cronbach Alpha. 
Fourth, the affective, normative and continuance commitment scores were determined for each 
respondent by summing the responses to each of the eight statements used to measure them. 
Since the scale length ranged from 1 to 7 for each statement, the lowest score possible is 8 (8 
x 1) and the highest possible score 56 (8 x 7).   
Fifth, the Gini-Simpson Index (GSI), one of the most widely used indexes to measure diversity 
(heterogeneity), was used to determine the degree of heterogeneity that existed within each 
source variable. The GSI takes in account the number of different types that exist in the data 
field of interest and also how evenly entities are distributed among those types. Although its 
origins lie in the field of ecology, it has been widely used in diverse disciplines, such as 
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genetics, sociology, economics, management etc. For example, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index, which is extensively used to measure market concentration in economics and 
management, is based on Gini-Simpson Index (Rhoades, 1993). The equation used to 
determine Gini-Simpson Index is given below -  




Where R is richness and quantifies the number of different types the data field of interest 
represents. For example, in the case of heterogeneity source variable gender, R is equal to two 
since the data field of interest comprises of two types, male and female. Pi represents the 
proportion of individuals that belong to the ith type in the data field of interest. An index value 
of 0 indicates complete homogeneity, while an index value of 1 indicates complete 
heterogeneity. We classify heterogeneity in our source variables into five categories based on 
the GSI value as follows, 0 to 0.20 very low heterogeneity, > 0.20 to 0.40 low heterogeneity, 
> 0.40 to 0.60 moderate heterogeneity, > 0.60 to 0.80 high heterogeneity, and > 0.80 to 1.0 
very high heterogeneity.  
Sixth, for the heterogeneity sources for which correlations could be determined, the 
Spearman’s correlation technique was used to determine if a correlation exists between a 
heterogeneity source and AC, CC and NC.  Lastly, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
performed to determine if the AC, CC and NC scores differed significantly between groups 
comprising a source of heterogeneity. 
4.0 Results 
4.1 Organisational Commitment 
A detailed presentation of the results on organisational commitment are provided in Apparao 
et al. (2020b). In brief, the Cronbach alpha of the statements used to measure the three 
different constructs of organisational commitment were all greater than 0.70, indicating that 
the statements were a reliable measure of the underlying construct being studied. The mean 
affective commitment score was 37.8 (SD = 9.7) and normative commitment score was 31.7 
(SD = 8.1). While the median scores were 39 and 32 respectively. As both the mean and 
median scores were above the mid-point of 31.5, it suggests that this co-operative has high 
affective and normative commitment.  However, the co-operative had low continuance 
commitment as both the mean (30.2, SD = 9.0) and median (29.0) CC scores were below the 
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scale mid-point.  Importantly a classification of organisation commitment scores into high 
and low levels based on the mid-point score of 31.5, revealed that 19.2% (n = 109) of 
respondents had high levels of all three components, AC, CC and NC; while 10.9% (n = 62) 
had low levels of all three components of organisational commitment  
4.2 Heterogeneity  
A detailed presentation of the results on heterogeneity are presented in Apparao et al. 
(2020a). In brief, high (n = 20, 57%) and very high (n = 5, 14%) levels of heterogeneity were 
observed for most (n = 25, 71%) of the 35 heterogeneity sources. In contrast low (n= 6, 17%) 
and very low (n = 1, 3%) heterogeneity were only observed for 7 (20%) sources. This 
indicates that the membership base of this co-operative is characterised by high 
heterogeneity.  
4.3 Heterogeneity and Organisational Commitment 
Significant differences in AC were observed between groups for 23 sources of heterogeneity. 
While a significant difference in CC and NC between groups was found for only 11 and 8 
sources of heterogeneity respectively. Importantly, of the 25 sources that demonstrated high 
or very heterogeneity, a majority showed significant differences (P < 0.05) in AC (n = 17). 
However, much fewer number of sources showed significant differences in CC (n = 8) and 
NC (n = 8). Furthermore, of the 7 sources that showed low of very low heterogeneity, a 
significant difference was observed in AC (n = 3) and CC (n = 2) but not NC.  Of the three 
sources that showed moderate heterogeneity, there were no differences in NC but one showed 
difference in CC and two showed significant differences in AC.  These findings tend to 
suggest that high heterogeneity will result in differences in AC between groups that comprise 
the heterogeneity source while low heterogeneity will not. It therefore indicates that there is a 
relationship between heterogeneity and AC. In the case of CC and NC, the findings suggest 
that high heterogeneity need not result in significant differences between the groups that 
comprise the heterogeneity source. This indicates that there might not be a relationship 





Table 2:  Farm- Business - Descriptive Statistics of Heterogeneity and Commitment 
# Variable N Mode Gini Simpson Index ANOVA F Values 
(Correlation Coefficients) 
AC CC NC 
1 Farm type 558 Dairy Low 0.00 2.62 0.00 
(NA) (NA) (NA) 
2 Dairy system 499 System 3 High 5.32*** 0.92 1.17 
(0.11**) (-0.07) (0.01) 
3 Seasonality 565 Spring calving Low 2.66* 0.93 2.02 
(NA) (NA) (NA) 
4 Milk Production 565 > 300,000 Very High 3.16*** 4.30*** 0.98 
kgMS/year (0.14***) (-0.16***) (0.06) 
5 Milk Types 567 Conventional Low 4.94** 2.96** 1.53 
milk (NA) (NA) (NA) 
6 Milk Quality 556 100,000 – 150,000 High 2.25* 1.49 0.86 
SCC/ml (-0.07) (0.04) (-0.01) 
7 GFR 538 500,000 – 1,000,000 High 3.99*** 7.11*** 1.11 
(0.15***) (-0.20***) (0.04) 
8 Total Assets 540 2,000,000 – 10,000,000 High 3.59*** 3.64*** 1.07 
(0.10**) (-0.12***) (0.04) 
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9 Total Debt 537 2,000,000 – 10,000,000 High 2.51** 1.73 1.11 
(0.12***) (-0.06) (0.06) 
10 Non-Farm Income 532 < 15 % Low 0.73 0.54 1.10 
(-0.05) (0.01) (-0.05) 
11 Stage of business 539 Consolidation High 0.12 3.06** 0.45 
(NA) (NA) (NA) 
12 Shares in Co-op 557 > 300,000 Very High 4.34*** 2.43** 2.24** 
(0.13***) (-0.11**) (0.09**) 
13 Share of milk supplied 560 100% Low 4.61** 0.39 1.56 
(0.12***) (-0.01) (0.07) 
14 Region 562 Waikato High 2.54** 5.16*** 0.95 
(NA) (NA) (NA) 
NA – Not Applicable  
Significance Level: *P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01 
 
 
Table 3: Member-Interest - Descriptive Statistics of Heterogeneity and Commitment 
# Variable N Mode Gini Simpson Index ANOVA F Values 




     
AC CC NC 
1 Likelihood of selling shares 563 Very unlikely High 14.07*** 1.96* 4.58*** 
     
(0.31***) (0.00) (0.17***) 
2 Seasons low milk price is acceptable 552 1 season High 4.56*** 1.19 6.25*** 
     
(0.02) (-0.09*) (-0.08) 
3 Willingness to accept lower dividend 563 Slightly willing High 9.77*** 1.09 5.23*** 
     
(0.27***) (0.02) (0.16***) 
4 Concerned about Co-op’s future 566 Agree Very High 10.68*** 0.62 2.71** 
     
(-0.30***) (0.07) (-0.06) 
5 Being valuable to co-op 567 Agree High 35.97*** 1.4 25.19*** 
     
(0.54***) (-0.04) (0.44***) 
6 Being a respected member of the community 566 Agree High 4.01*** 1.5 4.28*** 
     
(0.21***) (0.01) (0.17***) 
7 Creating opportunities for future farmers 568 Agree High 10.72*** 1.29 4.80*** 
     
(0.31***) (-0.07) (0.18**) 
8 Having time available for socializing with family & friends 566 Agree High 1.40 0.84 1.03 
     
(0.11**) (-0.07) (-0.02) 
9 Having variety in work 567 Agree Moderate 2.20** 0.82 0.81 
     
(0.14***) (-0.05) (-0.01) 
10 Looking after the environment 566 Strongly Agree Moderate 1.99* 0.65 0.49 
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(0.12***) (-0.08*) (0.02) 
11 Maximizing farm profits 565 Agree High 4.42*** 1.62 0.56 
     
(0.08) (-0.09) (-0.03) 
12 Paying off debts 567 Agree High 2.26* 0.28 0.83 
     
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
NA – Not Applicable  




Of the 6 sources for which correlations could be determined, a significant (P < 0.05) and 
positive correlation was observed between one source (age) and AC, and two sources (age 
and years’ experience in agriculture) and NC (Table 1). No significant correlations were 
observed for CC. This suggests that CC is not linearly related to any of the farmer-member 
sources of heterogeneity.  
A significant difference (P < 0.05) was observed in the affective commitment scores between 
groups that comprised just 1 (11%) source (number of farming entities) of the farmer-
member dimension (Table 1). As high or very heterogeneity was observed in 5 of the 8 
sources that comprised the farmer-member dimension, it suggests that high level of 
heterogeneity does not lead to significant differences in AC. Moreover, only two sources 
(25%) fit with our hypothesis, as they had a low level of heterogeneity and no difference in 
AC. These findings indicate that heterogeneity in the sources that comprise the farmer-
member dimension is not associated with affective commitment. 
There was a significant difference (P < 0.05) in the continuance commitment scores between 
groups that comprised 4 (44%) sources (gender, age, years’ experience in agriculture and 
number of farming entities) of the farmer-member dimension (Table 1).  Two of these 
sources had a high level of heterogeneity, one had low heterogeneity and one had moderate 
heterogeneity. Four sources with high or very high heterogeneity and one source with low 
heterogeneity did not have a significant difference in CC. As only 3 sources (38%) aligned 
with our hypothesis, it tends to indicate that heterogeneity in the sources that comprise the 
farmer-member dimension is not associated with continuance commitment. 
There was no significant difference (P > 0.05) in the normative commitment scores between 
groups that comprised any of the 9 heterogeneity sources of the farmer-member dimension 
(Table 1).  Six of these sources had high or very high level of heterogeneity. Hence only two 
sources (25%) aligned with out hypothesis as they had low heterogeneity and did not have a 
significant difference in NC. This indicates that there is no association between heterogeneity 
and NC within the farmer-member dimension.  
4.3.2 Farm-Business 
Of the 9 sources for which correlations could be determined, a significant (P < 0.05) and 
positive correlation was observed between 7 sources (dairy system, milk production, GFR, 
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total assets, total debt, shares in the co-operative and share of milk supplied) and affective 
commitment (Table 2). A significant and negative correlation was observed for 4 sources 
(milk production, GFR, total assets and shares in the co-operative) and continuance 
commitment.  A significant and positive correlation was observed for one source (shares in 
the co-operative) and NC. Suggesting that there is no linear relationship between most of the 
farm-business sources of heterogeneity and a member’s normative commitment.  
A significant difference (P < 0.05) was observed in the affective commitment scores between 
groups that comprised 11 (79%) sources (dairy system, seasonality, milk production, milk 
type, milk quality, GFR, total assets, total debt, shares in the co-operative, share of milk 
supplied and region) of the farm-business dimension (Table 2). Only one source (stage of 
business) that had high heterogeneity did not have a significant difference in AC. But 3 
sources for which differences in AC were found had a low level of heterogeneity. Since 10 
sources (71%) fit with the hypothesis, it suggests that there is an association between 
heterogeneity in the farm-business dimension and AC.  
There was a significant difference (P < 0.05) in the continuance commitment scores between 
groups that comprised 7 (50%) sources (milk production, milk type, GFR, total assets,  stage 
of the business, shares in the cooperative, and region) of the farm-business dimension (Table 
2).  Six of these had high heterogeneity while one had low heterogeneity. There was no 
significant difference between groups for the remaining 7 sources. Of these 7 sources, 4 had 
low heterogeneity while 3 had high heterogeneity. As 10 sources (71%) aligned with the 
hypothesis it suggests that there might be an association between heterogeneity in the farm-
business dimension and CC. 
There was a significant difference (P < 0.05) in normative commitment scores between 
groups for just 1 (7%) source (shares in the co-operative). This source had very high levels of 
heterogeneity. There was no significant difference between groups for the remaining 13 
sources. Of these, 5 had low heterogeneity while 8 had high or very heterogeneity. As only 6 
sources (43%) fit with our hypothesis, it indicates that there is no association between 
heterogeneity in the farm-business dimension and NC.  
4.3.3 Member-Interest 
Of the 12 sources that comprised member-interest heterogeneity, a significant (P < 0.05) 
correlation was observed between 9 sources and AC and 5 sources and NC (Table 3).  
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Affective and normative commitment were stronger for members who were less likely to sell 
co-operative shares, more willing to accept a lower dividend, and gave higher importance to – 
being valuable to the co-operative, being a respected member of the community, and creating 
opportunities for future farmers. Additionally, AC was stronger for members who were less 
concerned about the co-operatives future and gave greater importance to - having variety in 
their work, having time available for socializing with family and friends and looking after the 
environment.  There was no significant correlation between any of the member interest 
sources and CC at 5% LOS; however, 2 sources showed significant correlation (P < 0.10) at 
10% LOS. Continuance commitment tended to be stronger for members who were less 
acceptable of a prolonged low milk price payment and gave lesser importance to looking after 
the environment.  
A significant difference (P < 0.05) was observed in the affective commitment scores between 
groups that comprised 11 (92%) sources (selling co-operative shares, length of time milk 
price can be low, dividend payments, concern for the co-operative, being valuable to the co-
operative, being respected by the community, creating opportunities for future farmers, 
having variety in their work, looking after the environment, producing to maximise farm 
profits and paying off debts) of the member-interest dimension (Table 3). High or very 
heterogeneity was found in 9 of these sources while 2 had moderate heterogeneity.  Only one 
source that had high heterogeneity did not show significant difference in AC. Since most of 
the sources (90%) fit with our proposed hypothesis, it suggests that there might be an 
association between the member-interest dimension of heterogeneity and AC.  
There were no significant differences (P > 0.05) in the continuance commitment scores 
between groups that comprised any of the 12 sources (Table 3). However, one source 
(likelihood of selling co-operative shares) showed a significant difference in CC scores 
between groups (P < 0.10) at the 10% LOS. Since only one source (10%) tended to align with 
our hypothesis, it suggests that there is no association between the member-interest 
dimension of heterogeneity and CC.  
There was a significant difference (P < 0.05) in normative commitment scores between 
groups for 7 (58%) sources (selling co-operative shares, length of time milk price can be low, 
dividend payments, concern for the co-operative, being valuable to the co-operative, being 
respected by the community, creating opportunities for future farmers) of the member-interest 
dimension (Table 3). All 7 sources showed high or very heterogeneity. No difference in NC 
177 
 
was found for two sources that showed moderate heterogeneity and three source that showed 
high heterogeneity. As most of the sources (70%) aligned with our hypothesis, it suggests that 
there might be an association between the member-interest dimension of heterogeneity and 
NC.  
5.0 Discussion  
The primary objective of this study was to examine the relationship between heterogeneity 
and a members’ organisational commitment to the co-operative. Following on from two prior 
studies, this was achieved by de-constructing heterogeneity into 3 dimensions and 35 sources 
(Apparao et al., 2020a) and  member organisational commitment into 3 components (Apparao 
et al., 2020b). In pursuing this objective, our study has generated important insights that are 
useful in comprehending the phenomenon of heterogeneity and member commitment in 
agricultural co-operatives. It also aids in the understanding of the relationship between a 
member and the co-operative, an important aspect that influences the performance of co-
operatives (Österberg & Nilsson, 2009). 
It was hypothesized that there is an inverse relationship between heterogeneity and overall 
organisational commitment (Fulton & Giannakas, 2001; Bijman & Verhees, 2011). 
Therefore, given that a high level of heterogeneity was observed within the membership base 
of this co-operative a low level of organisational commitment is expected. However, since 
only 10.2 % of members had low levels off all three components of organisational 
commitment, the finding does not conform with our hypothesis as it suggests that high 
heterogeneity does not necessarily lead to low organisational commitment.  Moreover, as 
only 19.2% of members had high levels of all three components, neither does it suggest that 
high heterogeneity could lead to high organisational commitment. 
Drawing from the fact that organisational commitment is a multi-dimensional attitudinal 
construct (Allen & Meyer, 1990), it was hypothesised that heterogeneity has a distinct 
relationship with each of the three components of organisational commitment and it is by 
unravelling these distinct relationships that a greater understanding of heterogeneity and 
organisational commitment can be achieved. Based on this rationale it was hypothesised that 
high heterogeneity will result in low affective, continuance and normative commitment in 
agricultural co-operatives. However, the high levels of AC and NC do not align with our 
hypothesis and suggests that despite there being high heterogeneity, a farmers’ want and 
obligation to be a member of the co-operative are strong. It is possible that in this co-
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operative the challenges presented by heterogeneity to AC and NC are mitigated by having 
well designed structures and effective member engagement strategies in place. Similar to 
these findings, based on their  work on 18 forest user groups in Nepal Varughese and Ostrom 
(2001) found that by having good institutional design and mechanisms to manage for 
heterogeneity the community was able to overcome the negative implications of 
heterogeneity.  
The low level of CC that was observed aligns with our hypothesis and suggests that higher 
the heterogeneity, weaker will be a farmers’ need to be a member of the co-operative.  The 
need to be a member is due to utilitarian or more specifically financial benefit reasons 
(Jussila, Goel, et al., 2012). Due to the large diversity that exists within the membership base, 
it is possible that the members utilitarian reasons for being members are also quite varied. 
The inability of the co-operative to meet these varying needs could potentially be the reason 
for the low level of CC. Moreover, the CC of the members is influenced by few critical 
factors that are not entirely within the control of the co-operative such as global prices for 
dairy commodities and access to markets. Therefore, overcoming the issues presented by 
heterogeneity and strengthening CC could be challenging for the co-operative 
Importantly, across the three heterogeneity dimensions and sources, we found that there 
tended to be a relationship between heterogeneity and affective commitment, but not 
continuance and normative commitment. In other words, high heterogeneity is more likely to 
result in differences in a member’s want or desire to be a member of the co-operative; but not 
in a members’ need and obligation to be a member of the co-operative. Furthermore, although 
significant differences in AC, CC and NC were observed between groups for some of the 
heterogeneity sources, it was most pronounced for AC, and much less for NC and CC. This 
further indicates that AC is more likely to be different between members belonging to 
different groups that comprise a heterogeneity source than either CC or NC. As CC is 
grounded in the financial-benefit reasons for membership (Jussila, Goel, et al., 2012), it is 
less likely to be influenced by heterogeneity sources that do not have direct implications on 
economic or financial benefit aspects of membership. Likewise, NC is based on the 
ideological reasons for membership (Jussila et al., 2014) and is less likely to be influenced by 
heterogeneity sources that do not have an ideological aspect to them. In contrast, AC being 
emotive in nature (Jussila, Byrne, et al., 2012), is more likely to be influenced by several 
heterogeneity sources as an emotive link is likely to exist for most heterogeneity sources. 
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Moreover, this difference in AC between groups was most pronounced in the member-
interest dimension as compared to the farm-business and farmer-member dimension 
suggesting that a members’ want or desire to be a member is most influenced by members 
interests.  
Amongst the three dimensions of heterogeneity, the farmer-member dimension was not 
associated with any of the three forms of member organisational commitment. This suggests 
that farmer-member related properties such as a members age, gender, ethnicity, level of 
education etc. have no bearing on a members’ want, need or obligation to be a member of the 
co-operative. This is an interesting finding because co-operative scholars have suggested that 
heterogeneity arising from member characterises such as age, level of education etc. can have 
a significant impact of co-operative performance (Iliopoulos & Cook, 1999; Pozzobon et al., 
2011; Hoehler & Kuehl, 2018; Iliopoulos & Valentinov, 2018). For example Iliopoulos and 
Cook (1999) found that farmer-member characteristics such as age and level of education can 
result in increased influence costs in the co-operative.  
The farm-business dimension was associated with AC and CC but not NC. This implies that 
farm-business related properties have an influence on a farmers’ want and need to be a 
member of the co-operative but not on a farmer’s obligation to be a member of the co-
operative.  As CC has is related to the financial benefit reasons of membership, an association 
with the farm-business dimensions is expected.  
The member-interest dimension was associated with AC and NC but not CC. This suggests 
that properties associated with member-interest have an impact on a farmers emotive and 
ideological reasons to be a member of the co-operative but not on a farmers’ utilitarian 
reasons to be a member of the co-operative.  
The results of the correlation analysis indicated that in the farmer-member dimension farmers 
that are older, have stronger affective commitment and normative commitment. In addition, 
farmers with greater experience in agriculture have stronger normative commitment. As 
suggested by Fulton (1999), younger farmers are less committed because ideological reasons 
are of less importance to them than older members. Moreover according to Fulton and 
Adamowicz (1993), younger members are more likely to have a slant towards individualistic 
values. Similarly, in the farm-business dimension, higher: - the intensity of the dairy system, 
milk production volumes, GFR, total assets, total debt, shares in the co-operative and share of 
milk supplied to the co-operative, greater will be AC. In contrast, greater: - the milk 
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production, GFR, total assets and shares in the co-operative, weaker will be CC. These are 
very interesting findings because it implies that it is the larger farm-businesses, both in terms 
of physical and financial attributes, that have a stronger emotive basis for membership; while 
it is the smaller farm business that have a stronger utilitarian basis for membership of the co-
operative.  
6.0 Conclusions, implications and limitations 
In this study we developed a framework that brought together some vital insights that link 
heterogeneity and member organisation commitment within the specific context of 
agricultural co-operatives. This framework is based on 35 sources of heterogeneity that are 
grouped under three dimensions of heterogeneity: 1. Farmer-Member, 2. Farm-Business and 
3. Member-Interest, and three member organisational commitment components: 1. Affective 
Commitment, 2. Continuance Commitment and 3. Normative Commitment. Consequently, 
we believe the framework forms a good basis for testing theory and is a vital step towards 
applying frameworks to the task of linking co-operative theory and structure to its 
performance. This is a critical challenge that co-operative scholars must address in order to 
progress co-operative research and enhance its managerial relevance.  
We found that this co-operative had high level’s heterogeneity and also affective and 
normative commitment. This tends to suggest that high heterogeneity does not necessarily 
lead to a fall in the want and obligation to be a member. However, since continuance 
commitment was low, it suggests that high heterogeneity could potentially lead to decline in 
the need to be a member.  
Across the 35 heterogeneity sources measured, an association was observed between 
heterogeneity and affective commitment but not continuance and normative commitment. 
Indicating that heterogeneity is likely to result in differences in a members’ want to be a 
member but not in a members’ need or obligation to be a member. Within the three 
heterogeneity dimensions, an association was found between the farm-business dimension 
and affective and continuance commitment and the member-interest dimension and affective 
and normative commitment. Importantly, the farmer-member dimension was not associated 
with any of the three organisational commitment components.  
These findings have important implications for the development and delivery of co-operative 
communication and member engagement strategies that are focused on strengthening member 
commitment. For example, our results suggest that organisational commitment in the co-
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operative can be improved by segmenting members based on their farm-business and 
member-interest related properties and developing segment specific engagement strategies. 
While segmenting members based on farmer-member characteristics may not be as effective. 
Moreover, as AC tends to vary the most between groups across heterogeneity sources, it 
requires a much more specific and tailored member engagement protocol. While, in the case 
of NC and CC, a relatively generic member engagement protocol might be sufficient. 
It is also important that the co-operative ensures that CC of the membership base is 
strengthened, otherwise should the levels of AC and possibly NC fall, then there is a high risk 
of the members exiting the co-operative.  In addition to improving CC, it is recommended 
that the co-operative focus on further strengthening AC and NC of its membership base. AC 
in particular is the glue that holds this co-operative together and it is therefore vital that it be 
continuously strengthened. Especially since the CC in the co-operative is low, should the 
level of AC fall below desired levels, there is a significant threat of members behaving 
opportunistically and/or exiting the co-operative. 
As unique member-focused organisations built on the strength of the member-co-operative 
relationship, it is vital that co-operatives recognise the importance of member organisational 
commitment as a significant indicator of the member-co-operative relationship. Co-operative 
leadership and management should therefore prioritize its inclusion as a core performance 
metric or as an indicator of the co-operative’s health. It is recommended that co-operatives 
include AC, CC and NC as one of their key performance indicators. A regular measurement 
and analysis of these would indicate to what extent the strategy pursued by the co-operative 
are impacting these critical member commitment indicators and also how effective the 
member engagement and communication protocols are.  
This study had a few limitations. Firstly, this study was centred on one large dairy co-
operative in New Zealand. Therefore, generalisations of the results to agricultural co-
operatives in other geographies, especially non-dairy co-operatives need to be made with 
caution. Secondly, a member’s psychological state can vary over time with respect to the 
relationship with the co-operative. Since the data was collected at single point in time it does 
not allow us to study or understand any changes in the relationship between heterogeneity 
and commitment that can occur.  
Despite these limitations our findings contribute towards the growing literature on 
heterogeneity and commitment in agricultural co-operatives. By revealing that heterogeneity 
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can be linked to member organisational commitment, this study contributes towards the 
larger body of research aimed at identifying factors that influence member commitment in 
co-operatives; and can hence play an important role in predicting or evaluating co-operative 
performance. We hope that the findings reported in this paper will encourage researchers to 
further examine heterogeneity and member organisational commitment in the context of 
agricultural co-operatives.  
References 
Allen, N., & Meyer, J. (1990). The measurement and antecedents of affective, continuance 
and normative commitment to the organization. Journal of occupational psychology, 
63(1), 1-18.  
Anderson, B., & Henehan, B. (2005). What Gives Cooperatives a Bad Name? International 
Journal of Co-operative Management, 2(2), 9-15.  
Apparao, D., Garnevska, E., & Shadbolt, N. (2019). Examining commitment, heterogeneity 
and social capital within the membership base of agricultural co-operatives—A 
conceptual framework. Journal of Co-operative Organization Management, 7(1), 42-
50.  
Apparao, D., Shadbolt, N., & Garnevska, E. (2020a). Heterogeneity and Commitment to 
Collective Action: An empirical study of a New Zealand dairy co-operative. 
Mansucript accepted for publication in International Journal of Co-operative 
Accounting and Management. 
Apparao, D., Shadbolt, N., & Garnevska, E. (2020b). Member commitment in a large New 
Zealand dairy co-operative: An empirical study. Manuscript under review. 
Bijman, J. (2002). Essays on Agricultural Cooperatives: Governance Structure in Fruit and 
Vegetable Chains. Erasmus University, Rotterdam,  
Bijman, J. (2016). Agricultural cooperatives and market orientation: A challenging 
combination? In Market Orientation (pp. 151-168): Routledge. 
Bijman, J., Hanisch, M., & Van der Sangen, G. (2014). Shifting control? The changes of 
internal governance in agricultural cooperatives in the EU. Annals of Public and 
Cooperative Economics, 85(4), 641-661.  
Bijman, J., & Verhees, F. (2011). Member or customer? Farmer commitment to supply 
cooperatives. Paper presented at the International Conference on the Economics and 
Management of Networks (EMNet), Limassol, Cyprus. 
Bogetoft, P., & Olesen, H. B. (2004). Quality incentives and supply chains: managing 
Salmonella in pork production. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 86(3), 
829-834.  
Bogetoft, P., & Olesen, H. B. (2007). Sales distortion in heterogeneous cooperatives. In 
Vertical Markets and Cooperative Hierarchies (pp. 213-223). Dordrecht: Springer. 
Byrne, N., & McCarthy, O. (2005). An analysis of the credit union’s use of Craig’s 
commitment building measures. Journal of Co-operative Studies, 38(1), 20-27.  
Byrne, N., McCarthy, O., Ward, M., & McMurtry, J. (2012). Credit Union Restructuring: 
Don’t forget the member! International Journal of Co-operative Management, 6(1.1), 
33-41.  
Cechin, A., Bijman, J., Pascucci, S., & Omta, O. (2013). Decomposing the Member 
Relationship in Agricultural Cooperatives: Implications for Commitment. 
Agribusiness, 29(1), 39-61. doi:10.1002/agr.21321 
183 
 
Chaddad, F. R. (2007). The evolution of Brazilian dairy cooperatives: A life cycle approach. 
Paper presented at the XLV Congresso Da Sober," Conhecimentos para Agricultura 
do Futuro", Londrina. 
Cocolina, C. Q., & Cooperatives Europe. (2016). The Power of Cooperation - Cooperatives 
Europe Key Figures 2015. Retrieved from 
https://coopseurope.coop/sites/default/files/The%20power%20of%20Cooperation%20
-%20Cooperatives%20Europe%20key%20statistics%202015.pdf 
Coltrain, D., Barton, D., & Boland, M. (2000). Differences between new generation 
cooperatives and traditional cooperatives. Paper presented at the Risk and Profit 2000 
Conference, Holiday Inn, Manhattan, Kansas. 
http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/info/newgen/cbb.pdf 
Cook, M. L. (1995). The Future of U.S. Agricultural Cooperatives: A Neo-Institutional 
Approach. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 77(5), 1153-1159. 
doi:10.2307/1243338 
Cook, M. L., & Iliopoulos, C. (1999). Beginning to Inform the Theory of the Cooperative 
Firm: Emergence of the New Generation Cooperative. LTA, 4(99), 525-535.  
Cook, M. L., & Iliopoulos, C. (2000). Ill-defined property rights in collective action: the case 
of US agricultural cooperatives. In C. Menard (Ed.), Institutions, Contracts and 
Organizations (pp. 335-348). Cheltenham, UK and Massachusetts, USA: Edward 
Elgar Publishing. 




Dunn, J. R., Crooks, A. C., Frederick, D. A., Kennedy, T. L., & Wadsworth, J. J. (2002). 
Agricultural cooperatives in the 21st century (60). Retrieved from  
Eilers, C., & Hanf, C. H. (1999). Contracts between farmers and farmers’ processing co-
operatives: A principal-agent approach for the potato starch industry. In Vertical 
relationships and coordination in the food system (pp. 267-284): Springer. 
Evans, L., & Meade, R. (2006). The Role and Significance of Cooperatives in New Zealand 
Agriculture: A Comparative Institutional Analysis. Retrieved from 
http://maxa.maf.govt.nz/mafnet/rural-nz/profitability-and-economics/trends/iscr-
report-dec-2005/pdf-version/full-report.pdf 
Firestone, W. A., & Pennell, J. R. (1993). Teacher commitment, working conditions, and 
differential incentive policies. Review of educational research, 63(4), 489-525.  
Foreman, P., & Whetten, D. A. (2002). Members' identification with multiple-identity 
organizations. Organization Science, 13(6), 618-635.  
Fulton, J., & Adamowicz, W. (1993). Factors that influence the commitment of members to 
their cooperative organization. Journal of Agricultural Cooperation, 8, 39-53.  
Fulton, M. (1999). Cooperatives and member commitment. LTA, 4(99), 418-437.  
Fulton, M., & Giannakas, K. (2001). Cooperatives and Membership Commitment: 
Organizational Commitment in a Mixed Oligopoly: Agricultural Cooperatives and 
Investor-Owned Firms. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83(5), 1258.  
Garnevska, E., Callagher, L., Apparao, M., Shadbolt, N., & Siedlok, F. (2017). The New 
Zealand Co-operative Economy. Retrieved from New Zealand: https://nz.coop/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/Co-op-report-v9-WEB.pdf 
Gorton, G., & Schmid, F. (1999). Corporate governance, ownership dispersion and 
efficiency: Empirical evidence from Austrian cooperative banking. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 5(2), 119-140.  
184 
 
Hansmann, H. (1996). The ownership of enterprise. Cambridge, Mass. : The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press. 
Hendrikse, G., & Bijman, J. (2002). On the emergence of new growers' associations: self‐
selection versus countervailing power. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 
29(2), 255-269.  
Hoehler, J., & Kuehl, R. (2018). Dimensions of member heterogeneity in cooperatives and 
their impact on organization–a literature review. Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Economics, 89(4), 697-712.  
Hunt, T., & van Battum, S. (2015). Rabobank Global Dairy Top-20. Retrieved from 
https://agrihq.co.nz/assets/DairyTrader/Rabobank-Top-10-Report.pdf 
Iliopoulos, C., & Cook, M. L. (1999). The efficiency of internal resource allocation decisions 
in customer-owned firms: the influence costs problem. Paper presented at the 3rd 
Annual Conference of the International Society for New Institutional Economics, 
Washington DC. 
Iliopoulos, C., & Valentinov, V. (2018). Member heterogeneity in agricultural cooperatives: 
A systems-theoretic perspective. Sustainability, 10(4), 1271.  
International Co-operative Alliance (ICA). (2018). Cooperative identity, values & principles. 
Retrieved from https://www.ica.coop/en/cooperatives/cooperative-identity 
International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), & Euricse. (2014). The World Co-Operative 
Monitor: Exploring The Co-Operative Economy. Retrieved from 
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/24617037/QRcode/WCM2014.pdf 
Jiménez, M. C. R., Martí, E. G., & Ortiz, M. J. H. (2010). Member commitment in olive oil 
co-operatives: Cause and consequences. Journal of Co-operative Studies, 43(2), 24-
35.  
Jussila, I., Byrne, N., & Tuominen, H. (2012). Affective commitment in co-operative 
organizations: What makes members want to stay? International Business Research, 
5(10), 1.  
Jussila, I., Goel, S., & Tuominen, H. (2012). Member commitment in co-operatives: The 
utilitarian approach. Business and Management Research, 1(3).  
Jussila, I., Roessl, D., & Tuominen, T. (2014). Should I Stay or Should I Go? Normative 
Member Commitment in Co-operatives. International Journal of Marketing Studies, 
6(6), 26.  
Jussila, I., & Tuominen, P. (2010). Exploring the consumer co-operative relationship with 
their members: an individual psychological perspective on ownership. International 
Journal of Co-operative Management, 5(1), 23-33.  
Kalogeras, N., Pennings, J. M., van der Lans, I. A., Garcia, P., & van Dijk, G. (2009). 
Understanding Heterogeneous Preferences of Cooperative Members Agribusiness, 
25(2), 289-289.  
Karantininis, K., & Zago, A. (2001). Cooperatives and Membership Commitment: 
Endogenous Membership in Mixed Duopsonies. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 83(5), 1266. Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=
true&db=bth&AN=6183782&site=eds-live&scope=site 
Mäkelä, M. M., & Maula, M. V. J. (2006). Interorganizational Commitment in Syndicated 
Cross-Border Venture Capital Investments. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
30(2), 273-298. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2006.00121.x 
Mazzarol, T., Soutar, G. N., & Limnios, E. M. (2012). Member Loyalty in Co-operative 




Meyer, J., & Allen, N. (1987). A longitudinal analysis of the early development and 
consequences of organizational commitment. Canadian Journal of Behavioural 
Science/Revue canadienne des sciences du comportement, 19(2), 199.  
Meyer, J., & Allen, N. (1991). A three-component conceptualization of organizational 
commitment. Human resource management review, 1(1), 61-89.  
Nilsson, J., & Madsen, O. (2007). Issues in cross-border mergers between agricultural co-
operatives. Journal of Co-operative studies, 40(3), 27-38.  
Nilsson, J., Svendsen, G. L., & Svendsen, G. T. (2012). Are large and complex agricultural 
cooperatives losing their social capital? Agribusiness, 28(2), 187-204.  
Oliver, R. L. (1997). Satisfaction: A behavioral perspective on the consumer. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Ortmann, G. F., & King, R. P. (2007). Agricultural cooperatives I: History, theory and 
problems. Agrekon, 46(1), 18-46.  
Österberg, P., & Nilsson, J. (2009). Members' perception of their participation in the 
governance of cooperatives: the key to trust and commitment in agricultural 
cooperatives. Agribusiness, 25(2), 181-197.  
Pozzobon, D. M., Zylbersztajn, D., & Bijman, J. (2011). Modeling heterogeneity and member 
participation in cooperative governance. Paper presented at the Fifth International 
Conference on Economics and Management of Networks (EMNet). Limassol, Cyprus. 
Rhoades, S. A. (1993). The herfindahl-hirschman index. Fed. Res. Bull., 79, 188.  
Røkholt, P. O. (1999). Strengths and weaknesses of the co-operative form; A Matter of 
Perspective and Opinion. Paper presented at the ICA International Research 
Conference, Quebec. 
Simmons, R., & Birchall, J. (2004). Creating and supporting co-operative members in the 
West Midlands. Journal of Co-operative Studies, 37(1), 22-37.  
Soboh, R. A., Lansink, A. O., Giesen, G., & Van Dijk, G. (2009). Performance measurement 
of the agricultural marketing cooperatives: the gap between theory and practice. 
Review of Agricultural Economics, 31(3), 446-469.  
Solinger, O. N., Van Olffen, W., & Roe, R. A. (2008). Beyond the three-component model of 
organizational commitment. Journal of applied psychology, 93(1), 70.  
Staatz, J. M. (1987). Farmers’ incentives to take collective action via cooperatives: a 
transaction cost approach. Cooperative theory: New approaches, 18, 87-107.  
Staatz, J. M. (1989). Farmer Cooperative Theory: Recent Developments. (84). Washington, 
D.C: United States Department of Agriculture 
Sykuta, M. E., & Cook, M. L. (2001). Cooperative and Membership Commitment: A New 
Institutional Economics Approach to Contracts and Cooperatives. American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, 83(5), 1273-1279. Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=
true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.1244819&site=eds-live&scope=site 
Van Bekkum, O.-F. (2001). Cooperative models and farm policy reform: Exploring patterns 
in structure-strategy matches of dairy cooperatives in regulated vs. liberalized 
markets. The Netherlands: Koninklijke Van Gorcum. 
Varughese, G., & Ostrom, E. (2001). The contested role of heterogeneity in collective action: 
some evidence from community forestry in Nepal. World Development, 29(5), 747-
765.  
Vitaliano, P. (1983). Cooperative enterprise: an alternative conceptual basis for analyzing a 
complex institution. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 65(5), 1078-1083.  
Zeuli, K. A., & Cropp, R. (2004). Cooperatives: Principles and practices in the 21st century. 




Zusman, P. (1992). Constitutional selection of collective-choice rules in a cooperative 






Chapter 6: Conclusions 





Co-operatives are a unique organisational form that are owned and controlled by the 
members who use it.  Moreover, the primary objective of a co-operative is to maximise 
benefit for its members.  This strong member-orientation of co-operatives is its critical 
differentiator from the more common investor owned firm. The member – co-operative 
relationship therefore becomes central to the existence and functioning of the co-operative 
and forms the foundation upon which the co-operative stands. Despite the member-co-
operative relationship being vital, much of the research work on co-operatives tends to focus 
on the non-relational aspects and traditionally the performance of co-operatives has been 
examined mainly from an economic or financial perspective. The bulk of research about co-
operatives have incorporated theoretical aspects and approaches such as agency theory, 
property rights theory, ownership theory, transaction cost theory, contacting theory and game 
theory. Although the non-relational aspects are useful in detailing the economic 
characteristics of the co-operatives and explaining the reasons for the formation, existence 
and behaviour, they are predominantly theoretical and not always in total alignment with the 
social features of the co-operative organisational form. Therefore, they do not present a 
comprehensive enough assessment and understanding of co-operatives. Moreover, with the 
evolving nature of the co-operative organisational form, a rethink on how co-operatives are 
traditionally examined, evaluated and interpreted is required. In order to present a holistic 
evaluation of co-operative performance and complement the traditional approaches, requires 
an examination of the member-co-operative relational aspects, specifically from a socio-
psychological perspective. To address this research gap, the central premise of this thesis lay 
in identifying, describing, measuring and analysing the key socio-psychological phenomenon 
that could potentially influence the member – co-operative relationship. Informed by the 
literature, three important socio-psychological phenomena were identified and described in 
this thesis. These were 1) Heterogeneity, 2) Commitment and 3) Social Capital. Thereafter, 
two socio-psychological phenomena, member commitment and heterogeneity were studied 
empirically and in greater detail because several co-operative scholars have suggested that 
these two factors require further scrutiny. 
In doing so, this research builds on previous work undertaken which revealed the extent to 
which socio-psychological aspects, specifically heterogeneity and commitment are studied 
within the context of co-operative organisational forms. The approach to the research is 
fundamentally derived from the outcomes which are sought and an interest in contributing to 
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a greater understanding of co-operatives in general and agricultural co-operatives in New 
Zealand in specific. The research requires methods which are explorative, informative, co-
operative membership focused, and consistent with co-operative principles and expectations. 
This was achieved through four research papers. In each paper, a novel conceptual 
framework is developed and presented. In papers two, three and four an empirical test of the 
frameworks is also performed. As a result, the frameworks serve as a reference and 
coordination mechanism for efficient theory testing and is a vital step towards applying 
frameworks to the task of linking co-operative theory and structure to its performance. 
Moreover, since the objective was to measure the level of commitment and heterogeneity 
within the membership base and understand the relationship between them that exists, the 
research adopted a quantitative approach whereby co-operative members were the principal 
participants in the research. 
2.0 Summary and Discussion 
The first paper of this thesis was centred on identifying and presenting factors that explain the 
members’ relationship with their co-operative and developing a novel conceptual framework 
that links these factors. Three such factors were identified – 1) Commitment, 2) 
Heterogeneity and 3) Social Capital.  Commitment is a broad phenomenon, and an integral 
attribute of relationships, especially long-term relationships. It has a unique yet significant 
relevance to co-operatives in general and agricultural co-operatives in specific. This is based 
not only on the fact that the farmer-member and agricultural co-operative relationship is a 
long term one characterised by repeated exchanges, but also because member commitment is 
required for the expression of other properties that are unique and essential for co-operatives. 
A decrease in member commitment can have a serious impact on agricultural co-operative 
performance with the most visible feature being member’s exiting the co-operatives; and if 
enough number of members exit, the co-operative will cease to exist. Additionally, a low 
level of member commitment can also influence co-operative performance by causing 
reduced participation in governance, non-alignment with the co-operative strategy, increased 
opportunistic and free-rider behaviour, reduction in patronage (as suppliers or buyers) and 
greater reluctance to supply the co-operative with capital. Heterogeneity (or diversity) is an 
inherent property of any group or collective. According to theory, heterogeneity has a 
significant bearing whenever collective decision making is required. This is because an 
increase in heterogeneity leads to members in the group increasingly wanting different 
outcomes and consequently arriving at an optimal decision in an effective and efficient 
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manner becomes progressively challenging. This phenomenon has a significant impact on co-
operatives. Its effect on the co-operative model stems from the fact that individual farmer-
members are different (heterogeneous) in terms of their interests with respect to the co-
operative. Apart from leading to a rise in decision making costs, an increase in heterogeneity 
can have other significant negative effects on the co-operative such as – a decrease in 
member commitment, increase in opportunistic and free rider behaviour, and poor 
governance. It can therefore hinder co-operative performance.  Social capital is a broad 
concept with specific relevance to social organisations (such as communities, groups, 
collectives etc.); and is comprised of several characteristic features such as norms, values, 
trust, networks and communication. It is a key element required for creating and maintaining 
- economic prosperity, development, collective action and governance. With respect to co-
operatives, social capital is vital because it forms the social foundation upon which the co-
operative exists. A significant loss of social capital could result in the erosion of this 
foundation and possibly lead to the demise or collapse of the co-operative. It is suggested by 
few scholars that this decrease in social capital tends to occur when the co-operative grows to 
become a larger and more complex organisation. Moreover, a decrease in social capital can 
negatively affect co-operative performance by leading to – a decline in trust, reduced 
participation, weak governance, increased opportunistic and free riding behaviour, low 
satisfaction and loss of cohesion.  Consequently, a novel three-dimensional framework that 
encapsulates and links these three factors – commitment, heterogeneity and social capital - 
was developed and described. This framework forms the basis on which these socio-
psychological or non-financial factors can be explored, measured, analysed and interpreted; 
and provides a broad yet pertinent lens for evaluating co-operative performance from a socio-
psychological or non-conventional perspective. Importantly, grounded in co-operative theory 
and shaped via the framework, it was hypothesised that an increase in heterogeneity would 
most likely lead to a decline in social capital and weakening of commitment, while an 
increase in social capital would lead to a strengthening of commitment. 
The second paper of this thesis was centred on exploring member commitment, a critical 
phenomenon that defines and drives the member-co-operative relationship. This was 
achieved by de-coupling member commitment into two forms 1) organisational commitment 
and 2) commitment to collective action. Wherein organizational commitment is a 
psychological state that characterizes the members relationship with the co-operative and has 
implications on the decision to continue or discontinue membership in the co-operative. 
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Similarly, commitment to collective action is defined as the initiatives taken by an 
identifiable group (members) to realize their common interests and involves a willingness to 
make an effort towards the organization’s success, and not demonstrating behaviours that 
increase exit risk, side-selling and free-riding.  While there has been some theoretical 
development on the subject of member commitment, less progress has been made 
empirically; and with few efforts to operationalize and test them. This paper was an effort to 
provide such an empirical test by measuring and analysing member commitment in co-
operatives. To achieve this, organisational commitment was unravelled into three 
components, 1) affective (AC), 2) normative (NC) and 3) continuance (CC); and commitment 
to collective action (CCA) into two components, 1) patronage and 2) governance. Thereafter, 
the relationship between the three forms of organisational commitment and the two forms of 
commitment to collective action in co-operatives was examined. By focusing on a members’ 
organisational commitment and commitment to collective action, this paper provides an 
important contribution towards examining agricultural co-operatives from a socio-
psychological perspective. It thereby enhances the understanding of member and co-operative 
relationships in agricultural co-operatives. The research also provides a rigorous framework 
and instrument for understanding and measuring the relationship between member and the 
co-operative, by measuring organisational commitment and commitment to collective action. 
It therefore provides a means to monitor member commitment in the co-operative over time, 
and also for examining the effects of the co-operatives strategies or policies on member 
commitment. The co-operative had moderately high levels of commitment to collective 
action as well as commitment to governance (CG) and patronage (CP); and members were 
more committed towards governance of the co-operative than towards patronage of the co-
operative.  The co-operative had moderately high levels of AC and moderate levels of NC 
and slightly low levels of CC. However, since 10.9% of respondents (equating to about 1,090 
farmers) had low AC, CC and NC it indicates that some degree of organisational commitment 
risk exists for this co-operative. Importantly, a member’s desire or want to be a member of 
the co-operative was higher than either their need to be member or sense of obligation to be a 
member. This indicates that the economic or utilitarian aspects (continuance commitment) is 
not of most importance to members as suggested by several scholars.  More importantly, it is 
the emotional attachment to the co-operative, leading to a want or desire to be a member 
(AC) and the sense of obligation that results in members perceiving that being a member of 
the co-operative is the moral and right thing to do (NC), which influence commitment to 
collective action. The economic or financial reasons, leading to an individual needing to be a 
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member of the co-operative (CC), are not related to CCA. For this co-operative, 
strengthening affective and normative commitment, is quite likely to result in members 
sacrificing short term economic gains in favour of long-term performance of the co-operative; 
and also overcoming the free rider problem in co-operatives.  While improving the utilitarian 
aspects of member commitment will have no influence or effect on a member’s commitment 
to collective action. These finding, should be of value to co-operative management as it could 
have implications on the co-operative’s performance via free riding and exit. As unique 
member-focused organisations built on the strength of the member-co-operative relationship, 
it is vital that co-operatives recognise the importance of member commitment as a significant 
indicator of the member-co-operative relationship. Co-operative leadership and management 
should therefore prioritize the inclusion of AC, CC, NC and CCA as a core performance 
metric. A regular measurement and analysis of these would indicate to what extent the 
strategy pursued by the co-operative are impacting these critical member commitment 
indicators over time and how effective the member engagement and communication 
protocols are. It is also recommended that the co-operative’s management place emphasis on 
developing structures to manage and improve organisational commitment of their members. 
Drawing from the literature on employee organisational commitment, few of the ways by 
which the co-operative can possibly achieve this is by 1) providing members with increased 
participation in decision making, 2) showing greater recognition and appreciation of its 
members, 3) providing training and development for its members, 4) ensuring effective and 
constructive communication with members, 5) creating a sense of community within the 
membership base  and 6) building an environment wherein member perceive that they and 
their businesses are safe and secure. 
The third paper of this thesis was centred on unravelling member heterogeneity in 
agricultural co-operatives and examining its relationship with commitment to collective 
action. While several scholars have highlighted the role, importance and impact of 
heterogeneity on co-operative performance; empirical studies that examine heterogeneity and 
map out its expression are lacking. Moreover, in order to better understand the phenomenon 
of heterogeneity it is important to measure and monitor it. This gap is addressed by providing 
a much-needed empirical assessment. This was achieved by first disentangling heterogeneity 
in agricultural co-operatives into three dimensions- 1) farmer-member, 2) farm-business and 
3) member-interest and developing a measure for it. The farmer-member dimension is based 
on differences between members in personal characteristics. The farm-business dimension 
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includes physical, financial and product quality related properties. The difference between 
members that arises due to their diverging interests forms the basis of the member-interest 
dimension. In total 35 sources of heterogeneity were identified (Farmer-member = 9, Farm-
business = 14, and Member-interest = 12) and a novel measure and explanation of these was 
presented using the Gini-Simpson Index. Based on this measure considerable heterogeneity 
was found to exist in this co-operative with all three dimensions measured showing high 
levels of heterogeneity. Since Fonterra is a large and fairly complex co-operative with a 
foundation built on several mergers of co-operatives over many decades, a high level of 
heterogeneity is expected. The farm-business dimensions showed the greatest homogeneity of 
the three dimensions and suggests that the membership base tends to be more uniform with 
respect to farm business related properties, which is not surprising as they are all dairy farms. 
The co-operative was most diverse when it comes to its members-interests. This knowledge 
of member heterogeneity and its dimensions can help to identify conflict potential and serve 
as a starting point for evaluating its implications on co-operative performance. Thereafter a 
novel framework that explored the links (and/or relationship) between heterogeneity and 
members’ commitment to collective action in a large agricultural co-operative was presented 
and tested.  It was hypothesised that high heterogeneity will result in low commitment to 
collective action in agricultural co-operatives. Since this co-operative had high levels of 
heterogeneity, low levels of CCA were expected. However, this was not the case as CCA, as 
well as CP and CG levels were moderately high.  This suggests that higher heterogeneity 
does not lead to lower commitment. It is possible that the challenges presented by 
heterogeneity in this co-operative are mitigated by having well designed structures in place. 
Interestingly, of the three dimensions it is the differences in members’ interests that was most 
likely to result in differences in CCA as well as CG and CP. While heterogeneity in farmer-
member sources was not likely to result in differences in CCA. By demonstrating the links 
between heterogeneity and commitment to collective action, this study contributes towards 
the larger body of research aimed at identifying factors that influence member commitment in 
co-operatives and therefore could play an important role in predicting or assessing co-
operative performance.  
The fourth paper of this thesis follows on from papers 2 and 3 and is centred on examining 
the relationship between member heterogeneity and member organisational commitment in 
agricultural co-operatives. This was achieved by developing and empirically testing a novel 
framework that explores the links (and/or relationship) between heterogeneity and members’ 
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organisational commitment in agricultural co-operatives. Based on the framework, it was 
hypothesised that high heterogeneity will lead to low organisational commitment. In this co-
operative, despite there being high heterogeneity, a farmers’ want (AC) and obligation (NC) 
to be a member of the co-operative are strong. It is possible that the challenges presented by 
heterogeneity to AC and NC are mitigated by having well designed structures and effective 
member engagement strategies in place. However, since continuance commitment was low, it 
suggests that high heterogeneity could potentially lead to a decline in the need (CC) to be a 
member. Across the 35 heterogeneity sources measured, an association was observed 
between heterogeneity and affective but not continuance and normative commitment. 
Indicating that heterogeneity is likely to result in differences in a member’s want to be a 
member but not in a member’s need or obligation to be a member. Amongst the three 
dimensions of heterogeneity, the farmer-member dimension was not associated with any of 
the three forms of member organisational commitment. An association was found between 
the farm-business dimension and affective and continuance commitment and the member-
interest dimension and affective and normative commitment. These findings have important 
implications for the development and delivery of co-operative communication and member 
engagement strategies that are focused on strengthening member commitment. For example, 
it indicates that organisational commitment in the co-operative can be improved by 
segmenting members based on their farm-business and member-interest related properties 
and developing segment specific engagement strategies. While segmenting members based 
on farmer-member characteristics may not be as effective. Moreover, as AC tends to vary the 
most between groups across heterogeneity sources, it requires a much more specific and 
tailored member engagement protocol. While, in the case of NC and CC, a relatively generic 
member engagement protocol might be sufficient.  
On the whole, this thesis has enhanced the understanding of the member- co-operative 
relationship, specifically from a socio-psychological perspective by conceptualizing novel 
frameworks that are grounded in theory and also empirically testing the frameworks. The 
insights generated from the application of these frameworks could be valuable for co-
operative management as it has the potential to improve the assessment of co-operative 
performance and to help lead to better informed decisions, especially around strategy, 
governance, policy, planning and implementation. Although several scholars have suggested 
that the utilitarian or financial benefit reasons for membership are the single most important 
factor driving the member – co-operative relationship, this study did not find this to be the 
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case. In fact, it was identified that it is the emotive and obligatory reasons for membership 
that are of greater significance, especially in terms of positively influencing collective action.  
In line with the arguments presented by several scholars that large and fairly complex co-
operatives are characterised by high levels of heterogeneity, it was found that high levels of 
heterogeneity exist within the membership base of Fonterra Co-operative group.  
Heterogeneity was greatest for member-interests and least for farming-business. Importantly, 
the farmer-member dimension does not influence either a member’s organisational 
commitment or a member’s commitment to collective action. It was also suggested by several 
scholars that high heterogeneity could lead to lower levels of member commitment. Once 
again this was not the case, as AC, NC and CCA were high despite there being high levels of 
heterogeneity. However, as CC levels were slightly low it could be argued that high 
heterogeneity leads to a slight decline in the need to be a member.  Although heterogeneity 
did not have a significant bearing on member commitment, it should still be measured and 
monitored regularly. This is because, according to the literature, heterogeneity can hamper 
co-operative performance by increasing the transactions costs of decision making, and 
causing an erosion in social capital etc. It is therefore recommended that the co-operative 
have structures in place to manage for member heterogeneity. Lastly, a vital observation and 
finding of this thesis is that it is the AC (emotive reasons for membership) that forms the glue 
that holds the co-operative together. Hence, greater a members’ want or desire to be a 
member of the co-operative, better will be the co-operatives performance. It is therefore 
imperative that the co-operative regularly monitor AC and constantly strive to further 
strengthen it. For any erosion or decrease in AC could have significant negative implications 
on co-operative performance and could also perhaps lead to its demise. Apart from 
developing specific protocols for strengthening a member’s AC, the co-operative should also 
acknowledge and appreciate members that have a high AC. Moreover, it should be 
recognised that it is the smaller farms, both in terms of physical and financial attributes, that 
have shown to have a stronger utilitarian basis for membership and a weaker emotive basis 
for membership. Therefore, steps should also be taken to specifically strengthen the emotive 
basis of membership of the smaller farms.  
3.0 Limitations  
The empirical research component of this study was conducted at a single point in time and 
was a cross-sectional analysis of one co-operative. As a result, the research does not account 
for any changes in a member’s psychological state and attitude towards the co-operative that 
196 
 
can occur over time. It is important to note that the relationship between a member and the 
co-operative is a dynamic one and a member’s psychological state and attitude towards the 
co-operative could be different at various points of the relationship. As a result, the research 
does not throw light on any changes that might occur over time. Therefore, a longitudinal 
study that takes into account the evolution and variability in a members psychological state 
would be valuable. Secondly, the empirical research focused on only one co-operative 
(Fonterra), agricultural sector (dairy), and nation (NZ). Dairy co-operatives are marketing co-
operatives wherein the farmer is the supplier of product and are unique because they are 
focused on a single commodity (milk) and farmer type (dairy farmers). Consequently, they 
are quite different from input supply or services co-operatives, wherein the farmer is the 
buyer or customer of product or service and tend to include more than one commodity and 
farmer type. Therefore, generalizations of the findings, especially to non-dairy co-operatives 
need to be made with caution. Despite these limitations, this research provides some 
meaningful contributions towards examining agricultural co-operatives from a socio-
psychological perspective and understanding of the member and co-operative relationship. It 
therefore has significant implications on co-operative performance.   
4.0 Future research 
Empirical research on the member-co-operative relationship in agricultural cooperatives is 
still in its infancy and many interesting questions remain to be addressed. We hope that the 
findings reported in this thesis will further encourage researchers to examine these 
phenomena in the context of agricultural co-operatives. As explained and demonstrated in 
this thesis, frameworks should serve as a reference and coordination mechanism for efficient 
theory testing. Future research should therefore focus on not only developing theoretical 
frameworks but also on empirically applying these frameworks to the task of linking co-
operative theory and structure to its performance. This is a critical challenge that co-operative 
scholars must address in order to progress co-operative research and enhance its managerial 
relevance.  
Although we identified and explained that social capital was an important phenomenon that 
explains co-operatives from a socio-psychological perspective and also developed an 
instrument for measuring social capital in dairy co-operatives, an empirical examination of 
social capital was not performed in this thesis. Moreover, very little research has been done in 
the area of social capital in co-operatives and empirical studies that examine social capital in 
agriculture co-operatives are significantly lacking. Future research should therefore focus on 
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empirically examining social capital in agricultural co-operative and analysing its relationship 
with commitment and heterogeneity.   
Future research on member commitment should also consider making comparisons between 
different co-operative types, and also between co-operative members and IOF suppliers or 
customers, to identify similarities or differences between the groups in relation to affective, 
normative and continuance commitment. Lastly, it would also be interesting to know the 
implications of commitment and heterogeneity on co-operative governance, with a specific 
focus on the design structures for large multinational co-operatives with a heterogenous 



























An in-appropriate matching of methodology and the research problem may result in 
questionable results, ultimately having a negative impact in the researcher’s professionalism. 
It is therefore important to obtain a clear understanding of methodology.  According to (Holden 
& Lynch, 2004), research should not be methodologically led, rather, the methodological 
choice should be a consequence to the researchers philosophical stance and the social science 
phenomenon investigated. Further, according to Remenyi, Williams, Money, and Swartz 
(1998), there are several major questions that require significant consideration by researchers 
such as “How to research?” and “What to research?”, but central to the researchers answers is 
their perspective on “Why research?”.  While “What to research” may be driven by several 
reasons including the researchers own academic interests, the “How to research ?” i.e. the 
research methodology involves something more than just the practicalities – it necessitates a 
philosophical solution to “Why research” (Holden & Lynch, 2004).  Developing a 
philosophical perspective requires that the researcher make several core assumptions 
concerning two dimensions: the nature of society and the nature of science (Burrell & Morgan, 
1979).  
The social dimension involves a choice between two (diametrically opposite) views of society 
– regulatory or radical change. In the regulatory view of society, the researcher assumes that 
society evolves rationally. Society is viewed as unified and cohesive, whereas the radical 
change perspective views society as being in a constant conflict, as humans struggle to free 
themselves from the domination of societal structures (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). 
Science involves either a subjective or an objective approach to research and these two major 
philosophical approaches are highlighted by several core assumptions concerning ontology 
(reality), epistemology (knowledge), human nature (pre-determined or not), and methodology 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), these assumptions are consequential to each other, 
that is, the researchers view of ontology effects epistemological persuasion which, in turn, 
effects their view of human nature, consequently, choice of methodology logically follows the 
assumptions that the researcher has already made.  
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2. The Nature of Science 
Objectivism and subjectivism have been described as a continuum’s polar opposites with 
varying philosophical positions aligned between them. The objectivist approach to social 
research developed from natural sciences – social science researches decided to employ the 
highly successful methods of the natural sciences to investigate social science phenomenon. 
However, subjectivism arose as critics argued, and continue to argue, that both sciences are 
different and not comparable. 









Ontology relates to the nature of reality, that is, what things, if any, have existence or whether 
reality is “the product of one’s mind” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979).  The researchers view of 
reality is the corner stone to all other assumptions, that is, what is assumed here predicates the 
researchers other assumptions (Holden & Lynch, 2004).  Epistemology refers to the study of 
the nature of knowledge, that is, “How is it possible, if it is, for us to gain knowledge of the 
world?” (Hughes & Sharrock, 1997). This in-turn relates to the nature, validity, and limits of 
inquiry (Rosenau, 1992, p. 109). Much of the research that has been completed in the area of 
organisational science has been based on the assumption that reality is objective and out there 
waiting to be discovered and that this knowledge can be identified and communicated to others 
(Holden & Lynch, 2004). The third element, which concerns human nature, involves whether 
or not the researcher perceives man as the controlled or as the controller (Burrell & Morgan, 
1979). Finally, the last assumption, methodology, is the researches tool-kit – it represents all 
the means available to social scientists to investigate phenomena. 
On the basis of the core assumptions on the nature of science, there are several taxonomies that 
lie between the extreme philosophical positions, with Morgan and Smircich (1980) continuum 
of six major philosophical perspectives being one of the most widely accepted.  
206 
 
Supporters of the extreme position on objectivism are realists. They argue that that world 
predates individuals – it is prior to the existence of human consciousness  and, whether or not 
humans assign labels and perceive the existence of an external reality, the world will still exist 
as an empirical entity, made up of hard tangible and relatively immutable structures, 
independent of cognitive efforts of individuals (Gill & Johnson, 1997). Therefore, valid 
knowledge about a concrete reality can only be discovered through sense observation and 
measurement and any reference to the intangible or subjective is excluded as meaningless 
(Giddens, 1976; Morgan & Smircich, 1980).  
Objectivists perceive that their studies can be done independently of what is being observed 
and that their interests, values beliefs etc. will have no influence on what they study or what 
methods they use. They argue strongly that research choice and methodological choice are 
made objectively, that is, the researcher is able to set aside their own set of interests, values, 
skills etc. Objectivists believe that they are “independent of and neither affects nor is affected 
by the subjects of the research (Remenyi et al., 1998); any other contention implies that “social 
scientists are prone to employ wrapped logic and improper treatment of empirical data in order 
to support views they held prior to the investigation” (Gordan,1991).  According to Hunt 
(1993), objectivists retain objectivity by – “Requiring that theories, laws and explanations be 
empirically testable ensures that they will be inter-subjectively certifiable since different (but 
reasonably component) investigators with differing attitudes, opinions, and beliefs will be able 
to make observations and conduct experiments to ascertain their truth of content”. 
Critiques of objectivism argue that the explanatory success of objectivism in the natural 
sciences has not been repeated in the social sciences due its significant flaws. Supporters of 
subjectivism believe that subjectivism is more appropriate to the study of social science due to 
the complex nature of social science research, i.e. human beings. However, critiques of 
subjectivism argue that its biggest flaw is its inability to replace objectivism with a better 
approach. Further several objectivists believe that relativism and incommensurability are other 
major subjectivist flaws.  
3. Hypothetico-deductive Approach  
The major aim of objectivists and natural scientists is to identify casual explanation and 
fundamental laws that explain regularities in human social behaviour (Holden & Lynch, 2004). 
Due to which, the generalization of results from sample sizes essentially utilizes a hypothetico-
deductive process. This process begins with the formulation of hypothesis developed from the 
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researchers’ conceptualization of a particular phenomenon. Objectivists are grounded in 
causality, meaning that there are independent causes that lead to observed effects, and 
hypothesis are either verified or refuted by the observed effects. The hypothetico-deductive 
approach involves the quantitative operationalization of concepts, which involves 
reductionism, that is, the problem is reduced to its smallest elements (Holden & Lynch, 2004). 
The reduction enhances a problems comprehension. 
4. Quantitative Study vs Qualitative Study   
Quantitative research is based on the collection and analysis of a large amount of numeric data 
that can be tested statistically; and it relies heavily on statistical results to make context free 
generalizations, i.e. theory testing (Walter, 2006; Wiersma & Jurs, 2009). Cohen (2011) argues 
that a quantitative research approach in its epistemological and ontological orientation regards 
human behaviour as an object that can be controlled, thereby ignoring opinions and 
contributions as opposed to a qualitative approach. Quantitative research hence becomes a 
critical element of exploratory research, wherein the research problem or situation is studied in 
order to explain the relationship between different variables involved (Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2011). The main quantitative research methods according to Remenyi et al. (1998) 
are – forecasting research, laboratory experiments, large scale surveys and simulation and 
stochastic modelling. In the case of social issues, the purpose of quantitative research is to 
measure and count and examine the issue using statistical techniques and find the answers to 
“what”? and “how many?” (Saunders et al., 2011). The four important features of quantitative 
research methods are – control (causality), operational definitions (measurable variables), 
replication and hypothesis testing (generalization) (Bryman, 2008; Burns & Burns, 2008).  
Qualitative research is based on the “interpretive” approach to social sciences and focus on 
words rather than in the collection and analysis of data (Amaratunga, Baldry, Sarshar, & 
Newton, 2002). Qualitative research approaches help to define what needs to be studied when 
there is no theory on the topic and variables are not known (Leedy and Ormrod, 2014), as 
opposed to quantitative approaches that use theory to generate data. The main objective of 
qualitative research is to express reality and explain people in natural situations through the use 
of words (Amaratunga et al., 2002). In qualitative research, the focus is on gathering 
information from the content and there is no need for statistical tools or large scale data sets to 
infer outcomes from social phenomenon (Walter, 2006; Wiersma & Jurs, 2009). Few of the 
strengths of qualitative research are – awareness of complexity, preliminary to a quantitative 
study, carry in-depth study, see through the eyes of individuals being researched, descriptive 
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in nature and focuses on content, emphasis on process by using standard unstructured 
interviews, flexibility and theory building from data (Bryman, 2008; Burns & Burns, 2008). 
5. The Case Study Approach 
Case study approach is one of several methodologies that can be used for conducting research 
(Yin, 1994). A “case study,” can be best defined as an intensive study of a single (relatively 
bounded phenomenon) unit with an aim (by the scholar) to generalize (elucidate) across a larger 
set of units (larger class of similar phenomena) (Gerring, 2004). It represents a research strategy 
that can be likened to - an experiment, a history, or a simulation, which may be considered 
alternative research strategies (Yin, 1981). As a research strategy, the distinguishing 
characteristic of the case study is that it attempts to examine: i) a contemporary phenomenon 
in its real-life context, especially when ii) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident  (Yin, 1981). Whereas in experiments, the  phenomenon is deliberately 
divorced from its context (Yin, 1981). Moreover, the types of research questions best addressed 
by case studies are “explanations”, as opposed to other research strategies which focus on 
addressing incidence questions (Yin, 1981). The case study method is particularly relevant in 
explaining how and why contemporary events occur over which the researcher has little 
control. Furthermore, case studies are useful in understanding complex social phenomena, 
especially where behaviours cannot be manipulated (Yin, 1994); and when there is a need to 
emphasise the context in which the phenomena occur (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
Moreover, the case study research design aligns well with any social-scientific theoretical 
framework including behavioralism, rational choice, institutionalism, and interpretivism 
(Gerring, 2004). 
To define a research work as being a case study might mean 1) that its method is qualitative, 
small-N (Yin, 1994); 2) that the research is ethnographic, clinical, participant-observation, or 
otherwise “in the field” (Yin, 1994); 3) that the research is characterized by process-tracing  
(George & Bennett, 2005); 4) that the research investigates the properties of a single case  
(Campbell & Stanley, 1963; Eckstein, 1992, 2000); or 5) that the research investigates a single 
phenomenon, instance, or example (the most common usage) (Gerring, 2004). But these 
definitions are useful for describing certain kinds (subtypes) of case studies, rather than the 
general phenomenon itself (Gerring, 2004). In general, there are three types of case study 
research – descriptive, explanatory and exploratory ((Yin, 1994; Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). 
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Ragin (1999) suggests that case study research is mainly about "casing", that is, defining the 
topic, including the hypothesis(es) of primary interest, the outcome, and the set of cases that 
offer relevant information about the hypothesis. Case studies are generally more useful 1) when 
inferences are descriptive rather than causal, 2) when propositional depth is prized over breadth 
and boundedness, 3) when (internal) case comparability is given precedence over external case 
representativeness, 4) when insight in causal mechanisms is more important than insight into 
causal effects 5) when the causal proposition at issue is invariant rather than probabilistic, 6) 
when the strategy of research is exploratory, rather than confirmatory, and 7) when useful 
variance is available for only a single unit or a small number of units (Gerring, 2004). 
Case research has a distinct advantage where research and theory are in their formative stages 
(Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004) and where the actors and the context are critical (Benbasat, 
Goldstein, & Mead, 1987). Theory-building case study research in particular is of value when 
a fresh perspective is needed on a topic as existing theory, or when current perspectives seem 
inadequate because they have little empirical substantiation, or they conflict with each other or 
common sense (Eisenhardt, 1989). Another advantage of the case study is its ability to cope 
with a variety of evidence such as documents artefacts, interviews and other observations (Yin, 
1994) and to employ multiple methods of data collection to gather information (Benbasat et 
al., 1987). According to Sterns, Schweikhardt, and Peterson (1998), in agribusiness research, 
case study research is capable of generating a robust, comprehensive array of “knowledge” 
about complex, highly interdependent and dynamic economic and social phenomena, 
particularly in firm decision making. 
The case study research design typically constructs cases from a single unit while remaining 
attentive to inferences that span similar units outside the formal scope of investigation. A single 
case study is still a single-shot, a single piece of evidence lying at the same level of analysis as 
the proposition itself (Gerring, 2004). Non-case study research designs construct cases across 
units with a focus on illustrating principal causal inference. The case study is therefore not 
epistemologically distinct from the cross-unit analysis, and the two approaches are inter-
dependent; cross-unit work draws upon case study work and case study work does not disregard 
adjacent units (Gerring, 2004). If adjacent units are thought to be entirely non-comparable, the 
case study method would be superfluous. Moreover the "subjectivity" of case study research 
allows for the generation of a great number of hypotheses, and grants them a strong advantage 
in research at exploratory stages, for the single-unit study allows one to test a multitude of 
hypotheses in a rough-and-ready way (Gerring, 2004).These insights that might not be visible 
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to the cross-unit researcher who works with a thinner set of empirical data across a large 
number of units and with a more fixed definition of cases, variables, and outcomes. Similarly, 
case studies commonly afford multiple observations of a single case, thus providing firmer 
evidence of the factual accuracy of a given proposition than would be possible in the analogous 
cross-unit study (Gerring, 2004). It is important to acknowledge that practical and contextual 
considerations are often significant factors in the choice between a case study and a non-case 
study research format; because whatever can be done for a set of units can usually be done 
more easily for a single unit (Gerring, 2004). 
6. The Research Approach Taken 
The research builds on previous work undertaken which revealed the extent to which socio-
psychological factors, specifically social capital, heterogeneity and commitment are studied 
within the context of the co-operative organisational form.  The literature identifies that while 
the study and analysis of co-operatives are often strongly driven by economic aspirations (e.g. 
profit maximization) they are not always in total alignment with the social features of the co-
operative organisational form.  
The approach to the research is fundamentally derived from the outcomes which are sought i.e. 
a quantifiable measure of commitment and heterogeneity; and to derive relationships therefrom 
and an interest in contributing to a greater understanding of co-operatives in general and 
agricultural co-operatives in New Zealand in specific. The research requires methods which 
are explorative, informative, co-operative membership focused, and consistent with co-
operative principles and expectations. In our research the relatively bounded phenomenon that 
we are investigating is member commitment and heterogeneity in a New Zealand dairy co-
operative. With the larger objective of generalising our findings to the other dairy co-operatives 
in New Zealand and globally. Due to these reasons, a research approach using a case study is 
the selected methodology for this research. Moreover, since the objective is to measure the 
level of commitment and heterogeneity within the membership base and understand the 
relationship between them that exists, the research adopted a quantitative approach whereby 
co-operative members were the principal participants in the research. Similar approach has 
been used by other co-operative scholars (Barraud-Didier et al., 2012; Cechin et al., 2013; 
Puusa et al., 2018). 
As discussed earlier, co-operatives play a significant role within the dairy sector globally, with 
several co-operatives featuring in the top 10 dairy businesses in the world. Moreover, dairy co-
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operatives play a critical role in the New Zealand economy, accounting for over 90% of milk 
production and a combined revenue of almost 20 billion NZ$.  Given the role and importance 
of dairy co-operatives in the global dairy sector in general and in the NZ economy and 
agricultural sector in specific, they were identified as being the principal co-operative sector of 
interest in this research. Furthermore, amongst the dairy co-operatives in NZ, Fonterra Co-
operative group is by far the largest and most significant. For this reason, Fonterra was selected 
as the co-operative organisational form that would be the single case-study that this research 
focused on.  
A potential risk of such an approach is that the selected co-operative sector (i.e. dairy) and 
organisation (Fonterra) might not provide sufficient information through which generic 
outcomes can be identified or extrapolated. However, by adopting a quantitative approach and 
ensuring a large enough sample size is used, it is expected that it will be possible to identify 
key themes and issues which are generically applicable to all agricultural co-operatives. 
Moreover, the flexibility within the framework ensures that it is not restrictive in nature and 
can be purposefully modified quite easily to apply to other co-operative sectors should the need 
arise. A more specific outline of the advantages and disadvantages of the approach are 
presented in below (Table 2). 
Table 2: Advantages and dis-advantages of the approach taken 
Advantages Dis-advantages 
As a “case study” method using a single-
case is pursued in this research, a single unit 
(Fonterra) is intensively studied.  This 
results in empirically-rich, context-specific, 
and holistic accounts of the phenomena 
being studied. It is also better suited to 
addressing “explanations” types of research 
questions that this research is pursuing. 
Improper case selection may alternatively 
lead to overgeneralisation and/or 
misunderstandings of the relationship 
between variables or processes 
 
As a quantitative approach is taken, large 
amount of numeric data is collected and 
statistically analysed. The results can be 
used to make context free generalizations. 
This is very important for the theory testing 
objective. 
Moreover, by testing hypotheses and 
examining at cause and effect relationships 
the outcomes can be generalized across a 
larger set of units (dairy co-operatives in 
specific and agricultural co-operatives in 
general).  
There is a risk that the answers or 
characteristics given in a quantitative study 
aren’t an accurate representation of the 
entire population.  
 
Furthermore, as the researcher is detached 
from participants (to reduce bias in data 
collection and interpretation), the researcher 
is an “observer” or an “outside looking in”. 
It will therefore be difficult to get a better 
understanding, interpretations and 
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explanations of the phenomena being 
studied. 
The quantitative research approach requires 
careful experimental design and the ability 
for anyone to replicate both the test and the 
results. Hence, data collection, analysis and 
interpretation are rigorous, straightforward 
and less open to error and subjectivity.  
As a result of using predetermined working 
strategies, data collected is only geared 
towards supporting or rejecting the 
predetermined paradigms. The approach 
does not encourage imaginative, critical and 
creative thinking. Moreover, by focusing 
mainly on numbers, there is a risk of 
missing big-picture information or 
overlooking broader themes and 
relationships. 
By taking an objectivist view, objectivity is 
retained in this research approach. It 
therefore requires that theories, laws and 
explanations be empirically testable. This 
in-turn ensures that they will be inter-
subjectively certifiable since different 
investigators with differing attitudes, 
opinions, and beliefs will be able to make 
observations and conduct experiments to 
ascertain their truth of content. Hypothesis 
are either verified or refuted by the observed 
effects. 
As the study was performed in a single 
point in time, the data collected is useful to 
paint a present-time picture of what is 
happening in the selected case. However, it 
cannot measure or account for changes that 
are likely to happen over time.  
The use of hypotheses, theories and 
variables makes the work clear and 
understandable to readers and subsequent 
researchers. Moreover, such an approach is 
well informed by the previous studies done 
on the topic, field or area by previous 
researchers. 
The selected variables with which the 
quantitative research approach deals with, 
will only allow access to some selected 
aspects of the study populations beliefs or 
actions.  
The anonymous or blind nature of the 
survey strategy makes it useful for data 
collection because people are more likely to 
share an honest perspective. 
Quantitative research approach using a 
survey strategy does not give the researcher 
the option to review answers with 
participants. The replies provided to 
researchers must stand by themselves. This 
approach therefore has very few 
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Summary for Research Participants 
Unravelling Commitment and Diversity in a Co-operative 
A summary of the PhD Research undertaken by DJ Apparao (Massey University) 
Crucial take away: 
A novel metric has been developed that can be used to track commitment over time; commitment 
takes various forms, and all of these can be tracked as they provide useful insights into what drives 
members to commit. Importantly, affective commitment, or a members’ want or desire to be a member 
of the co-operative, was found to be the glue that holds this co-operative together. The stronger the 
affective commitment, the stronger will be the co-operative.  There was also a strong association 
between this form of commitment and commitment to collective action.  On-going measurement and 
management of affective commitment levels to ensure they remain high is therefore critical for the co-
operative. 
Background: 
Member Commitment is a core phenomenon that has a significant bearing on the success (longevity) 
or failure (demise) of co-operatives. As strongly member-oriented organisations, co-operatives look 
mainly towards their members for raw material supply (milk), capital and governance, and member 
commitment is very important for this to be achieved.  Although many co-operatives are cognizant of 
the importance of member commitment, they have not strongly included member commitment into 
their policies and operationalized it. This is largely because co-operatives do not have the right tools 
to measure, analyse and interpret the implications of member commitment.  
Another phenomenon that influences the success or failure of co-operatives is member diversity 
(heterogeneity). As democratic organisations, co-operatives are driven by collective decision making 
and consensus. Since different members are likely to demand different and often conflicting actions 
from the co-operative, an increase in diversity is thought to have a significant bearing on a co-
operative’s performance. Moreover, it is suggested that increasing diversity is leading to a decline in 
member commitment in co-operatives.  
In this research – a unique measure for commitment and diversity in co-operatives was developed and 
structures for its analysis and interpretation were also established. Responses from 568 member--
owners of a NZ co-operative were used to perform this analysis. Member commitment in specific was 
analysed from two perspectives, 1) Member Organisational Commitment and 2) Member 
Commitment to Collective Action. 
Member organisational commitment is a psychological state that characterizes the members’ 
relationship with the co-operative. It can be 1) Affective Commitment (want based), 2) Normative 
Commitment (obligation based) and/or 3) Continuance Commitment (need based). Member 
commitment to collective action, on the other hand, refers to initiatives taken by members to realize 
their common interests and primarily involves a willingness to make an effort towards the co-
operative’s success. It can be 1) Commitment to Governance (as governors), and/or 2) Commitment 




● A significant outcome of this research is the development of a novel tool that can be used 
by the co-operative to measure the level and type of commitment that exists in the co-
operative and to monitor it over time.  
● This co-operative has high levels of affective commitment and moderate levels of 
normative and continuance commitment. What this means is that the commitment of 
members to the cooperative is based less on their obligation towards, or need of, the 
cooperative respectively, but more on their desire to be a member of the cooperative.   
● Commitment to Collective Action levels were slightly high, with members showing greater 
commitment to governance than patronage. Importantly, 59% of respondents had high 
levels of both measures. 
● An association between commitment to collective action and organisational commitment 
was found that showed it is the members’ want followed by their obligation to be a 
member of the co-operative that positively influence and drive commitment to collective 
action in this co-operative.  
● A fairly high degree of diversity/heterogeneity exists in this co-op as 25 of the 35 diversity 
sources measured showed high levels of diversity. The co-op was most diverse when it 
came to its members-interests and least diverse in its members’ farming-business related 
properties.  
● Contrary to expectation the research found that high diversity did not mean low levels of 
member commitment, as both commitment to collective action and organisational 
commitment levels ranged from moderate to high.  
● Commitment, in particular the want to be a member, was most influenced by the sources 
of diversity, with 23 of the 35 sources showing a significant difference. These sources are 
important factors that influence commitment and can aid in segmentation of members, 
and also inform the development of segment specific member engagement protocols.  For 
example, two such sources were age and production volumes that suggested that older 
and larger farmers have significantly greater commitment than younger and smaller 
farmers.   
● 18 of the 35 sources of diversity showed a significant difference in commitment to 
collective action between groups, with a member’s commitment to patronage being less 
influenced by such factors than a member’s commitment to governance.  
Recommendations: 
• Co-operatives should develop strategies and protocols (i.e. member-facing in addition to 
market-facing) that will nurture and strengthen member commitment.  
• Commitment to collective action and organisational commitment are key indicators of co-
operative health and should be regularly measured and monitored. 
● A member commitment dashboard for the co-operative should be developed – informed 
by the measurement and analysis of member commitment (in conjunction with the 
heterogeneity sources). This dashboard should include -  
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o The establishment and trend analysis of member commitment benchmarks. 
o A segmentation of the membership-base based on commitment and 
heterogeneity; development of member commitment profiles & identification of 
clusters and patterns. 
o Identification and recognition of “Commitment Champions” (& “non-
committers”). 
o Protocols that aid in the development and delivery of personalised and 
exceptional member engagement/experience. 
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